The fundamental question in reverse mathematics is to determine which set existence axioms are required to prove particular theorems of mathematics. In addition to being interesting in their own right, answers to this question have consequences in both effective mathematics and the foundations of mathematics. Before discussing these consequences, we need to be more specific about the motivating question.Reverse mathematics is useful for studying theorems of either countable or essentially countable mathematics. Essentially countable mathematics is a vague term that is (...) best explained by an example. Complete separable metric spaces are essentially countable because, although the spaces may be uncountable, they can be understood in terms of a countable basis. Simpson gives the following list of areas which can be analyzed by reverse mathematics: number theory, geometry, calculus, differential equations, real and complex analysis, combinatorics, countable algebra, separable Banach spaces, computability theory, and the topology of complete separable metric spaces. Reverse mathematics is less suited to theorems of abstract functional analysis, abstract set theory, universal algebra, or general topology.Section 2 introduces the major subsystems of second order arithmetic used in reverse mathematics: RCA0, WKL0, ACA0, ATR0 and – CA0. Sections 3 through 7 consider various theorems of ordered group theory from the perspective of reverse mathematics. Among the results considered are theorems on ordered quotient groups, groups and semigroup conditions which imply orderability, the orderability of free groups, Hölder's Theorem, Mal'tsev's classification of the order types of countable ordered groups. (shrink)

We investigate the reverse-mathematical status of several theorems to the effect that the natural number system is second-order categorical. One of our results is as follows. Define a system to be a triple A,i,f such that A is a set and i∈A and f:A→A. A subset X⊆A is said to be inductive if i∈X and ∀a ∈X). The system A,i,f is said to be inductive if the only inductive subset of A is A itself. Define a Peano system to be (...) an inductive system such that f is one-to-one and i∉the range of f. The standard example of a Peano system is N,0,S where N={0,1,2,…,n,…}=the set of natural numbers and S:N→N is given by S=n+1 for all n∈N. Consider the statement that all Peano systems are isomorphic to N,0,S. We prove that this statement is logically equivalent to WKL0 over RCA0⁎ source. From this and similar equivalences we draw some foundational/philosophical consequences. (shrink)

We prove Menger’s theorem for countable graphs in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document}. Our proof in fact proves a stronger statement, which we call extended Menger’s theorem, that is equivalent to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\Pi^1_1\tt{-CA}_0}}$$\end{document} over \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\tt{RCA}_0}}$$\end{document}.

On the basis of a wide range of historical examples various features of axioms are discussed in relation to their use in mathematical practice. A very general framework for this discussion is provided, and it is argued that axioms can play many roles in mathematics and that viewing them as self-evident truths does not do justice to the ways in which mathematicians employ axioms. Possible origins of axioms and criteria for choosing axioms are also examined. The distinctions introduced aim at (...) clarifying discussions in philosophy of mathematics and contributing towards a more refined view of mathematical practice. (shrink)

In his remarkable paper Formalism 64, Robinson defends his eponymous position concerning the foundations of mathematics, as follows:Any mention of infinite totalities is literally meaningless.We should act as if infinite totalities really existed. Being the originator of Nonstandard Analysis, it stands to reason that Robinson would have often been faced with the opposing position that ‘some infinite totalities are more meaningful than others’, the textbook example being that of infinitesimals. For instance, Bishop and Connes have made such claims regarding infinitesimals, (...) and Nonstandard Analysis in general, going as far as calling the latter respectively a debasement of meaning and virtual, while accepting as meaningful other infinite totalities and the associated mathematical framework. We shall study the critique of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes, and observe that these authors equate ‘meaning’ and ‘computational content’, though their interpretations of said content vary. As we will see, Bishop and Connes claim that the presence of ideal objects in Nonstandard Analysis yields the absence of meaning. We will debunk the Bishop–Connes critique by establishing the contrary, namely that the presence of ideal objects in Nonstandard Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content. In particular, infinitesimals provide an elegant shorthand for expressing computational content. To this end, we introduce a direct translation between a large class of theorems of Nonstandard Analysis and theorems rich in computational content, similar to the ‘reversals’ from the foundational program Reverse Mathematics. The latter also plays an important role in gauging the scope of this translation. (shrink)

