- Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):373-393.details
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Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard.Lucas Roisenberg Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):683-704.details
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Uma solução não convencional para o problema de Gettier.Luís Estevinha Rodrigues - 2012 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):26-50.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.details
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Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.details
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Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:19-43.details
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Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
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First-Class and Coach-Class Knowledge.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):736-756.details
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Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.details
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Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):929-950.details
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Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?Justin Morton - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312.details
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Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
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Accidentally About Me.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1085-1115.details
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Grades of explanation in cognitive science.Richard Montgomery - 1998 - Synthese 114 (3):463-495.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.details
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Warrant entails truth.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.details
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On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details
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Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.details
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Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.details
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Single premise deduction and risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.details
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Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck.Tamar Lando - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):378-395.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.details
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Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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In praise of folly: A reply to blome-Tillmann.Stephen Kearns - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):219–222.details
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In praise of folly: a reply to Blome-Tillmann.Stephen Kearns - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):219-222.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Conceptual analysis and natural kinds: the case of knowledge.Joachim Horvath - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):167-184.details
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Safety and epistemic luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.details
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On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.details
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The Causal Theory of Knowledge Revisited: An Interventionist Approach.Job Grefte & Alexander Gebharter - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):193-202.details
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Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):765-771.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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