- Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?Miranda Fricker - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1317-1332.details
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Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability.Christopher Frey - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):237-254.details
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Perceptual experience and seeing that p.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.details
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On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.details
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Knowledge and Ways of Knowing.Craig French - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):353-364.details
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An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes.Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5001-5024.details
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Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience.Nils Franzén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):669-682.details
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The paradox of idealization.Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):461-469.details
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Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):1-20.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Pollock on probability in epistemology. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):455 - 465.details
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Saul Kripke e o paradoxo do dogmatismo.João Rizzio Vicent Fett - 2017 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):227-243.details
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Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.details
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Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.details
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Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.details
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Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):438-444.details
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Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.details
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A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.details
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Radical Knowledge Minimalism.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):223-227.details
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A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):601-616.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Straight talk: Conceptions of sincerity in speech.John Eriksson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):213-234.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.details
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.details
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Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1481-1505.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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Exploring Scientific Inquiry via Agent-Based Modelling.Dunja Šešelja - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (4):537-557.details
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Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.details
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No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
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Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1).details
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Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity.Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Deterministic Chance.Antony Eagle - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):269 - 299.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles.Julien Dutant - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.details
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The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.details
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