Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns(say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions mustin each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferentialpattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions aresatisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us thatsuch was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility betweencontent externalism (...) and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect ofsuch empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mentalcontent is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should beable to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be.That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively,we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigationof rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustrationand defense of that alternative. (shrink)

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian and Athanasius — and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...) is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism is often confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ********** Moralischer Subjektivismus ist ein Oberbegriff für Theorien wie Alfred Ayers „Emotivismus“ und John Mackies „Irrtumstheorie“, die heute kaum noch Vertreter finden. In diesem Aufsatz beleuchte ich das Feld vom Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion her. Ich lege so die Möglichkeit eines anderen moralischen Subjektivismus dar, der mit Ayers oder Mackies Theorie nur das Rubrum gemein hätte und doch gewichtige Vorzüge aufweist. Die handlungstheoretische Betrachtung von Moral und Religion mit Hilfe der Philosophie des Geistes legt nahe, dass dieser moralische Subjektivismus mit dem für die Moralphilosophie zentralen Problem des moralischen Sollens besser umgehen kann als seine Rivalen: Anders als der Realismus oder gar der Relativismus (mit dem der Subjektivismus oft verwechselt wird), kann der hier ausgeleuchtete Subjektivismus mit der besonderen Verbindlichkeit moralischer Forderungen umgehen, ohne die Parallele zur besonderen Verbindlichkeit religiöser Forderungen in Abrede stellen zu müssen. Die Rolle und Durchschlagkraft der vom Realisten so freigiebig gespendeten ontologischen oder semantischen Zusatzannahmen er- scheint vor diesem Hintergrund fragwürdig. Dem religiösen Realisten wird man vergleichbare Annahmen nicht zugeben wollen und muss es auch nicht. Dann aber können wir die Erklärung besonderer Verbindlichkeit generell nicht auf Ontologie oder Semantik gründen. Der verbreitete Appell an sogenannte moralische Tatsachen oder die behauptete Wahrheitsfähigkeit moralischer Sätze erweist sich so als wirkungslos. Sofern wir das Problem des moralischen Sollens überhaupt weiter ernst nehmen wollen, muss der moralische Subjektivismus als Position künftig ernsthaft erwogen werden. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is (...) considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

What is cruelty? How and why does it matter? What do the legal rejection of cruelty and the requirements of mercy entail? This essay asks these questions of Lucius Seneca, who first articulated an agent-based conception of cruelty in the context of punishment. The hypothesis is submitted that the answers to these questions offered in Seneca's De clementia constitute one of the turning points in the evolution of practical reason in law. I conclude, however, by arguing that even the mainstream (...) punitive practices of contemporary western societies fail to meet the modest imperatives of the rejection of cruelty and the unconditionality of mercy propounded by Seneca. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...) with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell’s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge – a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory. (shrink)

The reception of the translations of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century promoted a new understanding of the sciences as specialized fields of knowledge. The huge amount of translations required a new organization of knowledge, which included novel subjects and categories. Among these there is a very special case, namely the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis, translated from Arabic into Latin and then back into Greek to be re-translated into Latin again. De plantis was included (...) in the new curriculum in Ripoll 109, and constituted the main source for botanical studies until the sixteenth century. Throughout this paper we will explore the reception and impact of De plantis in both the Arabic and the Latin traditions. We aim to show its foundational role in the development of botany as a theoretical discipline within the natural sciences. (shrink)

