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  1. Belief‐Based Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?Gemma Cornelissen - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (1):85-109.
    Religious beliefs are often singled out for special treatment in secular liberal societies. Yet if a legal exemption is granted for a belief with a religious foundation, the question arises whether a similar, non‐religious moral belief must also be granted an exemption. I argue that common reasons for favoring religious over non‐religious beliefs fail to provide a convincing moral case for drawing a distinction of this nature. I focus on arguments concerning the role of religious beliefs in constituting an individual's (...)
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  • Clinical Cases and Metaphysical Theories of Personal Identity.Gabriel Andrade - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):317-326.
    In this article, we consider three metaphysical theories of personal identity: the soul theory, the body theory, and the psychological theory. Clinical cases are discussed as they present conceptual problems for each of these theories. For the soul theory, the case of Phineas Gage, and cases of pedophilic behavior due to a brain tumor are discussed. For the body theory, hypothetical cases of cephalosomatic anastomosis and actual cases of dicephalic parapagus and craniopagus parasiticus are discussed. For the psychological theory, cases (...)
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  • Moral and Vocational Dilemmas Meet the Common Currency Hypothesis: a Contribution to Value Commensurability.Eleonora Viganò & Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):83-102.
    Moral dilemmas have long been debated in moral philosophy without reaching a definitive consensus. The majority of value pluralists attribute their origin to the incommensurability of moral values, i.e. the statement that, since moral values are many and different in nature, they may conflict and cannot be compared. Neuroscientific studies on the neural common currency show that the comparison between allegedly incompatible alternatives is a practical possibility, namely it is the basis of the way in which the agent evaluates choice (...)
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  • Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-20.
    In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy (...)
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  • Am I Still Me? Personal Identity in Neuroethical Debates.Cordula Brand - 2009 - Medicine Studies 1 (4):393-406.
    Neurosurgery is a topic that evokes many hopes and fears at the same time. One of these fears is concerned with the worry about losing one's identity. Taking this concern seriously, the article deals with the question: Can the concept of ‘personal identity’ be used successfully in normative considerations concerning neurosurgery? This question will be answered in three steps. First, a short introduction to the philosophical debate about personal identity is given. Second, a new theory of personal identity is presented. (...)
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  • On the Basis of Moral Equality: A Rejection of the Relation-First Approach.Giacomo Floris - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):237-250.
    The principle of moral equality is one of the cornerstones of any liberal theory of justice. It is usually assumed that persons’ equal moral status should be grounded in the equal possession of a status-conferring property. Call this the property-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This approach, however, faces some well-known difficulties: in particular, it is difficult to see how the possession of a scalar property can account for persons’ equal moral status. A plausible way of circumventing such (...)
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  • On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism.J. Adam Carter - unknown
    Controversial view agnosticism is the thesis that we are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality and politics. Given that one’s social identity is in no small part a function of one’s positive commitments in controversial areas, CVA has unsurprisingly been regarded as objectionably ‘spineless.’ That said, CVA seems like an unavoidable consequence of a prominent view in the epistemology of disagreement—conformism—according to which the rational response (...)
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  • Women, "False" Memory, and Personal Identity.Sue Campbell - 1997 - Hypatia 12 (2):51 - 82.
    We contest each other's memory claims all the time. I am concerned with how the contesting of memory claims and narratives may be an integral part of many abusive situations. I use the writings of Otto Weininger and the False Memory Syndrome Foundation to explore a particular strategy of discrediting women as rememberers, making them more vulnerable to sexual harm. This strategy relies on the presentation of women as unable to maintain a stable enough sense of self or identity to (...)
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  • Infinity Goes Up on Trial: Must Immortality Be Meaningless?Timothy Chappell - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):30-44.
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  • Williams and the Desirability of Body‐Bound Immortality Revisited.A. G. Gorman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy:1062-1083.
    Bernard Williams argues that human mortality is a good thing because living forever would necessarily be intolerably boring. His argument is often attacked for unfoundedly proposing asymmetrical requirements on the desirability of living for mortal and immortal lives. My first aim in this paper is to advance a new interpretation of Williams' argument that avoids these objections, drawing in part on some of his other writings to contextualize it. My second aim is to show how even the best version of (...)
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  • Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
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  • Hume on the Self.Alan Schwerin - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):65-85.
    In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume’s account of the self.
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  • Why Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity Can Accept a Brain Death Criterion and Biological Definition of Death.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418.
    Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion (...)
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  • Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account.Matthew D. Adler - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (2):123-162.
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  • A Realist Critique of Moralism in Politics. The Autonomy of Bernard Williams's Basic Legitimation Demand.Cristina Voinea - 2015 - Public Reason 7 (1-2).
