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  1. (1 other version)Biases in the subjective timing of perceptual events: Libet et al. (1983) revisited.Adam N. Danquah, Martin J. Farrell & Donald J. O’Boyle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):616-627.
    We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...)
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  • Interpreting Heisenberg interpreting quantum states.Simon Friederich - 2012 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (1):85-114.
    The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states – the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious "collapse of the wave (...)
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  • Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review.Ben R. Newell & David R. Shanks - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):1-19.
    To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors (...)
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  • Conscious intention and motor cognition.Patrick Haggard - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
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  • The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: A commentary.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.
    A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...)
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  • Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet’s clock. [REVIEW]Edward J. Neafsey - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 94 (C):103171.
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  • Czy wnioski z eksperymentów naukowych badających wolną wolę są uzasadnione? Przegląd i analiza krytyki eksperymentów Benjamina Libeta i Johna-Dylana Haynesa.Michał Marzec-Remiszewski - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (2):475-492.
    Scientific experiments which try to examine free will are faced with various critical arguments — both philosophical and methodological. In this article I will present the most important and the most interesting critical arguments attacking two the most influential experiments: Benjamin Libet experiment and John‐Dylan Haynes experiment. In the first part of the article I will consider a particular criticism of Libet paradigm, which loses its importance in context of Haynes paradigm. Next I will present critical arguments which attack both (...)
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  • Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?Joseph Vukov - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2):61-82.
    Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so (...)
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  • Libet’s experiment: Questioning the validity of measuring the urge to move.Tomáš Dominik, Daniel Dostál, Martin Zielina, Jan Šmahaj, Zuzana Sedláčková & Roman Procházka - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:255-263.
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  • Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious men­ tal states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Lost in time..Ceci Verbaarschot, Jason Farquhar & Pim Haselager - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:300-315.
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  • The neural basis of event-time introspection.Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1899-1915.
    We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for (...)
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  • Verschmierte Spuren der Unfreiheit: Wissenschaftsphilosophische Klarstellung zu angeblichen Artefakten bei Benjamin Libet.Olaf L. Müller - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (1):45-83.
    Benjamin Libet's celebrated experiments concerning freedom elicited numerous attempts of _philosophical_ repudiation. Ten years ago, however, Judy Trevena and Jeff Miller published a _technical_ objection; they claim to have detected a,,smearing artifact" in Libet's calculations. This rests on a misunderstanding of Libet's methodology. In my reconstruction of Libet's argument, he draws an abductive inference to the best explanation. Now, Trevena's and Miller's objection does indeed lead to alternative explanations of Libet's measurements. These alternatives are _ad hoc_ and extremely improbable. They (...)
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  • Wie frei sind wir eigentlich empirisch?Sven Walter - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (1):8-35.
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  • The time of consciousness and vice versa.Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290.
    The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's concept of the “specious present,” an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the “time of arrival” (...)
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  • The Impact of a Landmark Neuroscience Study on Free Will: A Qualitative Analysis of Articles Using Libet and Colleagues' Methods.Victoria Saigle, Veljko Dubljević & Eric Racine - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):29-41.
    Gathering evidence across disciplines is a strength of interdisciplinary fields like neuroethics. However, conclusions can only be made if the evidence applies to the issue at hand. Libet and colleagues' Citation1983 experiment is an interesting case study in this problem. Despite ongoing critiques about the methods used and the replicability of its findings, many people consider Libet and colleagues' methodology a valid strategy to investigate free will and related topics. We reviewed studies using methods similar to those of Libet and (...)
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  • (1 other version)The primacy of conscious decision making.David R. Shanks & Ben R. Newell - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):45-61.
    The target article sought to question the common belief that our decisions are often biased by unconscious influences. While many commentators offer additional support for this perspective, others question our theoretical assumptions, empirical evaluations, and methodological criteria. We rebut in particular the starting assumption that all decision making is unconscious, and that the onus should be on researchers to prove conscious influences. Further evidence is evaluated in relation to the core topics we reviewed (multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions (...)
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  • The timing of conscious states.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  • Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action?Robert Deutschländer, Michael Pauen & John-Dylan Haynes - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:232-245.
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  • Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
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  • Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary.Stanley Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279.
    S. Pockett and G. Gomes discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other (...)
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  • The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications.Benjamin Libet - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  • Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases.Jeff Miller & Judy Arnel Trevena - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313.
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  • Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller.Susan Pockett - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.
    The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...)
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  • The What, the When, and the Whether of Intentional Action in the Brain: A Meta-Analytical Review.Laura Zapparoli, Silvia Seghezzi & Eraldo Paulesu - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
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  • Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
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  • Physical, neural, and mental timing.Wim van de Grind - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.
    The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with collegues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from (...)
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  • When timing the mind should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions.Steve Joordens, Marc van Duijn & Thomas M. Spalek - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.
    Trevena and Miller provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl . In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This (...)
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  • Neuroscience and Conscious Causation: Has Neuroscience Shown that We Cannot Control Our Own Actions?Grant S. Shields - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):565-582.
    Neuroscience has begun to elucidate the mechanisms of volition, decision-making, and action. Some have taken the progress neuroscience has made in these areas to indicate that we are not free to choose our actions . The notion that we can consciously initiate our behavior is a crucial tenet in the concept of free will, and closely linked to how most individuals view themselves as persons. There is thus reason to inquire if the aforementioned inference drawn by some might be too (...)
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  • Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.Stanley Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
    This issue of Consciousness and Cognition presents four target articles and eight commentaries on the target articles. The present article presents comments on those commentaries, grouped into backward referral and volition categories. Regarding backward referral: I disagree with my fellow commentators and take the unpopular position of defending Libet's notion of backward referral. I join my fellow commentators in critiquing Libet's notion of a 500-ms delay. I examine several of the hypotheses suggested by other commentators for why cortical and lateral (...)
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  • Subjective reports of stimulus, response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports?Jeff Miller, Paula Vieweg, Nicolas Kruize & Belinda McLea - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1013-1036.
    Four experiments examined how accurately participants can report the times of their own decisions. Within an auditory reaction time task, participants reported the time at which the tone was presented, they decided on the response, or the response key was pressed. Decision time reports were checked for plausibility against the actual RTs, and we compared the effects of experimental manipulations on these two measures to see whether the reported decision times showed appropriate effects. In addition, we estimated the amount of (...)
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