This study examined the effect of fake news on electoral outcome. Using post-election surveys, previous studies found associations between exposure to fake news and voting behavior, though these observational studies failed to show that these changes were actually caused by fake news. To examine whether fake news really affects voting behavior, we need to experimentally manipulate voters’ exposure to fake news in real elections and see if voters regret their vote choice knowing that the information was false. For this purpose, (...) our study focused on Mexico’s 2018 presidential election, which provided an ideal setting. During the campaign, false information about a scandal allegedly involving Ricardo Anaya, a candidate from the National Action Party, was widely disseminated. However, his innocence was officially acknowledged after the election. Using this correction of fake news as a treatment, we tested a sample of 1,561 individuals to assess whether the retraction of fake news caused post-election regret: would Mexican voters have voted differently if they had not been exposed to such false information. Our multivariate analyses found that the retraction of fake news did cause post-election regret among voters with lower internal political efficacy, but voters associated with higher political knowledge and internal political efficacy were not affected by the retraction and were less likely to experience regret. About 20% of the respondents experienced post-election regret, and of those, about 35% would have switched their vote to Anaya. The findings corroborate lasting effects of fake news, which may have non-negligible effects on electoral outcomes. (shrink)

The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Dictionary 2015 is a standard text analysis dictionary that quantifies the linguistic and psychometric properties of English words. A Japanese version of the LIWC2015 dictionary has been expected in the fields of natural language processing and cross-cultural research. This study aims to create the J-LIWC2015 through systematic investigations of the original dictionary and Japanese corpora. The entire LIWC2015 dictionary was initially subjected to human and machine translation into Japanese. After verifying the frequency of use (...) of the words in large corpora, frequent words and phrases that are unique to Japanese were added to the dictionary, followed by recategorization by psychologists. The updated dictionary indicated good internal consistency, semantic equivalence with the original LIWC2015 dictionary, and good construct validity in each category. The evidence suggests that the J-LIWC2015 dictionary is a powerful research tool in computational social science to scrutinize the psychological processes behind Japanese texts and promote standardized cross-cultural investigations in combination with LIWC dictionaries in different languages. (shrink)

The rise of social media provides convenient mechanisms for audiences to participate in secondary science communication. The present study employs the theory of consumption values and theory of planned behavior to predict audiences’ SSC intentions. The results indicate that emotional value, social value, altruistic value, attitude, internal perceived behavioral control and subjective norm are significant predictors of audiences’ intentions to share or to repost science content on their social media. These results suggest that the theory of consumption values, together with (...) the theory of planned behavior, is a useful framework for understanding SSC behaviors. (shrink)

Controversies surrounding social media platforms have provided opportunities for institutional reflexivity amongst users and regulators on how to understand and govern platforms. Amidst contestation, platform companies have continued to enact projects that draw upon existing modes of privatized governance. We investigate how social media companies have attempted to achieve closure by continuing to set the terms around platform governance. We investigate two projects implemented by Facebook (Meta)—authenticity regulation and privacy controls—in response to the Russian Interference and Cambridge Analytica controversies surrounding (...) the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Drawing on Goffman’s metaphor of stage management, we analyze the techniques deployed by Facebook to reinforce a division between what is visible and invisible to the user experience. These platform governance projects propose to act upon _front-stage data relations:_ information that users can see from other users—whether that is content that users can see from “bad actors”, or information that other users can see about oneself. At the same time, these projects relegate _back-stage data relations_—information flows between users constituted by recommendation and targeted advertising systems—to invisibility and inaction. As such, Facebook renders the user experience actionable for governance, while foreclosing governance of back-stage data relations central to the economic value of the platform. As social media companies continue to perform platform governance projects following controversies, our paper invites reflection on the politics of these projects. By destabilizing the boundaries drawn by platform companies, we open space for continuous reflexivity on how platforms should be understood and governed. (shrink)

How can the harm caused by waves of fake news or derogatory speech on social media be minimized without unduly limiting freedom of expression? I draw on an eighteenth-century debate for thinking about this problem: Hume and Smith present two different models of the transmission of emotions and ideas. Empathetic processes are causal, almost automatic processes; sympathy, in contrast, means putting oneself into the other person’s position and critically evaluating how one should react. I use this distinction to argue that (...) the architectural logic of social media should be improved to prevent cumulative harms and to facilitate sympathetic processes. (shrink)