    In this article I aim to show that one of the criticisms that have been leveled at Williams’s Basic Legitimation Demand, the one that states that it rests on a moral presupposition – that of the equal worth of persons – arises out of a misreading of his realist politics. For this purpose, I will start by sketching Williams’s critique of moralism in ethics, which will serve as the basis of later analyzing his realist critique of moralism in politics. Once (...)
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  • Engineering and the Problem of Moral Overload.Jeroen Van den Hoven, Gert-Jan Lokhorst & Ibo Van de Poel - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):143-155.
    When thinking about ethics, technology is often only mentioned as the source of our problems, not as a potential solution to our moral dilemmas. When thinking about technology, ethics is often only mentioned as a constraint on developments, not as a source and spring of innovation. In this paper, we argue that ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a constraint and technological progress can create moral progress rather than just moral problems. We show this by (...)
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  • Egoism, Empathy, and Self-Other Merging.Joshua May - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):25-39.
    [Emerging Scholar Prize Essay for Spindel Supplement] Some philosophers and psychologists have evaluated psychological egoism against recent experimental work in social psychology. Dan Batson (1991; forthcoming), in particular, argues that empathy tends to induce genuinely altruistic motives in humans. However, some argue that there are egoistic explanations of the data that remain unscathed. I focus here on some recent criticisms based on the idea of self-other merging or "oneness," primarily leveled by Robert Cialdini and his collaborators (1997). These authors argue (...)
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  • Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...)
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  • Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  • In Defense of Imperative Inference.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):59 - 71.
    "Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (...)
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  • Two Dogmas of Moral Theory? Comments on Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure.Eva F. Kittay - 2016 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1):1-11.
    In Moral Failure, Lisa Tessman argues against two principles of moral theory, that ought implies can and that normative theory must be action-guiding. Although Tessman provides a trenchant account of how we are thrust into the misfortune of moral failure, often by our very efforts to act morally, and although she shows, through a discussion well-informed by the latest theorizing in ethics, neuroethics, and psychology, how much more moral theory can do than provide action-guiding principles, I argue that the two (...)
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  • The Brave Officer Rides Again.Andreas Mogensen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):315-329.
    According to the Psychological Account of personal identity, personal identity across time is maintained by some form of psychological overlap or continuance. I show that the Psychological Account has trouble accommodating cases of transient retrograde amnesia. In such cases, the transitivity of psychological continuity may break down. I consider various means of responding to this problem, arguing that the best available response will undercut our ability to rely on intuitions about brain transplantation to support the Psychological Account. When the Psychological (...)
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  • Re-Enchanting The World: An Examination Of Ethics, Religion, And Their Relationship In The Work Of Charles Taylor.David McPherson - 2013 - Dissertation, Marquette University
    In this dissertation I examine the topics of ethics, religion, and their relationship in the work of Charles Taylor. I take Taylor's attempt to confront modern disenchantment by seeking a kind of re-enchantment as my guiding thread. Seeking re-enchantment means, first of all, defending an `engaged realist' account of strong evaluation, i.e., qualitative distinctions of value that are seen as normative for our desires. Secondly, it means overcoming self-enclosure and achieving self-transcendence, which I argue should be understood in terms of (...)
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  • The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport.Leon Culbertson - 2005 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 32 (1):65-86.
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  • Equality of Educational Opportunity: In Defence of a Traditional Concept.Roy Nash - 2004 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 36 (4):361–377.
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  • Women, “False” Memory, and Personal Identity.Sue Campbell - 1997 - Hypatia 12 (2):51-82.
    We contest each other's memory claims all the time. I am concerned with how the contesting of memory claims and narratives may be an integral part of many abusive situations. I use the writings of Otto Weininger and the False Memory Syndrome Foundation to explore a particular strategy of discrediting women as rememberers, making them more vulnerable to sexual harm. This strategy relies on the presentation of women as unable to maintain a stable enough sense of self or identity to (...)
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  • Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
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  • A Theory of Providence for Distributive Justice.Shlomo Dov Rosen - 2018 - Journal of Religious Ethics 46 (1):124-155.
    Distributive justice assumes a morally critical judgment of nature, which typically contradicts providential conceptions. Hence, simple conceptions of divine Providence cannot support distributive justice. This essay analyzes and develops a complex strand of theorizing about Providence within Jewish philosophy that is compatible with distributive justice. According to this conception, the actions of divine Providence express different and mutually exclusive considerations of justice. Therefore, the moral value of outcomes is intransitive between the situations of different people. And while each providential action (...)
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  • On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and “Liberal Metaphysicians”.Andrew Jason Cohen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
    It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...)
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  • The Right and Wrong of Growing Old: Assessing the Argument From Evolution.Bennett Foddy - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):547-560.
    One argument which is frequently levelled against the enhancement of human biology is that we do not understand the evolved function of our bodies well enough to meddle in our biology without producing unintended and potentially catastrophic effects. In particular, this argument is levelled against attempts to slow or eliminate the processes of human ageing, or ‘senescence’, which cause us to grow decrepit before we die. In this article, I claim that even if this argument could usefully be applied against (...)