Elementary Recursive Nonstandard Analysis, in short ERNA, is a constructive system of nonstandard analysis with a PRA consistency proof, proposed in around 1995 by Patrick Suppes and Richard Sommer. It is based on an earlier system developed by Rolando Chuaqui and Patrick Suppes. Here, we discuss the inherent problems and limitations of the classical nonstandard framework and propose a much-needed refinement of ERNA, called , in the spirit of Karel Hrbacek’s stratified set theory. We study the metamathematics of and its (...) extensions. In particular, we consider several transfer principles, both classical and ‘stratified’, which turn out to be related. Finally, we show that the resulting theory allows for a truly general, elegant and elementary treatment of basic analysis. (shrink)

By RCA 0 , we denote a subsystem of second order arithmetic based on Δ0 1 comprehension and Δ0 1 induction. We show within this system that the real number system R satisfies all the theorems (possibly with non-standard length) of the theory of real closed fields under an appropriate truth definition. This enables us to develop linear algebra and polynomial ring theory over real and complex numbers, so that we particularly obtain Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz in RCA 0.

In this paper, we show within ${\mathsf{RCA}_0}$ that both the Jordan curve theorem and the Schönflies theorem are equivalent to weak König’s lemma. Within ${\mathsf {WKL}_0}$ , we prove the Jordan curve theorem using an argument of non-standard analysis based on the fact that every countable non-standard model of ${\mathsf {WKL}_0}$ has a proper initial part that is isomorphic to itself (Tanaka in Math Logic Q 43:396–400, 1997).

In this paper we introduce theories of universes in analysis. We discuss a non-uniform, a uniform and a minimal variant. An analysis of the proof-theoretic bounds of these systems is given, using only methods of predicative proof-theory. It turns out that all introduced theories are of proof-theoretic strength between Γ0 and ϕ1ɛ00.

How do ordinals measure the strength and computational power of formal theories? This paper is concerned with the connection between ordinal representation systems and theories established in ordinal analyses. It focusses on results which explain the nature of this connection in terms of semantical and computational notions from model theory, set theory, and generalized recursion theory.

The paper investigates the strength of the Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, on the basis of Kripke-Platek set theory without Foundation. It is shown that the addition of AFA considerably increases the proof theoretic strength.

We explore the interaction between Lebesgue measure and dominating functions. We show, via both a priority construction and a forcing construction, that there is a function of incomplete degree that dominates almost all degrees. This answers a question of Dobrinen and Simpson, who showed that such functions are related to the proof-theoretic strength of the regularity of Lebesgue measure for Gδ sets. Our constructions essentially settle the reverse mathematical classification of this principle.

Every function over the natural numbers has an infinite subdomain on which the function is non-decreasing. Motivated by a question of Dzhafarov and Schweber, we study the reverse mathematics of variants of this statement. It turns out that this statement restricted to computably bounded functions is computationally weak and does not imply the existence of the halting set. On the other hand, we prove that it is not a consequence of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. This statement can therefore be seen (...) as an arguably natural principle between the arithmetic comprehension axiom and stable Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. (shrink)

In the paper we investigate typed axiomatizations of the truth predicate in which the axioms of truth come with a built-in, minimal and self-sufficient machinery to talk about syntactic aspects of an arbitrary base theory. Expanding previous works of the author and building on recent works of Albert Visser and Richard Heck, we give a precise characterization of these systems by investigating the strict relationships occurring between them, arithmetized model constructions in weak arithmetical systems and suitable set existence axioms. The (...) framework considered will give rise to some methodological remarks on the construction of truth theories and provide us with a privileged point of view to analyze the notion of truth arising from compositional principles in a typed setting. (shrink)

We study the Lindenbaum algebra ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (WKL o, RCA o) of sentences in the language of second-order arithmetic that imply RCA o and are provable from WKL o. We explore the relationship between ${\Sigma^1_1}$ sentences in ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (WKL o, RCA o) and ${\Pi^0_1}$ classes of subsets of ω. By applying a result of Binns and Simpson (Arch. Math. Logic 43(3), 399–414, 2004) about ${\Pi^0_1}$ classes, we give a specific embedding of the free distributive lattice with countably many generators into ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (...) (WKL o, RCA o). (shrink)