Social-bots-mediated information manipulation is influencing the public opinion environment, and their role and behavior patterns in news proliferation are worth exploring. Based on the analysis of bots' posting frequency, influence, and retweeting relationship, we take the diffusion of The New York Times' coverage of Xinjiang issue on the overseas social platform Twitter as an example and employ the two-step flow model. It is found that in the role of second-step diffusion, unlike posting news indiscriminately in first-step diffusion, social bots are (...) more inclined to postcontroversial information in second-step diffusion; in terms of diffusion patterns, although social bots are more engaged in first-step diffusion than in second-step diffusion and can trigger human users to retweet, they are still inferior to humans in terms of influence. (shrink)

I this paper, I address the question of why it is important to inquire into the epistemic blameworthiness of the consumers of disinformation. In response, I defend the claim, recently challenged by A. Worsnip, that this question is relevant for the second question of how the problem of disinformation should be effectively dealt with. Against Wornsip’s explicit argument to the contrary, I defend an account of epistemic blameworthiness from which it follows that the strategy of endeavouring to educate blameworthy disinformation (...) consumers holds promise. Moreover, I defend the claim that the blameworthiness of disinformation consumers is also relevant for the question of whether attempting to educate them, above and beyond an effective strategy, would be a fair way to fix the problem. In the final part, I address the complication that unfair educational strategies may still prove useful, and so be all-things-considered justified, if better alternatives are not available. (shrink)

Current advances in research, development and application of artificial intelligence systems have yielded a far-reaching discourse on AI ethics. In consequence, a number of ethics guidelines have been released in recent years. These guidelines comprise normative principles and recommendations aimed to harness the “disruptive” potentials of new AI technologies. Designed as a semi-systematic evaluation, this paper analyzes and compares 22 guidelines, highlighting overlaps but also omissions. As a result, I give a detailed overview of the field of AI ethics. Finally, (...) I also examine to what extent the respective ethical principles and values are implemented in the practice of research, development and application of AI systems—and how the effectiveness in the demands of AI ethics can be improved. (shrink)

O estudo, de abordagem hermenêutica, realiza um debate acerca das fake news e suas ressonâncias na vida social, de modo particular, durante o período de pandemia ocasionada pelo COVID-19. Realizamos uma reflexão sobre como o contato com as fake news pode ocasionar interferências nos processos educacionais e nos diversos segmentos da sociedade. Elencamos considerações sobre os multiletramentos digitais como um meio de diálogo pedagógico, que envolve a mobilização de um conjunto de letramentos e práticas sociais interligadas e sensíveis aos contextos (...) vitais enquanto condição para o enfrentamento das fake news na educação. (shrink)

We review articles about corporate political activity published in Business & Society since its beginnings 60 years ago and in a set of other leading management journals over the past decade. We present evidence that most studies of CPA use the political markets’ perspective. Under the premise that the contemporary political environment has changed significantly since the inception of the political markets’ perspective, our review asks two interconnected questions. First, to what degree have changes in the political environment challenged the (...) ability of the political markets’ perspective to understand the pillars of politics: issues, institutions, interests, and information? Second, to what degree have CPA scholars augmented or diversified their theoretical arguments to accommodate these changes in the political environment? We document the CPA literature across these dimensions and questions and note that many scholars are already adopting other theories side by side with the political markets’ perspective. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic poses a health threat that has dominated media coverage. However, not much is known about individual media use to acquire knowledge about COVID-19. To address this open research question, this study investigated how the perceived threat is linked to media use and how media use is associated with perceived and actual knowledge about COVID-19. In a German online survey conducted between April 16 and April 27, 2020, N = 952 participants provided information on their perceived threat and (...) media use to inform themselves about COVID-19. In this process, they indicated how well they were informed about COVID-19 and subsequently completed a COVID-19 knowledge test. Results indicated that individuals who felt more threatened by COVID-19 used media more often to inform themselves but focused on fewer different media channels. Further, frequent media use was associated with higher perceived knowledge, but not with higher actual knowledge about COVID-19, reflecting an illusion of knowledge. Additionally, using fewer media channels was linked to higher perceived and actual knowledge. Finally, explorative analyses on the use of different media channels revealed that an illusion of knowledge emerged for using social media, public television, and newspapers. Potential explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

