Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Peircean realism - towards a scientific metaphysics.Vittorio Justin Serra - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Kent
    The problem of the status of metaphysics -- what it is and what it is for, what use it is - has been with us for millennia, at least since Plato took issue with the Sophists, and continues to the present day. Here I attempt an intervention in this perennial dispute, with the aim of providing some kind of rapprochement between the factions. This intervention is based on how Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) understood metaphysics and the position presented here is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Constructivist Set-Theoretic Analysis: An Alternative to Essentialist Social Science.James Mahoney - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (4):327-366.
    Psychological essentialism is a cognitive bias through which human beings conceive the entities around them as having inner essences and basic natures. Social scientists routinely generate flawed inferences because their methods require the truth of psychological essentialism. This article develops set-theoretic analysis as a scientific-constructivist approach that overcomes the bias of psychological essentialism. With this approach, the “sets” of set-theoretic analysis are mental phenomena that establish boundaries and identify similarities and differences among entities whose natural kind composition is not known. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Relationism and the Problem of Order.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):245-273.
    Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Symmetric and asymmetric theories of time.Vincent Grandjean - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14403-14426.
    There is a feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional way of defining the A-theories of time. One reason is that these definitions rest on an ontological question—‘Do the future and the past exist?’—to which no non-speculative answer can be provided. Another reason is that these definitions fail to distinguish between various A-theories of time at all times and, therefore, cannot be regarded as essential to them. In the present paper, I make a fresh start in the debate, by introducing two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • James Ladyman und Don Ross. Every Thing Must Go - Metaphysics Naturalized (2007) [Rezension].Johannes Heinle - manuscript
    Eine Rezension des Buches "Every Thing Must Go - Metaphysics Naturalized" von James Ladyman und Don Ross.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism.Seungbae Park - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (1):1-13.
    Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism.David Glick - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):751-772.
    Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Realismo estructural óntico y modalidad.Bruno Borge - 2020 - Ideas Y Valores 69 (173):37-56.
    En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente dos estrategias empleadas para esclarecer la naturaleza modal de las estructuras tal como son concebidas por el realismo estructural óntico (reo) en su versión eliminativista: los patrones reales de Ladyman y Ross (2007) y las leyes y simetrías de French (2014). Ofrezco argumentos para mostrar que ambas resultan incapaces de brindar una caracterización de las estructuras como entidades inherentemente modales. Ese resultado impone serias dificultades al proyecto de presentar el reo como una posición realista (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Benacerraf Problem as a Challenge for Ontic Structural Realism.Majid Davoody Beni - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):35-59.
    Benacerraf has presented two problems for the philosophy of mathematics. These are the problem of identification and the problem of representation. This paper aims to reconstruct the latter problem and to unpack its undermining bearing on the version of Ontic Structural Realism that frames scientific representations in terms of abstract structures. I argue that the dichotomy between mathematical structures and physical ones cannot be used to address the Benacerraf problem but strengthens it. I conclude by arguing that versions of OSR (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Particles, causation, and the metaphysics of structure.Anjan Chakravartty - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2273-2289.
    I consider the idea of a structure of fundamental physical particles being causal. Causation is traditionally thought of as involving relations between entities—objects or events—that cause and are affected. On structuralist interpretations, however, it is unclear whether or how precisely fundamental particles can be causally efficacious. On some interpretations, only relations exist; on others, particles are ontologically dependent on their relations in ways that problematize the traditional picture. I argue that thinking about causal efficacy in this context generates an inevitable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws.Andrew Michael Winters - 2015 - Dissertation, University of South Florida
    Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Structuralism’s Multiple Paths through Spacetime Theories.Edward Slowik - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):45-66.
    This essay examines the underdetermination problem that plagues structuralist approaches to spacetime theories, with special emphasis placed on the epistemic brands of structuralism, whether of the scientific realist variety or not. Recent non-realist structuralist accounts, by Friedman and van Fraassen, have touted the fact that different structures can accommodate the same evidence as a virtue vis-à-vis their realist counterparts; but, as will be argued, these claims gain little traction against a properly constructed liberal version of epistemic structural realism. Overall, a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask.Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 143-159.
    The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism. We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • How not to be a realist.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - In Elaine M. Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structure, Objects and Causality, , Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 77. Springer. pp. 59-76.
    When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
    (i) Scientific realism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine about the existence and nature of the unobservables of science. (ii) There are good explanationist arguments for realism, most famously that from the success of science, provided abduction is allowed. Abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference. (iii) We have no reason to believe a doctrine of empirical equivalence that would sustain the underdetermination argument against realism. (iv) The key to defending realism from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Moderate structural realism about space-time.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2007 - Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
    This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  • Risk, Reward, and Scientific Ontology: Reply to Bryant, Psillos, and Slater.Anjan Chakravartty - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (1):43-63.
