- How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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A Topological Approach to Full Belief.Alexandru Baltag, Nick Bezhanishvili, Aybüke Özgün & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):205-244.details
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God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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Hindsight bias is not a bias.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):43-52.details
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Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):294-308.details
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The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.details
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Knowledge as a social kind.Leandro De Brasi - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):130-139.details
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Luminosity in the stream of consciousness.David Jenkins - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1549-1562.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1887-1904.details
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Forgetting.Matthew Frise - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 223-240.details
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Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28.details
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On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief.Jakob Koscholke - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1183-1188.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.details
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Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.details
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How to be an anti-reductionist.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2849-2866.details
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Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.details
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On Virtue, Credit and Safety.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):98-120.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Filosofía de la Mente: el estado de la cuestión.Josep L. Prades - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21 (3):315-332.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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On Extended Rationality.Alan Millar - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):235-245.details
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Coin trials.Martin Smith - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):726-741.details
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Knowledge and the permissibility of action.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2021-2043.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value?Kurt L. Sylvan - 2017 - Synthese 197 (12):5335-5356.details
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¿Puede el conocimiento ser un estado mental?Florencia Rimoldi - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (2):171-201.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2695-2713.details
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Acting on true belief.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2221-2237.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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No justification for lottery losers.Christoph Kelp - unknowndetails
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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Inferentialism and knowledge: Brandom’s arguments against reliabilism.José L. Zalabardo - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):975-993.details
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Inference and Epistemic Transparency.Gabriele Usberti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (3):517-530.details
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What skill is not.Evan Riley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):344-354.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Uncertainty and Persistence: a Bayesian Update Semantics for Probabilistic Expressions.Deniz Rudin - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):365-405.details
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Savoir que l’on sait. La question de la transparence dans les attitudes épistémiques.Neil Kennedy - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):451-478.details
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Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms.Charlie Pelling - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):335-348.details
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