Le rapport à l’altérité en général et à autrui en particulier condense un noyau de possibilités multiples qui, selon l’hypothèse esquissée, s’exprime et s’interprète dans le mode de penser et de vivre le Désir d’avenir. Oscillant entre hétérophagie et hétérophilie, ce type fondamental d’érotisme temporel s’incarne dans des configurations phénoménologiques dont la typologie idéale fait covarier une décision métaphysique (repérable au sein du spectre qui va de l’idéalisme constructiviste au réalisme affectif) avec une attitude éthique (située entre le scepticisme individualiste (...) et l’hétérodicée absolue). L’analyse des contrastes qui définissent les positions onto-éthiques de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Levinas devient une méthode heuristique pour mettre en évidence la topologie de l’incommensurable et de l’optatif. -/- The relation to alterity in general and to others in particular encapsulates a logical space of multiple possibilities which, according to the author’s hypothesis, may be expressed and interpreted in the manner of thinking and living the Desire of future. Oscillating between heterophagia and heterophilia, this fundamental type of temporal eroticism embodies various phenomenological configurations whose ideal typology reveals a deep correlation between a metaphysical decision (oriented towards either constructivist idealism or affective realism) with an ethical attitude (ranging from individualistic scepticism to absolute heterodicy). The analysis of mutual contrasts defining Sartre’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Levinas’ onto-ethic stances is adopted as a methodological device in order to elucidate a broad topology of incommensurabilia and desiderata. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose une réinterprétation originale du rôle cognitif du Je pense kantien qui se veut pertinente pour la phénoménologie et pour la philosophie actuelle de l’esprit. L’étude du rapport entre temporalité phénoménale et cognition catégoriale constitue le fil conducteur de cette recherche. Elle mène à la question capitale du statut ultime du Moi, du sens du Je du Je pense. Que désigne-t-il : un épiphénomène contingent, une représentation sui generis, une métareprésentation, un acte indéconstructible, un événement fonctionnel, une forme (...) logique ? Recèle-t-il une véritable unité ou plutôt une multiplicité productrice d’unité ? Représente-t-il une identité réelle ou un changement identifiable, un référent vide ou ‘saturé’ ? La réponse à toutes ces questions dépend notamment de la façon de concevoir l’efficacité du Je, c’est-à-dire de l’articulation entre inconscient cognitif, conscience de soi et conscience de quelque chose en général. En pensant Kant avec la philosophie moderne et contemporaine, l’auteur tente d’élucider l’instabilité inévitable du passage critique à un Cogito postmétaphysique. (shrink)

Le verdict du tribunal de la raison, institué par la critique kantienne, commande la fin de la métaphysique qui se muerait en croyance rationnelle, absolument nécessaire dans le cadre de la raison pratique et de ses exigences d’intelligibilité. Cependant, l’assimilation existentielle de l’impossibilité de la métaphysique par Kleist déclenche non seulement le sentiment de finitude et d’humilité de la raison, mais aussi le refus tragique, désespéré, d’une science strictement phénoménale et d’une solution croyante pour apaiser son besoin de vérité absolue. (...) Ainsi, une catastrophe, comme le tremblement de terre de Lisbonne ou du Chili, convoque des significations contrastées : Kant s’attache à la mécanique naturelle et à la possibilité d’un dessein inscrutable, tandis que Kleist éprouve la vie sous le signe du hasard, « voyage sans but », dont le mouvement offre le dynamisme diasporique du salut impossible. (shrink)

This Article defines four distinct conceptions of cruelty found in underdeveloped form in domestic and international criminal law sources. The definition is analytical, focusing on the types of agency, victimization, causality, and values in each conception of cruelty. But no definition of cruelty will do justice to its object until complemented by the kind of understanding practical reason provides of the implications of the phenomenon of cruelty. -/- No one should be neutral in relation to cruelty. Eminently, cruelty in criminal (...) law, a human-created phenomenon, vigorously calls for responses in the form of preventive and corrective action on the part of private and public actors. It is in this sense that cruelty is a problem of practical reason, one of action preoccupied with its legal or moral obligations, rational grounds, value commitments, and actual consequences. -/- However, the connection between conceptions of cruelty and the implications practical reason can draw from the correct application of a conception of cruelty to phenomena in the world remains too detached to be able to capture and explain people's actual experiences both of seeing cruelty in the world and of confronting the question of what to do about cruelty and how to address its cultural and institutional aspects. Something is missing. -/- What is missing is the integration of conceptions of cruelty and the practical reason implications of detecting cruelty in the world into normative models which operate as meaning matrixes for cognition, meaning, and action. This Article undertakes this explanatory task through an exercise of reconstructing seminal philosophical ideas about cruelty. The result is that the four conceptions of cruelty are placed within three distinct normative models, which ultimately render intelligible legal conceptions of cruelty and legal reactions to it. (shrink)

We discuss some basic issues underlying the natural numbers: induction and recursion. We examine recursive formulations and their use in establishing universal and particular properties.