El presente artículo plantea una reflexión filosófica y pedagógica acerca de las condiciones para el Desarrollo humano y el empoderamiento ciudadano en contextos digitales. Vivir en plena era digital requiere de unas bases teóricas que orienten la educación cívica en entornos digitales y que apunten hacia el progreso social y democrático. No obstante, la idea de forjar un ethos intercultural y democrático en un mundo interconectado y mediático no es una tarea sencilla de abordar. Así, se propone como objetivo abordar (...) algunas preguntas cruciales en este sentido: ¿Cuáles son las capacidades y las virtudes cívicas en un entorno mediático radicalmente diverso? ¿Cómo fomentar la ciudadanía mediática frente a usos de las redes sociales ética y políticamente cuestionables? ¿Cómo promover una cultura digital en la línea del Desarrollo humano? Tras un análisis bibliográfico y hermenéutico, se articula una propuesta formativa para empoderar la ciudadanía mediática a partir del «enfoque de las capacidades» de Amartya Sen y Martha Nussbaum. A partir de estos presupuestos, y partiendo de la actual necesidad de reconstruir un ethos democrático para un mundo interconectado y globalizado, se formula un modelo teórico para cultivar la democracia en entornos digitales, a favor del Desarrollo humano y aprovechando el potencial de las redes sociales como estructura comunicativa reticular de alcance global e intercultural. (shrink)

Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to (...) condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation. (shrink)

Cultural evolutionary theory has identified a range of cognitive biases that guide human social learning. Naturalistic and experimental studies indicate transmission biases favoring negative and positive information. To address these conflicting findings, the present study takes a socially situated view of information transmission, which predicts that bias expression will depend on the social context. We report a large‐scale experiment (N = 425) that manipulated the social context and examined its effect on the transmission of the positive and negative information contained (...) in a narrative text. In each social context, information was progressively lost as it was transmitted from person to person, but negative information survived better than positive information, supporting a negative transmission bias. Importantly, the negative transmission bias was moderated by the social context: Higher social connectivity weakened the bias to transmit negative information, supporting a socially situated account of information transmission. Our findings indicate that our evolved cognitive preferences can be moderated by our social goals. (shrink)

Deepfakes are realistic videos created using new machine learning techniques rather than traditional photographic means. They tend to depict people saying and doing things that they did not actually say or do. In the news media and the blogosphere, the worry has been raised that, as a result of deepfakes, we are heading toward an “infopocalypse” where we cannot tell what is real from what is not. Several philosophers have now issued similar warnings. In this paper, I offer an analysis (...) of why deepfakes are such a serious threat to knowledge. Utilizing the account of information carrying recently developed by Brian Skyrms, I argue that deepfakes reduce the amount of information that videos carry to viewers. I conclude by drawing some implications of this analysis for addressing the epistemic threat of deepfakes. (shrink)

Four studies explore the role of perceptual fluency in attenuating bullshit receptivity, or the tendency for individuals to rate otherwise meaningless statements as “profound”. Across four studies, we presented participants with a sample of pseudoprofound bullshit statements in either a fluent or disfluent font and found that overall, disfluency attenuated bullshit receptivity while also finding little evidence that this effect was moderated by cognitive thinking style. In all studies, we measured participants’ cognitive reflection, need for cognition, faith in intuition, and (...) superstitious beliefs. Superstition strongly predicted bullshit receptivity regardless of fluency. Inconclusive results were found for the remaining scales. Potential links for the role of perceptual disfluency in promoting analytic thinking are discussed. (shrink)

At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this (...) Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 568-579, May 2022. At present, there is a wide divergence in attitudes toward free speech in countries strongly influenced by Confucianism. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have fairly robust rights of free expression. Mainland China does not, strongly restricting speech that the government judges threatens State interests. I argue that although traditional Confucian scholars supported many restrictions on expression, Confucian philosophers actually have good reason to want to protect expression about values. Subsequently, (...) I consider how to address the problem of disinformation while preserving this Confucian right to free expression. I focus on the case of Taiwan, as the Confucian state facing the most serious disinformation campaigns from China. The goal of government and civil society actors has been to focus on correcting disinformation while preserving free access to information, though laws do provide for civil and even criminal penalties for intentional spread of false information. As many democratic societies are facing the problem of concerted disinformation campaigns that aim to sow confusion and increase discord among the populace, Taiwan’s successes here are worth studying. Yet the Confucian cultural background means people accept more government involvement in defining what is true and false than may be the case elsewhere, and the right to free speech is less absolute. (shrink)