We examine the Dual Ramsey Theorem and two related combinatorial principles VW(k,l) and OVW(k,l) from the perspectives of reverse mathematics and effective mathematics. We give a statement of the Dual Ramsey Theorem for open colorings in second order arithmetic and formalize work of Carlson and Simpson [1] to show that this statement implies ACA 0 over RCA 0 . We show that neither VW(2,2) nor OVW(2,2) is provable in WKL 0 . These results give partial answers to questions posed by (...) Friedman and Simpson [3]. (shrink)

In (Fund Math 60:175–186 1967), Wolk proved that every well partial order (wpo) has a maximal chain; that is a chain of maximal order type. (Note that all chains in a wpo are well-ordered.) We prove that such maximal chain cannot be found computably, not even hyperarithmetically: No hyperarithmetic set can compute maximal chains in all computable wpos. However, we prove that almost every set, in the sense of category, can compute maximal chains in all computable wpos. Wolk’s original result (...) actually shows that every wpo has a strongly maximal chain, which we define below. We show that a set computes strongly maximal chains in all computable wpo if and only if it computes all hyperarithmetic sets. (shrink)

Reductivist programs in logicand philosophy, especially inthe philosophy of mathematics,are reviewed. The paper argues fora ``methodological realism'' towardsnumbers and sets, but still givesreductionism an important place,albeit in methodology/epistemologyrather than in ontology proper.

In this paper we apply methods of proof mining to obtain a highly uniform effective rate of asymptotic regularity for the Ishikawa iteration associated with nonexpansive self-mappings of convex subsets of a class of uniformly convex geodesic spaces. Moreover, we show that these results are guaranteed by a combination of logical metatheorems for classical and semi-intuitionistic systems.

The first attempt at a systematic approach to axiomatic theories of truth was undertaken by Friedman and Sheard (Ann Pure Appl Log 33:1–21, 1987). There twelve principles consisting of axioms, axiom schemata and rules of inference, each embodying a reasonable property of truth were isolated for study. Working with a base theory of truth conservative over PA, Friedman and Sheard raised the following questions. Which subsets of the Optional Axioms are consistent over the base theory? What are the proof-theoretic strengths (...) of the consistent theories? The first question was answered completely by Friedman and Sheard; all subsets of the Optional Axioms were classified as either consistent or inconsistent giving rise to nine maximal consistent theories of truth.They also determined the proof-theoretic strength of two subsets of the Optional Axioms. The aim of this paper is to continue the work begun by Friedman and Sheard. We will establish the proof-theoretic strength of all the remaining seven theories and relate their arithmetic part to well-known theories ranging from PA to the theory of ${\Sigma^1_1}$ dependent choice. (shrink)

Continuing the earlier research from [T. Bigorajska, H. Kotlarski, Partitioning α-large sets: some lower bounds, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 358 4981–5001] we show that for the price of multiplying the number of parts by 3 we may construct partitions all of whose homogeneous sets are much smaller than in [T. Bigorajska, H. Kotlarski, Partitioning α-large sets: some lower bounds, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 358 4981–5001]. We also show that the Paris–Harrington independent statement remains unprovable if the number of colors is (...) restricted to 2, in fact, the statement is unprovable in IΣb. Other results concern some lower bounds for partitions of pairs. (shrink)

In this paper, we present another case study in the general project of proof mining which means the logical analysis of prima facie non-effective proofs with the aim of extracting new computationally relevant data. We use techniques based on monotone functional interpretation developed in Kohlenbach , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225–260) to analyze Cheney's simplification 189) of Jackson's original proof 320) of the uniqueness of the best L1-approximation of continuous functions fC[0,1] by polynomials pPn of degree n. Cheney's (...) proof is non-effective in the sense that it is based on classical logic and on the non-computational principle WKL . The result of our analysis provides the first effective uniform modulus of uniqueness . Moreover, the extracted modulus has the optimal ε-dependency as follows from Kroó 331). The paper also describes how the uniform modulus of uniqueness can be used to compute the best L1-approximations of a fixed fC[0,1] with arbitrary precision. The second author uses this result to give a complexity upper bound on the computation of the best L1-approximation in Oliva 66–77). (shrink)

