- Might anything be plain good?Thomas Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3335-3346.details
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Knowledge and assumptions.Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140.details
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In defence of good simpliciter.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.details
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The normativity of rationality.Nicholas Shackel - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):167-189.details
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Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.details
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Is anything just plain good?Mahrad Almotahari & Adam Hosein - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1485-1508.details
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A problem for the unity of normativity.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):404-411.details
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Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Weighing Explanations.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-157.details
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Defending Moral Mind-Independence: The Expressivist’s Precarious Turn.Lisa Warenski - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):861-69.details
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(1 other version)“Ought”, reasons, and vice: a comment on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):451 - 463.details
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(1 other version)Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.details
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Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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(2 other versions)Duties of Love.R. Jay Wallace - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):175-198.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Knowing what I want.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Normativity.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):744-753.details
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Recent work on normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):331-346.details
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The ethics of morphing.Caspar Hare - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):111 - 130.details
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Getting Machines to Do Your Dirty Work.Tomi Francis & Todd Karhu - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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Dubious pleasures.Javier González de Prado - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):217-234.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.details
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(2 other versions)Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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(1 other version)Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press.details
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Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-scope oughts, and Ought-to-be’s.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.details
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Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.details
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There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):677-686.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Sensitive Human Resource Development: A Conceptual Model and Its Implementation.Saleh Afroogh, Seyyed Abbas Kazemi & Faegheh Hajhosseini - 2021 - International Journal of Business and Management 16 (6).details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Naturalizing the contributory.Philip Fox - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6275-6298.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Veritism and the normativity of logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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Pragmatism, truth, and cognitive agency.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1811-1824.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Value of Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1–25.details
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