If political fake news is a serious concern for democratic politics, no less worrisome is scientific news with patently distorted content. Prima facie, scientific misinformation partially escapes the definition of fake news provided by empirical and philosophical analysis, mainly patterned after political disinformation. Most notably, we aim to show that people are often unaware not only of disseminating, but also of producing false or misleading information. However, by leveraging the philosophical and psychological literature, we advance some reasons for keeping scientific (...) misinformation under the same umbrella, broadening the definition of fake news in order to account for it as well. In concluding, we shall advance some ideas on how to reform scientific communication, which may help to address the issue of scientific misinformation. (shrink)

Despite the initial promise of social media platforms as a means of facilitating discourse on matters of civic discourse, in practice it has turned out to impair fruitful conversation on civic issues by a number of means. From self-isolation into echo chambers, to algorithmically supported filter bubbles, to widespread failure to engage politically owing to psychological phenomena like the ‘spiral of silence’, a variety of factors have been blamed. I argue that extant accounts overlook the importance of interpersonal relationships to (...) sustaining quality civic discourse on social media. Drawing on an Aristotelian account of friendship with an emphasis on the value of interpersonal difference plus the influence of interactions on individual character, I argue that a common scapegoat for the failure of civic discourse online—the variety of “unfriend” disconnection tools offered on various platforms—actually show promise at promoting better-quality civic conversation and overcoming the obstacles present on social media platforms. (shrink)

Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...) is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. (shrink)

Misinformation in various guises has become a significant concern in contemporary society and it has been implicated in several high-impact political events over the past years, including Brexit, the 2016 American elections, and bungled policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in some countries. In this paper, I draw on resources from contemporary social epistemology to clarify why and how misinformation is epistemically bad. I argue that its negative effects extend far beyond the obvious ones of duping individuals with false or (...) misleading beliefs. Misinformation has systemic effects on our information environments, making all of us worse off, including the epistemically vigilant. This paper does not offer measures or policies to fight misinformation, but aims to contribute to the prior goal of better understanding what's bad about misinformation. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for ameliorative projects. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Understanding is a demanding epistemic state. It involves not just knowledge that things are thus and so, but grasping the reasons why and seeing how things hang together. Understanding, then, typically requires inquiry. Many of our inquiries are conducted online nowadays, with the help of search engines, forums, and social media platforms. In this paper, I explore the idea that online inquiry easily leads to what I will call online illusions of understanding. Both the structure of online information presentation (...) (with hyperlinks, shares, retweets, likes, etc.) and the operation of recommender systems and the like make it easy for people using them to form the impression that they are conducting inquiry responsibly, whereas they are in fact fed with irrelevant information, or, even worse, falsehoods, misinformation, disinformation, or outright conspiracy theories. (shrink)

While COVID-19 spreads aggressively and rapidly across the globe, many societies have also witnessed the spread of other viral phenomena like misinformation, conspiracy theories, and general mass suspicions about what is really going on. This study investigates how exposure to and trust in information sources, and anxiety and depression, are associated with conspiracy and misinformation beliefs in eight countries/regions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Data were collected in an online survey fielded from May 29, 2020 to June 12, 2020, resulting in (...) a multinational representative sample of 8,806 adult respondents. Results indicate that greater exposure to traditional media is associated with lower conspiracy and misinformation beliefs, while exposure to politicians and digital media and personal contacts are associated with greater conspiracy and misinformation beliefs. Exposure to health experts is associated with lower conspiracy beliefs only. Higher feelings of depression are also associated with greater conspiracy and misinformation beliefs. We also found relevant group- and country differences. We discuss the implications of these results. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary culture. From a communication studies perspective, conspiracy theories undermine democratic communication by misleading the publ...