In recent years, proof theoretic transformations that are based on extensions of monotone forms of Gödel’s famous functional interpretation have been used systematically to extract new content from proofs in abstract nonlinear analysis. This content consists both in effective quantitative bounds as well as in qualitative uniformity results. One of the main ineffective tools in abstract functional analysis is the use of sequential forms of weak compactness. As we recently verified, the sequential form of weak compactness for bounded closed and (...) convex subsets of an abstract Hilbert space can be carried out in suitable formal systems that are covered by existing metatheorems developed in the course of the proof mining program. In particular, it follows that the monotone functional interpretation of this weak compactness principle can be realized by a functional Ω∗ definable from bar recursion of lowest type. While a case study on the analysis of strong convergence results that are based on weak compactness indicates that the use of the latter seems to be eliminable, things apparently are different for weak convergence theorems such as the famous Baillon nonlinear ergodic theorem. For this theorem we recently extracted an explicit bound on a metastable version of this theorem that is primitive recursive relative to Ω∗.In the current paper we for the first time give the construction of Ω∗ . As a corollary to the fine analysis of the use of bar recursion in this construction we obtain that Ω∗ elevates arguments in Tn at most to resulting functionals in Tn+2 . In particular, one can conclude from this that our bound on Baillon’s theorem is at least definable in T4. (shrink)

We shall prove the second incompleteness theorem via Kolmogorov complexity.

In this paper we will state and prove some comparative theorems concerning PRA and IΣ1. We shall provide a characterization of IΣ1 in terms of PRA and iterations of a class of functions. In particular, we prove that for this class of functions the difference between IΣ1 and PRA is exactly that, where PRA is closed under iterations of these functions, IΣ1 is moreover provably closed under iteration. We will formulate a sufficient condition for a model of PRA to be (...) a model of IΣ1. This condition is used to give a model-theoretic proof of Parsons’ theorem, that is, IΣ1 is Π2-conservative over PRA. We shall also give a purely syntactical proof of Parsons’ theorem. Finally, we show that IΣ1 proves the consistency of PRA on a definable IΣ1-cut. This implies that proofs in IΣ1 can have non-elementary speed up over proofs in PRA. (shrink)

This short note is on the question whether the intersection of all fixed points of a positive arithmetic operator and the intersection of all its closed points can proved to be equivalent in a weak fragment of second order arithmetic.

We give a broad discussion of reflection principles in explicit mathematics, thereby addressing various kinds of universe existence principles. The proof-theoretic strength of the relevant systems of explicit mathematics is couched in terms of suitable extensions of Kripke–Platek set theory.

In this paper we establish the proof-theoretic equivalence of (i) $\hbox {\sf ATR}$ and $\widehat{\hbox{\sf ID}}_{\omega}$ , (ii) $\hbox{\sf ATR}_0+ (\Sigma^1_1-\hbox{\sf DC})$ and $\widehat{\hbox {\sf ID}}_{<\omega^\omega} , and (iii) $\hbox {\sf ATR}+(\Sigma^1_1-\hbox{\sf DC})$ and $\widehat{\hbox {\sf ID}}_{<\varepsilon_0} $.

We show that the principle of ω model reflection for Π1n − 1 formulas is equivalent over ACA0 to the scheme of Π1n bar induction. This extends and refines previous results of Friedman and Simpson.

First order reasoning about hyperintegers can prove things about sets of integers. In the author’s paper Nonstandard Arithmetic and Reverse Mathematics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 100–125, it was shown that each of the “big five” theories in reverse mathematics, including the base theory , has a natural nonstandard counterpart. But the counterpart of has a defect: it does not imply the Standard Part Principle that a set exists if and only if it is coded by a hyperinteger. In this (...) paper we find another nonstandard counterpart, *RCA0′, that does imply the Standard Part Principle. (shrink)

At the most general level, the concept of finitism is typically characterized by saying that finitistic mathematics is that part of mathematics which does not appeal to completed infinite totalities and is endowed with some epistemological property that makes it secure or privileged. This paper argues that this characterization can in fact be sharpened in various ways, giving rise to different conceptions of finitism. The paper investigates these conceptions and shows that they sanction different portions of mathematics as finitistic.

