- Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
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A plea for mental acts.Joëlle Proust - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):105-128.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.details
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Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution.Richard Moran - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):135-51.details
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MAKING UP YOUR MIND: Self‐Interpretation and Self‐Constitution.Richard Moran - 2006 - Ratio 1 (2):135-151.details
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Promêtheia as Rational Agency in Plato.Christopher Moore - 2020 - Apeiron 54 (1):89-107.details
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The structure of instrumental practical reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.details
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The policy-based approach to identification.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):105 – 125.details
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Motivational internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.details
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One Self per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):314-335.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.details
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Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.details
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Anscombe's and von Wright's non‐causalist response to Davidson's challenge.Christian Kietzmann - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (2):240-263.details
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Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?Jeanette Kennett & Doug McConnell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):470 - 489.details
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Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason).Jay Jian - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):360-374.details
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Agency, simulation and self-identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.details
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Guidance and Belief.David Hunter - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):63-90.details
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Intending, knowing how, infinitives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the Philosophy of Action.William Hasselberger - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):449-476.details
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Intention and the authority of avowals.Andy Hamilton - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):23 – 37.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.details
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Varieties of Epistemic Freedom.Alison Fernandes - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):736-751.details
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Knowledge in intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.details
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Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?David Enoch - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):319-339.details
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The Sense of Agency and the Epistemology of Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2589-2608.details
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Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.details
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Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Autonomy as Practical Understanding.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Action.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Practical reason and the structure of actions.Elijah Millgram - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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