There are two general senses of "post-truth." One is a contemporary, popular sense that captures the manner in which facts and truths have lost their power to inform public discussion and debate. This first sense is relatively new and is related to the explosion in the number of agencies and media by which truth claims are created and distributed and the corresponding monetization of the production of truth claims. There are so many news outlets, so many reports, so many conflicting (...) versions of events, so many conflicting interpretations of the outcome of even scientifically conducted research, that a general diminishment of trust has taken hold. This multiplication of truth claims exacerbates the confusing effects... (shrink)

This study examines high school students’ responses to a public policy discussion on the topic of Internet privacy. Specifically, students discussed the question of whether search engines and social media sites should be permitted to monitor, track, and share users’ personal data or whether such practices violate personal privacy. We observed discussions of the topic in four high school classrooms in 2015–2016, prior to the presidential election in 2016. We first explain why the topic failed to work as a controversial (...) public issue with high schoolers. We then explain their responses to the issue. We found (1) students displayed a surprising trust in Facebook and Google; (2) students framed the issue of Internet Privacy as a conflict in values and a set of trade-offs; and (3) students tended to put more weight on personal responsibility than implications for democracy in their assessment of the (acknowledged) erosion of privacy as a result of social media and Internet search engines. We conclude with implications for social studies education and teacher education. (shrink)

This paper focuses on extant approaches to counteract the consumption of fake news online. Proponents of structural approaches suggest that our proneness to consuming fake news could only be reduced by reshaping the architecture of online environments. Proponents of educational approaches suggest that fake news consumers should be empowered to improve their epistemic agency. In this paper, we address a question that is relevant to this debate: namely, whether fake news consumers commit mistakes for which they can be criticized and (...) that they could easily avoid by reforming their doxastic conduct. Proponents of structural approaches, like R. Rini and B. Millar, have defended in different ways a negative answer to this question. In this paper, we criticize their views and suggest that individual users could improve on their epistemic practice by widening their information diet. (shrink)

Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, appears to be steadily spreading, despite the increasing availability of information. The notion of informed ignorance herein proposed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media. Linked to many of societies’ most looming catastrophes, from political polarization to the climate crisis, practices related to knowledge and information are deemed some (...) of the most imminent and daunting modern threats, evidenced by the latest report of the World Economic Forum, which has named misinformation the most severe short-term global risk. This paper’s epistemic perspective links the properties of today’s information culture and the ways in which it interacts with individual capacities and limitations in current technological and socio-political contexts. Such a position is analyzed through the lens of epistemic principles as a contemporary epistemic phenotype that emerges from an environment of ill-adapted and excessive information inputs and leads to a distinctive type of social injustice that is primarily epistemic in nature. While equity and accessibility are widely discussed as important contributing factors to epistemic discrepancies, other overlooked but fundamental issues underlying epistemic injustices are considered, such as information manipulation, cognitive limitations, and epistemic degradation. To effectively face this elusive threat, we propose an inclusive viewpoint that harnesses knowledge from cognitive science, science and technology studies, and social epistemology to inform a unifying theory of its main impacts and driving forces. By adjusting a modern epistemic framework to the described phenomena, we intend to contextually outline its trajectory and possible means of containment based on a shared responsibility to maintain ethical epistemic standards. In a time of international unrest and mounting civil acts of violence, it is pertinent to emphasize the ethical principles of knowledge systems and authorities and suggest policy adaptations to maintain a social contract based on the shared values of truth and freedom. (shrink)

Owing to the proliferation of rumors on social media, it is necessary to disseminate debunking information to minimize the harm caused by them. Using content analysis, sentiment analysis, and regression analysis, this study examined the mediating role of follower count in the relationship between the debunker’s identity and sharing behavior, and it explored the relationship between the text sentiment of debunking information and sharing behavior based on data on the spread of three rumors that circulated extensively on social media. Using (...) an ordinary account as a reference, we found that the mediating or suppression effect of follower count in the relationship between debunker’s identity and sharing behavior was significant. The three test identities had more followers than the ordinary account, which resulted in a significant positive effect on the number of reposts. The debunker’s identity did not have a positive effect on the sharing of debunking information when controlling for mediating variables. Debunking information with emotional overtones was shared more widely compared with information with neutral emotions, and the dominant emotional polarity was different in the three different rumors. These findings can contribute to the generation of debunking information content, which can aid in the development of effective communication strategies and improvement in the efficiency of crisis management. (shrink)