In this paper, we introduce systems of nonstandard second-order arithmetic which are conservative extensions of systems of second-order arithmetic. Within these systems, we do reverse mathematics for nonstandard analysis, and we can import techniques of nonstandard analysis into analysis in weak systems of second-order arithmetic. Then, we apply nonstandard techniques to a version of Riemannʼs mapping theorem, and show several different versions of Riemannʼs mapping theorem.

This paper contains a corrected proof that the statement “every non-empty closed subset of a compact complete separable metric space is separably closed” implies the arithmetical comprehension axiom of reverse mathematics.

Let f be a computable function from finite sequences of 0ʼs and 1ʼs to real numbers. We prove that strong f-randomness implies strong f-randomness relative to a PA-degree. We also prove: if X is strongly f-random and Turing reducible to Y where Y is Martin-Löf random relative to Z, then X is strongly f-random relative to Z. In addition, we prove analogous propagation results for other notions of partial randomness, including non-K-triviality and autocomplexity. We prove that f-randomness relative to a (...) PA-degree implies strong f-randomness, hence f-randomness does not imply f-randomness relative to a PA-degree. (shrink)

It is known that infinitely many Medvedev degrees exist inside the Muchnik degree of any nontrivial Π10 subset of Cantor space. We shed light on the fine structures inside these Muchnik degrees related to learnability and piecewise computability. As for nonempty Π10 subsets of Cantor space, we show the existence of a finite-Δ20-piecewise degree containing infinitely many finite-2-piecewise degrees, and a finite-2-piecewise degree containing infinitely many finite-Δ20-piecewise degrees 2 denotes the difference of two Πn0 sets), whereas the greatest degrees in (...) these three “finite-Γ-piecewise” degree structures coincide. Moreover, as for nonempty Π10 subsets of Cantor space, we also show that every nonzero finite-2-piecewise degree includes infinitely many Medvedev degrees, every nonzero countable-Δ20-piecewise degree includes infinitely many finite-piecewise degrees, every nonzero finite-2-countable-Δ20-piecewise degree includes infinitely many countable-Δ20-piecewise degrees, and every nonzero Muchnik degree includes infinitely many finite-2-countable-Δ20-piecewise degrees. Indeed, we show that any nonzero Medvedev degree and nonzero countable-Δ20-piecewise degree of a nonempty Π10 subset of Cantor space have the strong anticupping properties. Finally, we obtain an elementary difference between the Medvedev degree structure and the finite-Γ-piecewise degree structure of all subsets of Baire space by showing that none of the finite-Γ-piecewise structures is Brouwerian, where Γ is any of the Wadge classes mentioned above. (shrink)

Probably there is no position in Goodman’s corpus that has generated greater perplexity and criticism than Goodman’s “nominalism”. As is abundantly clear from Goodman’s writings, it is not “abstract entities” generally that he questions—indeed, he takes sensory qualia as “basic” in his Carnap-inspired constructional system in Structure—but rather just those abstracta that are so crystal clear in their identity conditions, so fundamental to our thought, so prevalent and seemingly unavoidable in our discourse and theorizing that they have come to form (...) the generally accepted framework for the most time-honored, exact, sophisticated, refined, central, and secure branch of human knowledge yet devised, mathematics itself! Of all the abstracta to question, why sets? Of course, Goodman gave his “reasons”, the unintelligibility of “generating” an infinitude of “constructed objects” automatically from any given object or objects. But critics have been quick to point out that set theory is intended not as a theory of what can be “generated” or “constructed” from given objects in any literal sense but rather as a theory of a certain realm of objects independently existing in their own right. “Construction” is a metaphor. (shrink)

FieldHartry. Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism 2nd ed.Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-877792-2. Pp. vi + 56 + vi + 111.

