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Rationality versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.details
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Reflection and Self‐Trust.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):75-82.details
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Primitive knowledge disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.details
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Purifying impure virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Infallibilism, evidence and pragmatics.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):626-635.details
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In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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Deference and description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.details
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Cognitive diversity and epistemic norms.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.details
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Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows.Aaron Bronfman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):871-892.details
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Contextualism about Evidential Support.Jessica Brown - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):329-354.details
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A partial defense of extended knowledge.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):39-62.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.details
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Elgin on Science, Art and Understanding.Jochen Briesen - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2651-2671.details
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Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy?Jason Bridges - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):522-547.details
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The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.details
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Replies.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-464.details
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Contextualism, relativism, and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions.Elke Brendel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):101-117.details
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What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.details
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Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists Can Live on the Edge.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.details
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Group understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.details
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Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.details
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Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4065-4081.details
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The diachronic threshold problem.Rodrigo Borges - 2021 - Philosophical Studies.details
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On synchronic dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.details
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Introduction to the special issue ‘knowledge and justification: new perspectives’.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1473-1480.details
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Horwich on Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.Steffen Borge - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):229-253.details
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E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1031-1041.details
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Applied philosophy of language.Emma Borg - unknowndetails
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The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerpdetails
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.details
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A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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Embedded Attitudes.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406.details
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The indexicality of 'knowledge'.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.details
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Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1221-1230.details
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Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.details
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Conversational implicature and the cancellability test.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):156-160.details
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In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.details
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A warranted-assertability defense of a Moorean response to skepticism.Tim Black - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205.details
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What is scientific progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.details
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