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, a parallel crisis emerged in the form of an “infodemic,” where misinformation proliferated through social media at an unprecedented scale. This article delves into the evolving landscape of reliable and misinformation sources reporting on the pandemic, examining their communication dynamics. Leveraging a comprehensive data set encompassing 437,832 news published online by media organizations from January 2020 to December 2021, I employ structural change analysis and network-based natural language processing to explore these dynamics. The findings illuminate the (...) contrasting approaches adopted by reliable sources, which prioritize scientific discourse, and misinformation, which exhibits high topic volatility—rapid change in the focus—suggesting that misinformation sources frequently shift their attention to different topics. Notably, this highlights a deliberate strategy employed by misinformation purveyors, that is, creating false crises without authoritative resolutions, thereby fostering a sense of lack of control, chaos, and uncertainty. Furthermore, the sentiment and morality analysis of COVID-19 news reveal that reliable news tends to maintain a balanced and neutral tone, while misinformation often exhibits a highly negative and morally charged narrative. These results carry significant implications for devising effective social countermeasures against misinformation at various stages of the pandemic. (shrink)

Deepfakes are audio, video, or still-image digital artifacts created by the use of artificial intelligence technology, as opposed to traditional means of recording. Because deepfakes can look and sound much like genuine digital recordings, they have entered the popular imagination as sources of serious epistemic problems for us, as we attempt to navigate the increasingly treacherous digital information environment of the internet. In this paper, I attempt to clarify what epistemic problems deepfakes pose and why they pose these problems, by (...) drawing parallels between recordings and our own senses as sources of evidence. I show that deepfakes threaten to undermine the status of digital recordings as evidence. The existence of deepfakes thus encourages a kind of skepticism about digital recordings that bears important similarities to classic philosophical skepticism concerning the senses. However, the skepticism concerning digital recordings that deepfakes motivate is also importantly different from classical skepticism concerning the senses, and I argue that these differences illuminate some possible strategies for solving the epistemic problems posed by deepfakes. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic” of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial information environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other people, including sociotechnical systems that mediate testimony and evidence. But when we attempt to engage in epistemic “superheroics” - withholding trust (...) from others and trying to figure it all out for ourselves – these can malfunction in ways that make us vulnerable to forming irrational beliefs. Some epistemic systems are prone to coalescing audiences around false conspiracy theories. This analysis affords a new perspective on philosophical efforts to understand conspiracy theories and other epistemic projects prone to collective irrationality. (shrink)

Purpose The study explores how social media impacts institutional trust through the lens of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. Specifically, this study aims to understand how moral relativism and moral intuitionism can moderate the relationship between social media use and perception of social authorities. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes a large data set from the World Values Survey, covering responses from approximately 52,000 individuals across 45 countries between 2017 and 2022. Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test for interactions between social (...) media use and stages of moral development on trust in social institutions. Findings The study finds that different stages of moral development significantly moderate the relationship between social media use and institutional trust. Specifically, higher moral development buffers the negative effect of social media use on trust in three main social institutions: law enforcement, parliament and the legal system. In contrast, individuals with higher levels of moral relativism and moral intuitionism are more susceptible to the negative influence of social media on institutional trust. Research limitations/implications The study relies on self-reported data from the World Values Survey, which may introduce response biases. In addition, while the large-scale data set offers insights into correlations, it does not allow for conclusive causal inferences. Originality/value This research contributes to understanding technology’s impact on modern societies by highlighting the role of individual moral development in shaping perceptions of key social institutions. The study uniquely integrates Kohlberg’s moral development theory with the influence of social media, offering a novel perspective on how personal moral systems can moderate the effect of digital media use. (shrink)

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

When people retell stories, what guides their retelling? Most previous research on story retelling and story comprehension has focused on information accuracy as the key measure of stability in transmission. This paper suggests that there is a second, affective, dimension that provides stability for retellings, namely the audience affect of surprise. In a large-sample study with multiple iterations of retellings, we found evidence that people are quite accurate in preserving all degrees of surprisingness in serial reproduction – even when the (...) event that produced the surprisingness in the original story is dropped or changed. Thus, we propose that the preservation of affect is an implicit goal of retelling: not merely do retellers recall highly surprising events better, but rather they register all levels of surprisingness precisely and aim to surprise their implied audience to same degree. This study used 2,389 participants. (shrink)

