- Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.details
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Being in a Position to Know and Closure: Reply to Heylen.Sven Rosenkranz - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):68-72.details
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Being in a Position to Know and Closure.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.details
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The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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On the unreliability of introspection.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.details
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Consciousness, Attention, and Justification.Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Cans.Tim Kearl & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):375-395.details
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The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):447-471.details
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Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument.Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):538-559.details
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Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
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The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration.Sebastian Liu - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):474-486.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual justification.Nicholas Silins - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Accuracy and ur-prior conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.details
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Introspective knowledge of negative facts.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):389-410.details
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Against Right Reason.Robert Steel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):431-460.details
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Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.details
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Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):765-771.details
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