    RÉSUMÉDans Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology, je soutiens que les convictions ontologiques associées à la recherche scientifique sont imprégnées de convictions philosophiques. Les interprétations de l'ontologie scientifique impliquent ce que j'appelle des inférences métaphysiques et, qui plus est, il existe différentes façons de faire ces inférences sur la base de positions épistémiques différentes, mais néanmoins rationnelles. Si cette analyse est juste, elle problématise toute distinction nette entre la métaphysique naturalisée et les autres types de métaphysique, et dissout (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon.Samuel Kimpton-Nye - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3421-3441.
    Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties and laws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism, which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account of laws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties and laws. This account rejects CDE’s structuralist metaphysics of properties in favour of a view of properties as qualitative grounds of dispositions and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism - a hybrid view.Julie Godfrey - 2020 - Dissertation, Durham University
    Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism aim to account for modality. Dispositional Essentialism takes properties to account for laws. In particular, it takes determinate properties to account for laws of nature, which are determinable. Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. According to Steven French, Ontic Structural Realism takes laws and symmetries to be part of the fundamental structure of the world. Determinate properties are “dependent” on laws. The core difference between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s accounts of modality is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Le réalisme structural face au problème de la mesure.Quentin Ruyant - 2016 - Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1):43-51.
    Le réalisme structural est une tentative d’établir un compromis entre le réalisme scientifique et l’empirisme, en restreignant le réalisme à la structure relationnelle des théories scientifiques. Il se décline en deux versions, épistémique et ontique. Le réalisme structural ontique propose de concevoir les relations nomologiques décrites par les théories comme des éléments primitifs de la réalité. Il est motivé, notamment, par le fait que sous sa forme épistémique, le réalisme structural ne se distingue pas réellement d’une position empiriste. Cependant, il (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Ontic Structural Realism and Natural Necessity.William Kallfelz - unknown
    J. Ladyman, Ladyman and Ross refine J. Worral's structural realism, by developing an ontic structural realism which they argue is a consistently naturalistic means of characterizing the ontology of fundamental physics. I argue that particular elements of M. Lange and M. Eklund strengthen and refine their project of characterizing fundamental physics via OSR and by extension, their presentation of information-theoretic structural realism. I demonstrate this point by situating M. Lange’s discussion of nomological modality and natural necessity within Ladyman and Ross’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism.David Glick - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy008.
    Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as generalism (Dasgupta, 2009, 2016). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)What is ontic structural realism?Peter Mark Ainsworth - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):50-57.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • A defence of informational structural realism.Luciano Floridi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):219-253.
    This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the "1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference". The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism, epistemic and ontic structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.Michael Esfeld - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):19-32.
    This paper argues that ontic structural realism (OSR) faces a dilemma: either it remains on the general level of realism with respect to the structure of a given theory, but then it is, like epistemic structural realism, only a partial realism; or it is a complete realism, but then it has to answer the question how the structure of a given theory is implemented, instantiated or realized and thus has to argue for a particular interpretation of the theory in question. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Why It Is Time To Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction.Marie I. Kaiser - 2012 - In D. Dieks, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structure. Springer. pp. 255-272.
    In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence.Steven French - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):89 - 109.
    According to 'Ontic Structural Realism' (OSR), physical objects—qua metaphysical entities—should be reconceptualised, or, more strongly, eliminated in favour of the relevant structures. In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relationship between these putative objects and structures in terms of certain accounts of metaphysical dependence currently available. This will allow me to articulate the differences between the different forms of OSR and to argue in favour of the 'eliminativist' version. A useful context is provided by Floridi's account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms: Essays in Honour of John L. Bell.David DeVidi, Michael Hallett & Peter Clark (eds.) - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Pluralist structural realism: The best of both worlds?David Glick - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4145-4166.
    Worrall :99–124, 1989) famously claimed that structural realism is the best of both worlds; it enables one to endorse the best arguments for scientific realism and antirealism. In this paper, I argue that structural realism also enables one to combine two other seemingly inconsistent positions: realism and pluralism. Indeed, the very features which form the basis of the structural realist’s reply to the problem of theory change may be applied synchronically to allow for a pluralist structural realism. The resulting position (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fresnel's laws, ceteris paribus.Aaron Sidney Wright - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64:38-52.
    This article is about structural realism, historical continuity, laws of nature, and \emph{ceteris paribus} clauses. Fresnel's Laws of optics support Structural Realism because they are a scientific structure that has survived theory change. However, the history of Fresnel's Laws which has been depicted in debates over realism since the 1980s is badly distorted. Specifically, claims that J.~C. Maxwell or his followers believed in an ontologically-subsistent electromagnetic field, and gave up the aether, before Einstein's \emph{annus mirabilis} in 1905 are indefensible. Related (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The physical world as a blob: Is OSR really realism?: Steven French: The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford: OUP, 2014, 416pp, ₤50.00 HB.Mauro Dorato - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):173-181.