A perennial problem in social epistemology is the problem of expert testimony, specifically expert testimony regarding scientific issues: for example, while it is important for me to know information pertaining to anthropogenic climate change, vaccine safety, Covid-19, etc., I may lack the scientific background required to determine whether the information I come across is, in fact, true. Without being able to evaluate the science itself, then, I need to find trustworthy expert testifiers to listen to. A major project in social (...) epistemology has thus become determining what the markers of trustworthiness are that laypersons can appeal to in order to identify and acquire information from expert testifiers. At the same time, the ways in which we acquire scientific information has changed significantly, with much of it nowadays being acquired in online environments. While much has been said about the potential pitfalls of seeking information online, little has been said about how the nature of seeking information online should make us think about the problem of expert testimony. Indeed, it seems to be an underlying assumption that good markers of trustworthiness apply equally well when seeking information from expert testifiers in online and offline environments alike, and that the new challenges and opportunities presented by online environments merely affects the methods by which we can acquire evidence of said trustworthiness. Here I argue that in making this assumption one risks failing to account for how unique features of the ways in which we acquire information online affect how we evaluate the trustworthiness of experts. Specifically, I argue for two main claims: first, that the nature of information-seeking online is such that the extent to which information is susceptible to manipulation is a dominant marker of trustworthiness; second, as a result, one will be more likely to seek out a particular kind of expert testifier in online environments, what I call a cooperative as opposed to preemptive expert. The result is that criteria for expert trustworthiness may look significantly different when acquiring information online as opposed to offline. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The term “deep state” has enjoyed political prominence in recent years, especially in movements around former President Donald Trump. However, the term emerged in the activist milieu after the founding of Students for a Democratic Society, which sought to engender political realignment in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination. Those on the far right who use the term to level accusations of conspiracy at supposed subversives in the administrative state are unwittingly drawing on a long-running but little-analyzed intellectual tradition. (...) In that tradition, conspiracy theories purport to unmask the real intentions of political actors in order to facilitate cooperation and recruitment across ideological and partisan divides. From the postwar period to the present, conspiracy theories, and the “deep state” vocabulary in particular, circulated freely across the left-right political divide. Authors and activists were attracted to these tropes and texts not merely because they appeared to reveal concrete truths about long-hidden elements of American political life, but also because their very ambiguity enabled them to be flexibly co-opted. Conspiracy theories allowed activists to mobilize around shared gaps in public knowledge about traumatic events like the assassination, activating public dissatisfaction with official explanations of those events. Their ambiguity, coupled with the seeming pervasiveness of conspiracy theorist tropes across political divides, appeared to activists seeking realignment of both the left and the right as a promising tactical opportunity to assert that they and their erstwhile enemies were actually engaged in a shared project. Activists thus came to see conspiracy theory not as the province of an exclusively left or right politics, but as an autonomous and contestable cultural space. This, in turn, led to cross-partisan encounters. (shrink)

Automated Influence is the use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate, and analyse people’s data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the interactional focus of “AI Ethics” in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of AI, we show that the real problem (...) with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy that it precipitates. (shrink)

Online interactions have become major channels for people to obtain and disseminate information during the new normal of COVID-19, which can also be a primary platform for rumor propagation. There are many complex psychological reasons for spreading rumors, but previous studies have not fully analyzed this problem from the perspective of the interaction between official institutions and influential users. The purpose of this study is to determine optimal strategies for official institutions considering the impact of two different influential user types (...) by designing two game-theoretic models, namely “Rumor Clarification and Interaction Model” and “Rumor Verification and Interaction Model,” which can, respectively decide whether to clarify and when to clarify. The results of this article show that clarification strategies can be decided according to the characteristics of rumors and the influential user’s reactions. Meanwhile, publishing verified information prevents trolls’ “loophole advantages” and prevents reputed personalities from spreading false information due to the vague authenticity of rumors. Results also show that the verification strategy is limited by cost, period, and verification index. (shrink)

Misinformation is a serious concern for societies across the globe. To design effective interventions to combat the belief in and spread of misinformation, we must understand which psychological processes influence susceptibility to misinformation. This paper tests the widely assumed – but largely untested – claim that emotionally provocative headlines are associated with worse ability to identify true versus false headlines. Consistent with this proposal, we found correlational evidence that overall emotional response at the headline level is associated with diminished truth (...) discernment, except for experienced anger which was associated with increased truth discernment. The second set of studies tested a popular emotion regulation intervention where people were asked to apply either emotional suppression or emotion reappraisal techniques when considering the veracity of several headlines. In contrast to the correlation results, we found no evidence that emotion regulation helped people distinguish false from true news headlines. (shrink)