We show that a theory of autonomous iterated Ramseyness based on second order arithmetic (SOA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension. The property of Ramsey is defined as follows. Let X be a set of real numbers, i.e. a set of infinite sets of natural numbers. We call a set H of natural numbers homogeneous for X if either all infinite subsets of H are in X or all infinite subsets of H are not in X. X has the property (...) of Ramsey if there exists a set which is homogeneous for X. The property of Ramsey is considered in reverse mathematics to compare the strength of subsystems of SOA. To characterize the system of ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension in terms of Ramseyness we introduce a system of autonomous iterated Ramseyness, called R-calculus. We augment the language of SOA with additional set terms (called R-terms) ${R\vec{x}X\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ for each first order formula ${\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ (where φ may contain further R-terms). The R-calculus is a system which comprises comprehension for all first order formulas (which may contain R-terms or other set parameters) and defining axioms for the R-terms which claim that for each ${\vec{x}}$ , we can remove finitely many elements from the set ${R\vec{x}X\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ such that the remaining set is homogeneous for ${\{{X}{\phi(\vec{x},X)\}}}$ . We show that the R-calculus proves the same ${\Pi^1_1}$ -sentences as the system of ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension. (shrink)

I examine various claims to the effect that Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and other problems of higher set theory are ill-posed questions. The analysis takes into account the viability of the underlying philosophical views and recent mathematical developments.

The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.

The aim of this article is to give the proof-theoretic analysis of various subsystems of Feferman's theory T1 for explicit mathematics which contain the non-constructive μ-operator and join. We make use of standard proof-theoretic techniques such as cut-elimination of appropriate semiformal systems and asymmetrical interpretations in standard structures for explicit mathematics.

We characterize the proof-theoretic strength of systems of explicit mathematics with a general principle asserting the existence of least fixed points for monotone inductive definitions, in terms of certain systems of analysis and set theory. In the case of analysis, these are systems which contain the Σ12-axiom of choice and Π12-comprehension for formulas without set parameters. In the case of set theory, these are systems containing the Kripke-Platek axioms for a recursively inaccessible universe together with the existence of a stable (...) ordinal. In all cases, the exact strength depends on what forms of induction are admitted in the respective systems. (shrink)

In 2007. Terence Tao wrote on his blog an essay about soft analysis, hard analysis and the finitization of soft analysis statements into hard analysis statements. One of his main examples was a quasi-finitization of the infinite pigeonhole principle IPP, arriving at the "finitary" infinite pigeonhole principle FIPP₁. That turned out to not be the proper formulation and so we proposed an alternative version FIPP₂. Tao himself formulated yet another version FIPP₃ in a revised version of his essay. We give (...) a counterexample to FIPP₁ and discuss for both of the versions FIPP₂ and FIPP₃ the faithfulness of their respective finitization of IPP by studying the equivalences IPP ↔ FIPP₂ and IPP ↔ FIPP₃ in the context of reverse mathematics ([9]). In the process of doing this we also introduce a continuous uniform boundedness principle CUB as a formalization of Tao's notion of a correspondence principle and study the strength of this principle and various restrictions thereof in terms of reverse mathematics, i.e., in terms of the "big five" subsystems of second order arithmetic. (shrink)

The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over (...) subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting provides deflationists with better defence and brings a broader perspective to the debate. (shrink)

In this paper we study the reverse mathematics of two theorems by Bonnet about partial orders. These results concern the structure and cardinality of the collection of initial intervals. The first theorem states that a partial order has no infinite antichains if and only if its initial intervals are finite unions of ideals. The second one asserts that a countable partial order is scattered and does not contain infinite antichains if and only if it has countably many initial intervals. We (...) show that the left to right directions of these theorems are equivalent to ACA0 and ATR0, respectively. On the other hand, the opposite directions are both provable in WKL0, but not in RCA0. We also prove the equivalence with ACA0 of the following result of Erdös and Tarski: a partial order with no infinite strong antichains has no arbitrarily large finite strong antichains. (shrink)

In this paper we will investigate different axiomatic theories of truth that are minimal in some sense. One criterion for minimality will be conservativity over Peano Arithmetic. We will then give a more fine-grained characterization by investigating some interpretability relations. We will show that disquotational theories of truth, as well as compositional theories of truth with restricted induction are relatively interpretable in Peano Arithmetic. Furthermore, we will give an example of a theory of truth that is a conservative extension of (...) Peano Arithmetic but not interpretable in it. We will then use stricter versions of interpretations to compare weak theories of truth to subsystems of second-order arithmetic. (shrink)