This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain (...) normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board. (shrink)

Among the many ways to evaluate the rationality and adequacy of belief, the relationship between two dimensions is of particular interest: the epistemic dimension and the moral dimension. A belief is epistemically rationalwhen it is supported by the evidence and it is morally adequatewhen its formation and holding is sensitive to moral features of the situation. According to the traditional view, known as purism, the moral domain does not directly impact the epistemic domain. However, there is debate in the literature (...) about the existence of immoral beliefs that seem, at first sight, epistemically rational. These beliefs that contain apparent normative conflict raise the challenge of explaining how different forms of normativity are related. Non-traditional theories hold that there is an encroachment of moral factors in epistemic rationality. Moral encroachment is the view that moral features can affect the epistemic status of a belief, for example, influencingthe threshold of sufficient evidence for rational belief. This idea produces a natural answer to the conflict problem: it wouldn’t exist because moral contexts make immoral beliefs also epistemically irrational. In this paper, I’ll argue that immoral beliefs can’t be epistemically rational, so there is no conflict. This, however, is not due to moral encroachment. It happens because immoral beliefs are never actually supported by the evidence. They are immoral because they are insensitive to moral contexts andepistemically irrational because they are insensitive to available evidence. This account is compatible with purism and, since it is the most parsimonious theory, we should adopt purism. (shrink)

Le pari de cet ouvrage est d'explorer les facettes multiples à travers lesquelles se donne le soi. Parler de soi plutôt que de moi implique une rupture franche avec les philosophies qui placent le sujet humain en position fondatrice. Le soi est encore moins une « chose » mais un mode d'être ; le soi n'est pas une donnée mais une conquête dont le devenir est en partie indéterminé. C'est donc sous le signe des épreuves qu'il faut penser les variations (...) phénoménologiques et herméneutiques sur le soi. Si la philosophie reste la discipline dominante des réflexions qui parcourent les contributions du volume, l'originalité de cet ouvrage est d'offrir en même temps au lecteur d'autres variations par lesquelles se décline le soi. (shrink)

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a milestone in the attempt to understand scientific development based on empirical observations. However, in the next decades after the publication of his book, history, psychology, and sociology became increasingly marginal in Kuhn’s discussions. In his last articles, Kuhn even suggested that philosophers should pay less attention to empirical data and focus more on “first principles.” The purpose of this article is, first, to describe this radical transformation in Kuhn’s methodological approach, from his initial (...) naturalism to his later and more strict philosophical stance. Next, I present some of the alleged justifications for explaining this transition, such as his interest in problems more firmly attached to the philosophical tradition and a desire for greater acceptance within this community. Although these factors certainly played a role in explaining Kuhn’s change, I also believe that an important theoretical component exerts a fundamental function in this transition: the idea that scientific development is a kind of evolutionary process, which is better understood through the use of abstract theoretical models, instead of sparse observations of scientific activity. (shrink)

A presente obra assume-se como um projeto genuinamente interdisciplinar de reflexão ética, interrogando os seus fundamentos e explorando as suas interseções com diversas áreas das Ciências Humanas e Sociais. Reunindo especialistas de distintas áreas, oriundos de países diferentes, o livro tem como fio condutor um diálogo polifónico com o pensamento ético contemporâneo, enraizando-se na tradição crítica que procura refundar a racionalidade prática na construção humana de sentido e, por conseguinte, refutar o niilismo e o relativismo axiológico absoluto.

Abstract: Alienation and slavery from Precious or what we don't want to see. It is our purpose to establish, in a parallel reading, these two films (highly rewarded), namely The Fence and Precious, that apparently being so different, are an illustration of the reality of life and the modern democratic world: the social uprooting and slavery. If in the movie of Phillip Noyce and Christone Olsen The Fence, is told a story of three young Aboriginal girls who are forcibly taken (...) to be transformed into domestic slaves, in the movie of Lee Daniels Precious, the young woman is already a servant in her own home and seeks the transformation of her life. Uniting these two stories, we find fundamental elements: illiteracy, ill-treatment, the idea of a migration (real or metaphysical), among others, but whose fundamental notion is the journey. If the film The Fence, the fence itself is used to conduct the three young Aboriginal to a real reunion with the family, in Precious, the metaphorical ‘fence’ is the limit of her world. From this interpretation, we will undertake our reflection about what we consider to be the alienation of the modern world and the silence we produce about them. (shrink)

