- Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
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AI Wellbeing.Simon Goldstein & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - manuscriptdetails
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Can we turn people into pain pumps?: On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:1-32.details
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Exploring Arbitrariness Objections to Time-Biases.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Jordan Oh, Sam Shpall & Wen Yu - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.details
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Bias towards the future.Kristie Miller, Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, James Norton, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):e12859.details
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The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1845-1860.details
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What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?Todd Karhu - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):876-889.details
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Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-31.details
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On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):181-194.details
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Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.details
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Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes 1.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):216-232.details
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Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2053-2075.details
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Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):226-252.details
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Rationality and Success.Preston Greene - 2013 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures?Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):367-376.details
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The Rationality of Near Bias toward both Future and Past Events.Preston Greene, Alex Holcombe, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):905-922.details
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Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.details
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Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
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"Transforming Others: On the Limits of "You "ll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning.Dana Sarah Howard - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):341-370.details
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Painful Art and the Limits of Well-Being.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of Negative Emotions in Art. Palgrave/Macmillan.details
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A Life Worth Living.Aaron Smuts - manuscriptdetails
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.details
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Valuation by behaviour.Wim de Muijnck - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):141-155.details
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Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
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(1 other version)Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Why future-bias isn't rationally evaluable.Callie K. Phillips - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):573-596.details
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To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):711-729.details
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Preferences and Prudential Reasons.Dale Dorsey - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):157-178.details
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Against Time Bias.Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970.details
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Prudence and past selves.Dale Dorsey - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1901-1925.details
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Experience and Time.Brian Garrett - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):427-430.details
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Future-Bias: A (Qualified) Defense.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):351-373.details
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Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247-256.details
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In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.details
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Good and Good for.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Blameworthiness and Time.Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.details
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Past-future preferences for hedonic goods and the utility of experiential memories.Ruth Lee, Jack Shardlow, Patrick A. O'Connor, Lesley Hotson, Rebecca Hotson, Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (8):1181-1211.details
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Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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