- Aesthetic properties.Sonia Sedivy - 2024 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London: Routledge.details
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Creeped Out.Sara Bernstein & Daniel Nolan - 2022 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford studies in philosophy of mind. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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Profilo: Bernard Williams.Francesco Testini - 2020 - Aphex 22:1-33.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation, details
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Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Reasons, normativity, and value in aesthetics.Alex King - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):1-17.details
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Making Sense of Shame.James Laing - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (2):233-255.details
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Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
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Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.details
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Emotions as indeterminate justifiers.András Szigeti - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):1-23.details
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Filosofie en subjectiviteit.Rob van Gerwen - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (4):545-549.details
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A Defense of Modest Ideal Observer Theory: The Case of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):489-510.details
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Emotion as High-level Perception.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7181-7201.details
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The Evolutionary Debunker Meets Sentimental Realism.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - 2016 - In Giancarlo Marchetti & Sarin Marchetti (eds.), Facts and Values: The Ethics and Metaphysics of Normativity. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 176-195.details
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Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Thickness and Evaluation.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):89-104.details
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Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.details
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On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.details
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Projetivismo, circularidade e o problema da atitude moral.Leonardo De Mello Ribeiro - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).details
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Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
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Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. NEPFil. pp. 63-89.details
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Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience.Nils Franzén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):669-682.details
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Are Emotions Perceptions of Value (and Why this Matters)?Charlie Kurth, Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Haley Crosby & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Jack Basse - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.details
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Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell Universitydetails
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The uses of aesthetic testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.details
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(2 other versions)VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.details
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Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.details
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Consciousness and Moral Status.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - New York: Routledge.details
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A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics.Dale Dorsey - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):493-523.details
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Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.details
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Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas.András Szigeti - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.details
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(3 other versions)Beauty.Jennifer A. McMahon - 2019 - Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy.details
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Die Natur der Farben.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - De Gruyter.details
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The Nature of Aesthetic Experiences.Fabian Dorsch - 2000 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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O Lugar das Emoções na Ética e na Metaética.Flavio Williges, Marcelo Fischborn & David Copp (eds.) - 2018 - Pelotas: NEPFil online/Editora da UFPel.details
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Hume's conception of character.Robert Heath Mahoney - unknowndetails
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The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism.Nicholas Baima - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.details
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Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics.Lorenzo Greco - 2012 - In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. New York: Routledge. pp. 210-23.details
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(1 other version)Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments?Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2013 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 12 (1):113-126.details
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Are emotions perceptions of value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.details
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Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Cognitive Psychology of the Potentiality Argument.Lincoln Frias & Noel Struchiner - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):36-38.details
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(1 other version)Prematurely Depotentialized? Ethical Nonnaturalism and the Absurdest-Extension Objection.Sebastian Muders & Markus Ruether - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):34-36.details
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Subjectivism without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.details
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Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
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Values Compared.Włodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):73-96.details
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