- What must a proof of incompatibilism prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.details
|
|
Why free will remains a mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.details
|
|
Truth, function and paradox.S. Shapiro - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):38-44.details
|
|
Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
|
|
Assimilations and Rollbacks: Two Arguments Against Libertarianism Defended.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):151-172.details
|
|
A flawed conception of determinism in the Consequence Argument.S. Sehon - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):30-38.details
|
|
The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.details
|
|
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
|
|
From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse.Joseph C. Schmid - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1413-1435.details
|
|
Agent-Causation and Paradigms for God’s Knowledge.Christina Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):35--54.details
|
|
Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7).details
|
|
A New Version of the Mind Argument Refuted.Phillip Goggans - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (2):203-209.details
|
|
The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
|
|
Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (2):89-110.details
|
|
Is plural denotation collective?Alex Oliver & Timothy Smiley - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):22–34.details
|
|
Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
|
|
‘Animals run about the world in all sorts of paths’: varieties of indeterminism.Jesse M. Mulder - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-17.details
|
|
A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.Thomas Müller & Hans J. Briegel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):219-252.details
|
|
An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will: three contingencies of the debate.Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg & Verena Wagner - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):1-10.details
|
|
Is Agent-Causal Libertarianism Unintelligible?Stephen D. Mizell - 2020 - Philosophia Reformata 85 (1):1-19.details
|
|
The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
|
|
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
|
|
Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
|
|
Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.details
|
|
Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
|
|
On the very concept of free will.Joshua May - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.details
|
|
Free Will and Desire.Brian Looper - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1347-1360.details
|
|
Agentive Duality reconsidered.Annina Loets & Julia Zakkou - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3771-3789.details
|
|
Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
|
|
Luck and history‐sensitive compatibilism.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.details
|
|
Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.details
|
|
Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.details
|
|
The nature and basis of human dignity.Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2008 - In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics. pp. 173-193.details
|
|
Alternative Possibilities and a Dogma on Freedom Debate選択可能性と「自由論のドグマ」.Taehee Lee - 2018 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 51 (1):19-40.details
|
|
O pojęciu zdarzenia będącego złamaniem prawa przyrody.Adrian Kuźniar - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (3):107-123.details
|
|
Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.details
|
|
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.details
|
|
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327-341.details
|
|
Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility.David P. Hunt - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):39--49.details
|
|
Identity reconsidered.Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):715-725.details
|
|
The Consequence of the Consequence Argument.Marco Hausmann - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):45-70.details
|
|
Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.details
|
|
Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
|
|
The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
|
|
Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
|
|
Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.details
|
|
Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
|
|
A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
|
|
Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. [REVIEW]Meghan Griffith - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.details
|
|
Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen.Meghan Elizabeth Griffith - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.details
|
|