    In my review of Steven French's The structure of the world. Metaphysics & Representation. OUP, Oxford, 2014 I argue that the author is forced to navigate between the Scilla of Tegmark’s Pitagoreanism (2008) and the Carybdis of “blobobjectivism” (Horgan and Potrč 2008), namely the claim that the whole physical universe is a single concrete structurally complex but partless cosmos (a “blob”).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Relations.Fraser MacBride - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In this paper I provide a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about relations. After (1) distinguishing different varieties of relations, symmetric from non-symmetric, internal from external relations etc. and relations from their set-theoretic models or sequences, I proceed (2) to consider Bradley’s regress and whether relations can be eliminated altogether. Next I turn (3) to the question whether relations can be reduced, bringing to bear considerations from the philosophy of physics as well as metaphysics. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Dissertation, Sussex
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence.Steven French - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):89-109.
    According to ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR), physical objects—qua metaphysical entities—should be reconceptualised, or, more strongly, eliminated in favour of the relevant structures. In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relationship between these putative objects and structures in terms of certain accounts of metaphysical dependence currently available. This will allow me to articulate the differences between the different forms of OSR and to argue in favour of the ‘eliminativist’ version. A useful context is provided by Floridi’s account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Structures as the objects of fundamental physics.Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld - unknown
    The paper argues that there are structures rather than objects with an intrinsic identity in the domain of fundamental physics. We line out the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity, recall the main objection against that position (section 1) and then retrace the development to epistemic structural realism (section 2) and to ontic structural realism (section 3). We elaborate on the arguments for ontic structural realism from quantum physics (section 4) and from space-time physics (section 5). Finally, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations.Steven French & Juha Saatsi - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):548-559.
    The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The real challenge, however, is how to incorporate the core notion of `explanatory approximate truth' (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Towards a Philosophy of Chemical Reactivity Through the Molecule in Atoms-of Concept.Saturnino Calvo-Losada & José Joaquín Quirante - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (1):1-41.
    A novel non-classical mereological concept built up by blending the Metaphysics of Xavier Zubiri and the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules of R. F. W. Bader is proposed. It is argued that this philosophical concept is necessary to properly account for what happens in a chemical reaction. From the topology of the gradient of the laplacian of the electronic charge density, \\) within the QTAIM framework, different “atomic graphs” are found for each atom depending on the molecular context, reflecting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How not to be a Realist or why we Ought to Make it Safe for Closet Structural Realists to Come out.Ioannis Votsis - unknown
    When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Hacia una ontología sin objetos: una defensa del realismo estructural óntico en el nivel metodológico.Bruno José Borge - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Structural Realism and Causation: An Unhappy Marriage?Ioannis Votsis - unknown
    It has recently been objected that structural realism, in its various guises, is unable to adequately account for causal phenomena (see, for example, Psillos 2006). In this talk, I consider whether structural realism has the resources to address this objection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)What is ontic structural realism?Peter Mark Ainsworth - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):50-57.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structure.James Ladyman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23–43.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Representation: The problem for structuralism.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):536-547.
    What does it mean to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach's The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Scientific Ontology: Fact or Stance?Stathis Psillos - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (1):15-31.
    RÉSUMÉDans cette contribution, les points fondamentaux du livre d'Anjan Chakravartty, Scientific Ontology, sont discutés de manière critique. Après une brève présentation du projet d'une ontologie dite «stance-based», je critique la manière dont Chakravartty conçoit l'inférence métaphysique. Puis, dans la section 4, je conteste l'opinion de Chakravartty selon laquelle les débats fondamentaux en métaphysique conduisent inévitablement à un désaccord insoluble. La section 5 examine le concept de position épistémique et relève les problèmes inhérents à la manière dont Chakravartty conçoit la rationalité (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • An Interpretation on Structural Realism to Spacetime Used in Big-Bang Cosmology.Sho Fujita - 2017 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 44 (1-2):1-14.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Structuralism in the philosophy of physics.Vincent Lam - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12421.
    Ontic structuralism or ontic structural realism in the philosophy of physics can be broadly considered as an interpretative strategy providing a set of conceptual and metaphysical tools—or, more ambitiously, an ontological framework—in order to account for central features of current fundamental physics. This article aims to review the main structuralist interpretative moves in the context of our two best fundamental physical theories of matter and spacetime, namely, quantum theory and general relativity. We highlight in particular the structuralist understanding of permutation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)S cientific S tructuralism: O n the I dentity and D iversity of O bjects in a S tructure.James Ladyman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23-43.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Shifting to structures in physics and biology: A prophylactic for promiscuous realism.Steven French - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (2):164-173.
    Within the philosophy of science, the realism debate has been revitalised by the development of forms of structural realism. These urge a shift in focus from the object oriented ontologies that come and go through the history of science to the structures that remain through theory change. Such views have typically been elaborated in the context of theories of physics and are motivated by, first of all, the presence within such theories of mathematical equations that allow straightforward representation of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations