- Being Open-Minded about Open-Mindedness.Kasim Khorasanee - 2024 - Philosophy 99 (2):191-221.details
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Freier Wille, Personale Identität und epistemische Ungewissheit.Dagmar Kiesel & Sebastian Schmidt - 2019 - In Ferrari Cleophea & Dagmar Kiesel (eds.), Willensfreiheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann. pp. 221-258.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Inquiry and trust: An epistemic balancing act.Heather Rabenberg - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2-3):583-601.details
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Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality.Hamid Vahid - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):122-133.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire.Genae Matthews - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Insult and Injustice in Epistemic Partiality.Jack Warman - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.details
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Echo Chambers and Friendship.Alper Güngör - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.details
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Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging.J. Spencer Atkins - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-28.details
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The Trinity and the Light Switch: Two Faces of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.details
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Against the newer evidentialists.David Thorstad - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3511-3532.details
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The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships.Andreas Bengtson & Søren Flinch Midtgaard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-32.details
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Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.details
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Defending Wokeness: A Response to Davidson.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6):21-26.details
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Rational Faith: How Faith Construed as Trust Does, and Does Not, Go Beyond Our Evidence.Katherine Dormandy - 2023 - The Monist 106 (1):72-82.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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The harm of humiliation.James Laing - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):532-547.details
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Epistemic Partialism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Philosophy Compass (2):e12896.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Loving truly: An epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love.Katherine Dormandy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.details
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Rationality for the Self-Aware (Ernest Sosa Lecture).David Christensen - 2021 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 95:215-236.details
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The Loyalty of Religious Disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 238-270.details
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Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself.Jennifer M. Morton - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):728-746.details
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The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):501-517.details
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Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.details
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The Ethics of Expectations.Rima Basu - 2023 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 13. Oxford University Press. pp. 149-169.details
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(1 other version)Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry (3):1-14.details
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From Impossibility to Evidentialism?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):384-406.details
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The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Fake News vs. Echo Chambers.Jeremy Fantl - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):645-659.details
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Ingroup Attitude: A Reliance-Based Analysis.Xin Zhang - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.details
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There is no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.details
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Collegial Relationships.Monika Https://Orcidorg Betzler & Jörg Https://Orcidorg Löschke - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):213-229.details
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Sins of Thought.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):273-293.details
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How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (4):547-562.details
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Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.details
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(1 other version)#BelieveWomen and the Ethics of Belief.Renee Bolinger - forthcoming - In NOMOS LXIV: Truth and Evidence. New York:details
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The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving.Cathy Mason - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2439-2455.details
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Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.details
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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