- The Philosophy of Legal Proof.Lewis Ross - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
|
|
Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
|
|
Etiological Proper Function and the Safety Condition.Dario Mortini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-22.details
|
|
On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
|
|
Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
|
|
A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
|
|
Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
|
|
Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
|
|
The Paradox of Graded Justification.Logins Arturs - forthcoming - Episteme:1-32.details
|
|
Understanding, Luck, and Communicative Value.Andrew Peet - 2023 - In Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
|
|
The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
|
|
The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan.Kok Yong Lee - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):459-478.details
|
|
Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
|
|
The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Episteme:1-16.details
|
|
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
|
|
Review of Justification as Ignorance by Sven Rosenkranz. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - forthcoming - Mind.details
|
|
Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
|
|
La racionalidad pragmática de la creencia religiosa.Angel Rivera-Novoa - 2021 - Cauriensia 16:531-556.details
|
|
How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Cake Theory of Credit.Jaakko Hirvelä & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):347-369.details
|
|
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
|
|
Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
|
|
Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
|
|
Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.details
|
|
Eleven angry men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.details
|
|
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
|
|
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
|
|
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
|
|
Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
|
|
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
|
|
Conjunctive paraconsistency.Franca D’Agostini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6845-6874.details
|
|
Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - 2023 - The Monist 106 (1):35–45.details
|
|
(1 other version)Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
|
|
Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
|
|
More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
|
|
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
|
|
Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
|
|
Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 217–231.details
|
|
The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
|
|
Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
|
|
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
|
|
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
|
|