- Persistence through function preservation.David Rose - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):97-146.details
|
|
Intentional action without knowledge.David Rose, Alfred Mele & Romy Vekony - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1231-1243.details
|
|
Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.details
|
|
How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
|
|
Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):569-588.details
|
|
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
|
|
The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue.Conny Rhode - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):535-554.details
|
|
Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy.Sara Kier Praëm, Jacob Busch & Carsten Bergenholtz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1531-1545.details
|
|
Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):297-310.details
|
|
Talking to ourselves? Academic philosophy and the public sphere.Chris Norris - 2014 - Think 13 (37):57-72.details
|
|
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
|
|
Philosophical Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.details
|
|
Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.details
|
|
Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknowndetails
|
|
How To Think About Philosophical Methodology.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):447-463.details
|
|
Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
|
|
Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.details
|
|
Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.details
|
|
The method(s) of cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.details
|
|
Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language.Jeffrey Maynes - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):260-278.details
|
|
Moral Judgment and the Duties of Innocent Beneficiaries of Injustice.Matthew Lindauer & Christian Barry - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):671-686.details
|
|
Why Variation Matters to Philosophy.Edouard Machery - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (1):1-22.details
|
|
Thought experiments and philosophical knowledge.Edouard Machery - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.details
|
|
Response to Alexander and Weinberg, Baz and DeutschBy Edouard Machery.Edouard Machery - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):771-788.details
|
|
Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.details
|
|
The ordinary and the experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on method in philosophy.Guy Longworth - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):939-960.details
|
|
Twenty years of experimental philosophy research.Jincai Li & Xiaozhen Zhu - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):29-53.details
|
|
Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.details
|
|
Metaphilosophy and the Role of Intuitions.Julia Langkau - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):781-789.details
|
|
Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
|
|
The brittleness of expertise and why it matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.details
|
|
The armchair and the trolley: an argument for experimental ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.details
|
|
A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
|
|
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
|
|
Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
|
|
Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
|
|
Not Esoteric, Just Fallible: Comment on Starmans and Friedman About Philosophical Expertise.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (10):e12896.details
|
|
Thought experiments, real experiments, and the expertise objection.Christopher Hitchcock - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):205-218.details
|
|
Miscevic and the Stages Defence.Sören Häggqvist - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-8.details
|
|
Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals.Sören Häggqvist - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):741-754.details
|
|
Philosophical Expertise.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):139-144.details
|
|
The faculty of intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.details
|
|
Hybrid expressivism and epistemic justification.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2349-2369.details
|
|
Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.details
|
|
Theories of Reference and Experimental Philosophy.James Genone - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):152-163.details
|
|
Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.details
|
|
Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.details
|
|
The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral.Brian Flanagan & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):165-179.details
|
|
Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference.Brian Flanagan - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):87-95.details
|
|
Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement. [REVIEW]Brian Flanagan - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):345-352.details
|
|