- Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
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Logical reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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Dispositional belief, assent, and acceptance.Pascal Engel - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226.details
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Believing, holding true, and accepting.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.details
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Ideology and dystopia.Jon Elster & Hélène Landemore - 2008 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 20 (3):273-289.details
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Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.details
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Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness.Elizabeth Jackson - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4):85-108.details
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Review of Mohan Matthen-Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW]Dustin Stokes - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (3):323-325.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Existentialism as Biology.Ronald de Sousa - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):76-83.details
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Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):451-459.details
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Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Realism and the Absence of Value.Shamik Dasgupta - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):279-322.details
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Promising as Doxastic Entrustment.Jorah Dannenberg - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):425-447.details
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Models As Fictions, Fictions As Models.Gregory Currie - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):296-310.details
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The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport.Leon Culbertson - 2005 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 32 (1):65-86.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Can There be Thought Without Words?—Donald Davidson on Language and Animal Minds.Diana Couto - 2022 - Topoi 41 (3):587-598.details
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Os Limites da Racionalidade: Auto-Engano e Acrasia.Vasco Correia - 2010 - Disputatio 3 (28):1 - 17.details
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Betraying Animals.Steve Cooke - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):183-200.details
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Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.details
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Kant on the Ethics of Belief.Alix Cohen - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):317-334.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border’.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (10):e12949.details
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Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument.Chris Provis - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (1):95-112.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.details
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Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.details
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Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):511-526.details
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Implicit attitudes and the ability argument.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2961-2990.details
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Reliability and social knowledgerelevant responsibility.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Trans/Form/Ação 38 (1):187-212.details
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Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility.Leandro de Brasi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):113-140.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Self-Deception.Anthony R. Booth - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):115 - 130.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):5-16.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Justifying inference to the best explanation as a practical meta-syllogism on dialectical structures.Gregor Betz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3553-3578.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.Lisa Bastian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636.details
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Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism.Marvin Backes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10311-10329.details
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The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.details
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