- Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life.Valerie Tiberius - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):219-226.details
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Debunking and fully apt belief.Joshua C. Thurow - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?Amie L. Thomasson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2077-2106.details
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Moral Failure — Response to Critics.Lisa Tessman - 2016 - Feminist Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1):1-18.details
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The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology.Folke Tersman - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):181-204.details
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Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics.Folke Tersman - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12493.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Intuitional Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):639-659.details
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From Scepticism to Anti‐Realism.Folke Tersman - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (3):411-427.details
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Supervenience, expressivism and theistic ethics.Luke Taylor - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):227-247.details
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Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?William J. Talbott - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2277-2298.details
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How could a “blind” evolutionary process have made human moral beliefs sensitive to strongly universal, objective moral standards?William J. Talbott - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):691-708.details
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A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564.details
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What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.details
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Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.details
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In defense of future tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.details
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I—Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss.Sharon Street - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):161-189.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Evolution and Moral Realism.Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):981-1006.details
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The Revenge of Moral Twin Earth.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-17.details
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Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking.Amia Srinivasan - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):127-156.details
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The Archimedean Urge.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):325-362.details
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The Three Rs: Retribution, Revenge, and Reparation.Tamler Sommers - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):327-342.details
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Time-slice rationality and filling in plans.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):595-607.details
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Moral Knowledge and the Genealogy of Error.Nicholas Smyth - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):455-474.details
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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments.Emily Slome - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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A Peircean response to the evolutionary debunking of moral knowledge.Gary Slater - 2014 - Zygon 49 (3):593-611.details
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A natural history of natural theology: The cognitive science of theology and philosophy of religion. [REVIEW]Wes Skolits - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):849-853.details
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Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.details
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Neutrality and Force in Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.details
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Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.details
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Etiological information and diminishing justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.details
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Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.details
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A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem.Derek Shiller - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740.details
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The vanishing argument from queerness.Lee Shepski - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):371 – 387.details
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Sidgwick on Pleasure.Robert Shaver - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):901-928.details
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Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.Itay Shani - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):294-298.details
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Moral Progress and Evolution: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Eleonora Severini - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):87-105.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Moral Niche.Eleonora Severini - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):865-875.details
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The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism.Scott M. James - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):215-233.details
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What’s the Point? A Presentist Social Functionalist Account of Institutional Purpose.Armin W. Schulz - 2021 - Sage Publications Inc: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (1-2):53-80.details
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What’s the Point? A Presentist Social Functionalist Account of Institutional Purpose.Armin W. Schulz - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (1-2):53-80.details
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The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):192-223.details
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Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 2 : The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):702-713.details
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Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):373-393.details
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Evolution and Normative Scepticism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488.details
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Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson.T. M. Scanlon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):877-897.details
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The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):339-352.details
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No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.details
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