Much of what has been discussed in the theory of reference in the last twenty-five years is strongly influenced by considerations centring on the business of devising a semantics for quantified modal logic. In this context, discussion of the property of rigidity plays an important role. This property is conceived of as a semantic modal property that distinguishes proper names from descriptions. It is argued that there is a semantic modal asym- metry between expressions of these types. In this talk (...) I shall challenge this assumption. By examining the intuitive Kripkean argument or test employed I arrive at two rather nonconformist results: Firstly, it seems that the test does not establish a genuine semantic asymmetry: Rigidity appears to be a pragmatic property. Secondly, the test does not seem to demonstrate an asymmetry at all: When applied correctly it suggests that both proper names and descriptions (even discounting notorious cases like “the even prime”) can be used rigidly—or so I shall argue. (shrink)

Pretendemos com este ensaio fazer uma bordagem à filosofia fenomenológica da linguagem de Heidegger; abordagem que procura realizar, senão mesmo justificar, isso mesmo que subjaz a uma linguagem que é doação, que é fazer vir à presença aquilo que é nomeado. Mas linguagem tem um sentido mais lato que não apenas fala ou falado. Linguagem como ‘dizer’. Um ‘dizer’ que se escuta para lá do simples dito, para lá de qualquer modo de ser do dasein (autêntico ou inautêntico), para lá (...) do quotidianamente falado. Ou seja, o que permite tornar perceptível e inteligível as sentenças “o homem fala” e, “die sprache spricht”, o que permite dizer que o dasein é aquele que só pode advir através da linguagem mas simultaneamente é aquele pelo qual só o ser pode falar, é aquilo que apelidámos de ontopotencialidade. Tendo a linguagem esta ontopotencialidade, i.e., a potencialidade de doação permanente, de permitir um acontecer possibilitante de mundo(s) que instituem uma abertura, ela possibilita a manutenção dessa mesma abertura. Eis a tarefa do nosso ensaio. Dividimos assim a nossa comunicação em três partes, a saber: 1) A origem necessária: Logos – O discurso como mostração; 2) Linguagem e Poesia – A essência da arte e a arte da essência; 3) A Ontopotencialidade da linguagem – definição e síntese. (shrink)

Despite the apparent relationship between personal values and entrepreneurship, this topic t has been subject to little academic research. This article aims to explain, in the Brazilian context, how the personal values of entrepreneurs influence the degree of professionalism in their business. The article uses a descriptive and exploratory quantitative approach, with data collected via a survey and focus group. Results show that, in the Brazilian context, ethics and capitalist values have a greater influence on professionalism than do risk, innovation, (...) family history, etc. Certain personal values of small-business entrepreneurs become organizational values that drive their actions in challenging environments. The finding that only one of the ten independent variables has been considered statistically influential on professionalism constitutes its main theoretical contribution. It rethinks professionalism, no longer as a dependent variable, but as a personal value, like the rest, in independent, innovative and sovereign way. (shrink)

Most of the contributions collected in this volume are revised versions or alternative discussions of the papers presented in June-July 2017 at the Department of Philosophy from the University of Bergen/ Norway, in the context of the workshop Wittgenstein in/on translation, held under the auspices of the Strategic Programme for International Research and Education (SPIRE). Natasha Gruver and Miguel Quesada Pacheco were also invited, but their contributions could not be delivered at that time, for different reasons. We are glad to (...) include them here, as well as a completely new one from Rafael Azize, who has always kept a close dialogue with the Brazilian guests that came to Bergen. Interestling, all these three additional texts deal somehow with endeavors that have, to some extent, the character of an experiment – be it like a pure Wittgen- steinian thought experiment or its application to pragmatic or expressivepraxis. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss existing and new approaches to the theory and practice of translating Wittgenstein and philosophy. Wittgenstein is one of the most profound thinkers about language; his Nachlass includes a substantial corpus of his own translations of his writings from German to English or English to German, as also comments and corrections to translations by others of his own writings. Taking this into account, part of the expected results of the project is the production of exemplary studies of the subject, e.g., using Wittgenstein's own translations or own revisions of translations of his works: Wittgenstein on translation. A complementary line is to look at how his work has been or can be rendered into other languages (or research areas): Wittgenstein in translation. This task can be accomplished through a general overview involving several languages, or looking at special cases. The project took both perspectives into account. Special cases that received a closer look are, on the one hand, English as the most translated into language, notably in connection with Wittgenstein‟s own revisions of his work; on the other hand, already existing translations into Portuguese and a pro-ject produced Amerindian translation of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

As a result of the doctoral research developed by the main author (Vargas-Chaves, 2017), it was identified the evolution and perspectives of the pharmaceutical patent in the international trade system, as well as it future legal research needs in this topic, both immediate and long-term. Furthermore, a number of problems of public health were highlighted in which the patent-term-extension mechanisms have produced a lack of access to medicines.

This article aims to discuss on Rousseau's justification for his Metaphysical position. We note in Rousseau a justification of personal nature in response to the arguments of materialist and atheist philosophers. Rousseau also criticizes the "systems spirit". In this context that Rousseau back to read Descartes to develop a doctrine of his own. This expedient opens the perspective of a moral and personal dimension in research for truth.

[ES] En recientes décadas se ha observado un renovado interés por algunos de los temas clásicos de la ontología, desde áreas de conocimiento externas a la filosofía, sin embargo, este renacimiento ontológico ha «estimulado» una multiplicidad y diversidad de teorías y concepciones «ontológicas» que ha dado como consecuencia una proliferación de «ontologías» y de interminables batallas para determinar qué tipo de «entidades» estudian sus respectivos «dominios», que a su vez se consideran autónomos e independientes entre sí, inclusive de la propia (...) ontología. En este sentido, el propósito de este trabajo es caracterizar y representar de manera adecuada estas «ontologías», dentro del marco general del debate acerca de la naturaleza de la ontología. Es así que, en la primera sección haré un diagnostico de la ontología contemporánea; en la segunda proporcionaré algunas definiciones y caracterizaciones de las principales concepciones, en especial de las denominadas «ontologías aplicadas»; y en la tercera analizaré sí estas concepciones pueden ser consideradas diversos tipos de ontología o simplemente son diversos niveles de ontología. El marco de la discusión no se centrará en confrontar todas estas nociones, sino en describirlas y analizarlas para ofrecer un enfoque sobre el estado actual de la ontología y sus problemas. [EN] In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in some of the classic themes of ontology, from areas of knowledge external to philosophy; however, this ontological revival has «stimulated» a multiplicity and diversity of «ontological» theories and concepts that has resulted in a proliferation of «ontologies» and endless battles to determine what kind of «entities» study their respective «domains», which in turn are considered autonomous and independent, even of ontology itself. In this sense, the purpose of this work is to adequately characterize and represent these «ontologies», within the general framework of the debate about the nature of ontology. Thus, in the first section I will make a diagnosis of contemporary ontology; in the second I will provide some definitions and characterizations of the main concepts, especially the so-called «applied ontologies»; and in the third I will analyze whether these concepts can be considered different types of ontology or simply are different levels of ontology. The framework of the discussion will not center on confronting all these notions, but to describe and analyze them to provide a focus on the current state of ontology and its problems. (shrink)

In this propaedeutic work, through Kant’s own texts, I will try to offer a balanced description and a succinct reconstruction of Kant’s arguments about the possibility and impossibility of Metaphysics. In the first place I will present some criticisms of Metaphysics, then I will visualize the Kantian notion of Metaphysics, as well as its constitutive reasons and moments; and finally, I will analyze what kind of knowledge is Metaphysics and the characteristics and nature of it, so that this «science» is (...) viable. In order to carry out this task, I will assume the hypothesis that Kant’s Metaphysics, in correspondence with the resolution of the third question of knowledge, is a science that integrates practical and theoretical reason into a universal system that seeks transcendence. If Metaphysics has any chance, this would probably be the way. (shrink)

Resenha do livro: "Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man" é uma obra de Seyyed H. Nasr que examina a crise espiritual enfrentada pelo ser humano moderno em relação à natureza. Nasr aborda a crescente desconexão entre o homem e a natureza devido à visão mecanicista predominante na sociedade moderna. O livro propõe uma visão alternativa que busca restaurar a harmonia entre o homem e a natureza. Com sua abordagem interdisciplinar, o livro desafia as concepções convencionais e convida (...) os leitores a refletir sobre a crise espiritual contemporânea e a buscar uma reconciliação significativa com o mundo natural. É uma leitura indispensável para quem se interessa por filosofia, ciência e meio ambiente. (shrink)

A noção de que a vontade é um bem dado à criatura racional está presente tanto na reflexão de Agostinho como naquela de Anselmo, quando ambos abordam o tema do livre-arbítrio. No entanto, a forma de considerar a vontade difere em cada um deles: para Anselmo, a liberdade será pensada como a reta determinação da vontade para o bem, é o poder de não pecar, expressão da retidão da vontade; já para Agostinho, a vontade livre será pensada como um bem (...) intermediário, que pode aderir ao bem supremo ou afastar-se dele e converter-se para um bem que lhe é próprio, exterior ou inferior. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar algumas notas de leitura sobre (1) a liberdade da vontade em Agostinho e (2) sobre a definição de liberdade em Anselmo. (shrink)

The traditional conception of risk is probabilistic, according to which the degree of risk of an event is determined by the probability of its occurence. Recently this view was challenged by Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016), who suggested a modal theory of risk, centered in the idea that the riskiness of events depends on the modal distance between the actual world and worlds where the event obtains. What is attractive about this theory, according to Pritchard, is that it explains our judgement (...) about cases in which two equally probable events seem to have different degrees of risk. The modal theory of risk, however, has its own shortcomings: according to Bricker (2018), there are cases in which risk judgements are not tracking modal distance; there is also the problem of determining the risk of events that occur in the actual world, since the theory seems to imply that they are maximally risky because the actual world is maximally similar to itself (EBERT; SMITH; DURBACH, 2020). The modal conception of risk is also at odds with the most natural forms of reasoning over the morality of risk imposition. I begin exploring the two conceptions of risk, emphasizing their strenghts and weaknesses. I then argue that the probabilistic conception can be defended from objections, and a pluralistic theory of risk, although less unified, deserves to be considered. -/- . (shrink)

Algunas de las preguntas fundamentales de la filosofía del arte son: 1) ¿Qué es una obra de arte?, 2) ¿Qué es Arte?, 3) ¿Qué es el arte? Responderlas es determinar el sentido del arte. Este tipo de preguntas están planteadas bajo la fórmula ¿Qué es X?, es decir, preguntas en las cuales en lo simple esta lo complejo, preguntas en donde lo simple no quiere decir que sean sencillas; son preguntas que traen dentro de si su naturaleza y carácter metafísico-ontológico-gnoseológico, (...) y hasta axiológico. No es el propósito de este trabajo hacer frente o resolver estos problemas, sino proporcionar una aproximación al concepto de “obra de arte” en la época actual y como podría entenderse en relación a ciertos problemas ontológicos y epistemológicos actuales. -/- [Extended Version of: Vélez León, Paulo (2006). «Aproximaciones a la ¿obra de arte?». En Políticas al borde. Una investigación sobre el arte contemporáneo cuencano en los discursos políticos actuales, editado por Paulo Vélez León y Hernán Pacucuru. Cuenca: Universidad de Cuenca/Bienal Internacional de Cuenca, 2006, pp. 1-12]. (shrink)

Este ensaio estabelece uma comparação estética e fenomenológica entre os pensamentos de Yves-Klein e Merleau-Ponty. Se o pintor materializou as suas reflexões e concepções em obra pictórica, o fenomenólogo francês dissertou na escrita filosófica o resultado da sua reflexão. Da análise conjunta entre um e outro resulta esta fenomenologia e estética comparativa que apresenta alguns conceitos fundamentais que alimentaram essas reflexões, tais como a visibilidade, o corpo, o mundo. Assim, para além dessa comparação, este ensaio viabiliza o diálogo entre ambos. (...) Palavras-chave: Corpo. Mundo. Visibilidade. Merleau-Ponty. Yves Klein -/- Abstract:This essay establishes an aesthetic and phenomenological comparison between the thoughts of Yves-Klein and Merleau-Ponty. If the painter materialized his reflections and concepts in pictorial work, the French phenomenologist disserted in the philosophical writing the result of his reflection. From the joint analysis between one and the other, this phenomenology and comparative aesthetics results, which presents some fundamental concepts that fed these reflections such as visibility, the body, the world. Thus, in addition to this comparison, this essay enables the dialogue between both. Keywords: Body. World. Visibility. Merleau-Ponty. Yves Klein. (shrink)

The suggestion that emotions are, in a way, essential to moral judgement has been getting attention in recent literature. Jesse Prinz says that emotionist theories involve at least one of the following claims: (i) emotions are necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of moral concepts (epistemic emotionism); (ii) emotions are necessary and sufficient to determine moral properties (metaphysical emotionism). According to Prinz, some empirical results in moral psychology can support these kinds of emotionism (especially the first one). In The emotional (...) construction of morals, Prinz presents the famous dumbfounding cases, in which interviewees maintain a moral judgement even when confronted with the fact that they cannot articulate reasons why, as evidence for an emotionist view of moral judgement. There is, however, controversy regarding the interpretation of such cases: to begin with, it seems possible to interpret them through reasons, as suggested by Sinott-Armstrong, Yin and Stanley (2019); also, even if there are no reasons being considered, it is possible, as suggested by Jones (2006) and Alves (2013), that dumbfounded moral judgement isn’t a genuine example of moral judgement, since the subjects do not possess basic moral concepts. I start with moral dumbfounding cases and Prinz’s emotionist interpretation of them and later consider the alternative interpretations. Even though Prinz’s reading is initially appealing, it seems the empirical evidence does not support a sentimentalist metaethics as much as he suggests, and the appeal to reasons is still essential in understanding moral judgement. -/- . (shrink)

To what extent do early intuitions about ownership depend on cultural and socio-economic circumstances? We investigated the question by testing reasoning about third party ownership conflicts in various groups of three- and five-year-old children (N = 176), growing up in seven highly contrasted social, economic, and cultural circumstances (urban rich, poor, very poor, rural poor, and traditional) spanning three continents. Each child was presented with a series of scripts involving two identical dolls fighting over an object of possession. The child (...) had to decide who of the two dolls should own the object. Each script enacted various potential reasons for attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first contact, equity, plus a control/neutral condition with no suggested reasons. Results show that across cultures, children are significantly more consistent and decisive in attributing ownership when one of the protagonists created the object. Development between three and five years is more or less pronounced depending on culture. The propensity to split the object in equal halves whenever possible was generally higher at certain locations (i.e., China) and quasi-inexistent in others (i.e., Vanuatu and street children of Recife). Overall, creation reasons appear to be more primordial and stable across cultures than familiarity, relative wealth or first contact. This trend does not correlate with the passing of false belief theory of mind. (shrink)

ABSTRACT BEER, P. A. C. The matter of truth in knowledge production about psychic suffering: considerations from Ian Hacking and Jacques Lacan. 2020. 250p. Thesis (PhD) – Instituto de Psicologia, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2020. The thesis aims to reaffirm the importance of the debate around the matter of truth in relation to the production of knowledge concerning psychic suffering. Its point of departure is the understanding that the matter of truth contains two main appearances: as (...) employed to legitimize produced knowledge while establishing normative patterns, and as presenting itself in a critical form as a disruptive element to established knowledge. As such, it is a discussion that embraces both an affirmation of knowledge’s necessary character and of its variability. It will be argued in the above sense that the term “truth” must be taken as an inclusive and reciprocal gathering of epistemological, ontological, ethical and political elements. Ian Hacking’s historicized understanding of science enables such a consideration of contingent bases to scientific practice, while still producing necessary knowledge. It thus becomes is possible to establish a field in which normative understandings about scientific praxis might be criticized without it resulting in any kind of refusal or disqualification of the relevant, produced knowledge. Hacking’s proposition of a “historical ontology” and of a “dynamic nominalism” also represents an important contribution to the accumulation of knowledge production about psychic suffering debate, by affirming the ontological effects of knowledge. The way as truth is mobilized within Lacanian psychoanalysis flows from that standpoint, seen as focused on three main elements: truth’s autonomy towards the subject, (truth speaks), the opposing and temporary character of a positivized truth facing established knowledge ,(truth as critique), and the negative dimension of truth which relates to the inexhaustibility of this dialectical process of negations, (truth as radical difference). It is argued that it is possible to sustain a particular reasoning style, (in Hacking’s terms), for psychoanalysis, which is based on radical negativity. It is further argued, that the above rationalities in question work with a historicized understanding of knowledge that does not have any external (nor internal) criteria to warrant its truth. However, psychoanalysis takes negativity — arguably the base of knowledge’s variability and of truth’s disruptive character — beyond Hacking’s philosophy of science, and can thus offer even wider possibilities of thinking about the causality of psychic suffering. Even if with different intensities, both approaches signal the necessity of ethical and political implication in knowledge’s production and employment. Once there is no epistemological warranty to knowledge, its production value reverts to social agreements and ethical positioning. There is, therefore, the necessity of considering power relations. Finally, it is argued that the radical negativity sustained from psychoanalysis locates the political as an actually necessary field, inescapable by the very fact that it is not possible to crystalize any form of truth which is not the affirmation of radical difference. It is maintained then that introducing the matter of truth has as horizon the production of a kind of knowledge about psychic suffering which puts into question, at all time, its epistemological, ontological, ethical and political assumptions. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to explore Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “scientific crisis” and indicate some difficulties with it. First, Kuhn defines “crisis” through the notion of “anomaly” but distinguishes these concepts in two different ways: categorically and quantitatively. Both of these alternatives face considerable problems. The categorical definition relies on a distinction between “discoveries” and “inventions” that, as Kuhn himself admits, is artificial. The quantitative definition states that crises are a deeper, more profound type of anomaly. Kuhn, however, (...) does not offer any criteria for objectively defining this “severity” of the crises. The second kind of problem is related to the application of the concept of “crisis.” Apparently, Kuhn attributes crises to individuals as much as to communities. Lastly, there is the problem of the function of crises. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, they are presented as a precondition to scientific revolutions. In later articles, however, Kuhn seems to see them only as a common antecedent to revolutions. (shrink)

