- How Reasons Guide Us (in Reasoning and Rationalisation).Franziska Poprawe - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (4):544-569.details
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Group Agents, Moral Competence, and Duty-bearers: The Update Argument.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1691-1715.details
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Nudges, Nudging, and Self-Guidance Under the Influence.W. Jared Parmer - 2023 - Ergo 9 (44):1199-1232.details
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Bounded Reflectivism and Epistemic Identity.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 53 (1):53-69.details
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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
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Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.details
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Habermasian Constructivism: An Alternative to the Constitutivist Argument.Dafydd Huw Rees - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (4):675-698.details
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The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.details
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Akrasia , practical reason, and the diversity of motivation: A new defense of tripartition.Jeremiah Carey - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):971-981.details
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Because There Is a Reason to Do It: How Normative Reasons Explain Action.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):208-233.details
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Clarifying Conceptions of Freedom: Kaposy's Argument Against “The Inference”.William Smith - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):34-36.details
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A Casual Theory of Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):103-114.details
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(1 other version)Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.John M. Doris - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:e36.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What skill is not.Evan Riley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):344-354.details
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"The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Genevadetails
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Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.details
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Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal.Andrew McAninch - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):2-24.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Character, Will, and Agency.Roman Altshuler - 2016 - In Alberto Masala & Jonathan Mark Webber (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 62-80.details
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A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory.Nicholas Drake - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):189-214.details
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The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.details
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What is the Harm Principle For?John Stanton-Ife - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):329-353.details
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Intention.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
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De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.details
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Self-exposure and exposure of the self: Informational privacy and the presentation of identity. [REVIEW]David W. Shoemaker - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (1):3-15.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Deciding Under a Description.Matthew Heeney - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2):191-209.details
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Does intention involve belief?Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):426-440.details
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Emotions, Identifications, and Evaluation.Scott O'Leary - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):39-54.details
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Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
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Indeterministic Choice and Ability.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):191-203.details
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Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):163-190.details
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Supererogation and the Case Against an 'Overall Ought'.Elizabeth Ventham - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):181-192.details
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An Account of Practical Decisions.Patrick Fleming - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):121-139.details
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Justification, Attachments and Regret.Josep E. Corbí - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1718-1738.details
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Rational Planning Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:25-48.details
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Reason explanation and the second-person perspective.Johannes Roessler - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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Nietzschean Constructivism: Ethics and Metaethics for All and None.Alex Silk - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):244-280.details
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Age and Agency.Veli Mitova - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (3):335-369.details
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Interpersonal coordination and epistemic support for intentions with we-content.Olivier Roy - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):345-367.details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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Intention rationality.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.details
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Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459.details
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Hume’s better argument for motivational skepticism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Richard McCarty - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):76-89.details
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What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):322-342.details
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The Instrumental Rule.F. I. X. Jeremy David - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.details
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Love As If.John Shand - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):4-17.details
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