Neste livro reunimos alguns dos trabalhos apresentados no GT Filosofia, História e Sociologia da Ciência e da Tecnologia, durante o XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF, realizado em Goiânia, de 10 a 14 de outubro de 2022. Agradecemos aos autores e às autoras que contribuíram com seus textos para a realização deste projeto. Esperamos que os leitores e as leitoras aproveitem o rico material filosófico presente neste livro.

This essay offers an answer to the question of what societies afflicted by atrocities ought to transition into. The answer offered is able to better direct the evaluation of previous models and the design of new models of transitional justice. -/- Into what, then, should transitional justice transition? I argue in this essay that transitional justice should be a transition into the political, understood in its robust liberalism version. I further argue that the most significant part of transitions ought to (...) happen in the minds of the members of political communities, precisely where the less tangible and yet most important dimension of the political sets root. Both of these points are missing in transitional justice models and debates. In the current scenario of transitional justice models and debates, transitional justice practices and processes, as well as the normative forms of discourse that accompany them, fail to fully take the political as an end, thus failing in both transition and justice. (shrink)

Some "major" evolutionary transitions have been described as transitions in individuality. In this depiction, natural selection might bring about new kinds of individuals, whose evolutionary dynamics takes place in a novel way. Using a categorization proposed by Godfrey-Smith, this transition is fully accomplished when a new "paradigmatic" Darwinian population emerges. In this paper I investigate whether at some point in the evolution in the hominin lineage a transition of this kind might have happened, by assuming some of the theses of (...) dual inheritance theory, especially about the role played by a conformist bias. I argue that Godfrey-Smith misses in his book a scenario in which conformism is one of the preconditions for a transition towards a Darwinian population of cultural groups. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of the intellectual and political origins of modern law in the nineteenth century and its consequences for contemporary legal thought. Social theoretical analyses of law and legal thought tend to emphasize rupture and change. Histories of legal thought tend to draw a picture of strife between different schools of jurisprudence. Such analyses and histories fail to account for the extent to which present legal thought is the continuation of a jurisprudential settlement that occurred in the (...) nineteenth century. That settlement tamed the will of the masses under the influence of authoritative legal thought, conceptions of political morality, and a general sense of social evolution. The principal mechanism of the settlement was a compact between legal rationalism and historicism to which popular will acceded. After a period of polarization around the time of the American and French revolutions, nineteenth century legal rationalism came to see historical events as the outcome of the cunning operation of reason in the world, and legal historicism came to appeal to the rationalizations of legal reason in order to endow historical matter with both conceptual stability and intellectual authority. Popular will bought into both. Modern law and the main schools of legal thought have remained, ever since, bound to this convergence of reason and history in the face of will. Modern law is therefore as much about continuity as it is about rupture; as much about unity as it is about strife. (shrink)