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  • Introduction.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):325-337.
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  • Personal Identity and the Self in the Online and Offline World.Soraj Hongladarom - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):533-548.
    The emergence of social networking sites has created a problem of how the self is to be understood in the online world. As these sites are social, they relate someone with others in a network. Thus there seems to emerge a new kind of self which exists in the online world. Accounting for the online self here also has implications on how the self in the outside world should be understood. It is argued that, as the use of online social (...)
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  • Crossing the Bridge: The First-Person and Time.Patrick Stokes - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.
    Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the (...)
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  • An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts.Mathieu Beirlaen, Christian Straßer & Joke Meheus - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):285-315.
    We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally (...)
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  • Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
    Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when (...)
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  • The Mineness of Experience.Wolfgang Fasching - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.
    In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I (...)
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  • Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.
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  • The Impossibility of Incommensurable Values.Chris Kelly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):369 - 382.
    Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori argument that (...)
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  • Why Rights? Why Me?Jonathan K. Crane - 2007 - Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (4):559-589.
    That Jews are concerned about human rights is distinct from why Jews should be concerned about rights in the first place. This project analyzes the reasons Jews in the twentieth century put forward to convince co-religionists to take rights seriously. Focusing on the content of these arguments facilitates dividing the proffered rationales into three broad categories--the temporal, the innate, and the philosophical. Analysis of each category reveals subdivisions, reflecting the many ways Jews try to persuade each other to care about (...)
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  • Bernard Williams: Political Realism and the Limits of Legitimacy.Alex Bavister-Gould - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):593-610.
    : A central component of Bernard Williams' political realism is the articulation of a standard of legitimacy from within politics itself: LEG. This standard is presented as basic, inherent in all political orders and the best way to underwrite fundamental liberal principles particular to the modern state, including basic human rights. It does not require, according to Williams, a wider set of liberal values. In the following, I show that where Williams restricts LEG to generating only minimal political protections, seeking (...)
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  • Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.
    Doxastic responsibility matters, morally and epistemologically. Morally, because many of our intuitive ascriptions of blame seem to track back to agents’ apparent responsibility for beliefs; epistemologically because some philosophers identify epistemic justification with deontological permissibility. But there is a powerful argument which seems to show that we are rarely or never responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot control them. I examine various possible responses to this argument, which aim to show either that doxastic responsibility does not require that we (...)
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  • XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
    Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative (...)
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  • Tolerance and Pain.Derek Edyvane - 2011 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (3):405-419.
    It is often thought that tolerance must be painful; the absence of pain is taken as an indication of indifference, an indication that the agent does not really disapprove of the object of her professed tolerance. This article challenges that view by arguing that the association of tolerance and pain depends ultimately upon the contentious assumption that inner conflict is a form of dysfunction. By unsettling that assumption, it is possible to unsettle the idea that one?s tolerance of others must (...)
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  • Political Equality by Precedent.Hilliard Aronovitch - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (1):110-126.
    This article asks about the justification for the principle of political equality in the sense of equal entitlement to basic rights. A preliminary portion criticizes standard justifications that refer to a property or properties all human beings share; these fail because they are untrue, irrelevant, or question-begging. The more substantial and constructive portion of the article then argues for a different, indirect mode of justification, based on rebuttals of historical presumptions of inequality and the actual evolution of the idea of (...)
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  • The Art of War Corpus and Chinese Just War Ethics Past and Present.Ping-Cheung Lo - 2012 - Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (3):404-446.
    The idea of “just war” is not alien to Chinese thought. The term “yi zhan” (usually translated as “just war” or “righteous war” in English) is used in Mencius, was renewed by Mao Zedong, and is still being used in China today (zhengyi zhanzheng). The best place to start exploring this Chinese idea is in the enormous Art of War corpus in premodern China, of which the Seven Military Classics is the best representative. This set of treatises served as the (...)
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  • Ageing, Anti-Ageing, and Anti-Anti-Ageing: Who Are the Progressives in the Debate on the Future of Human Biological Ageing? [REVIEW]John Albert Vincent - 2009 - Medicine Studies 1 (3):197-208.
    This paper provides both an overview of and a personal perspective on the field of ‘anti-ageing’. In the late 20th century, progress in the science of ageing re-invigorated activity designed to avoid biological ageing. For some the objective was to abolish the need to die of old age. This anti-ageing movement includes a diverse range of people: hard scientists working in well-funded and established university laboratories, slick corporate-marketing executives and new-age entrepreneurs selling herbal elixirs. The movement has attracted anti-anti-ageing critical (...)
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  • What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
    In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...)
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.
    The ethics of belief is concerned with the question what we should believe. According to evidentialism, one should believe something if and only if one has adequate evidence for what one believes. According to classic pragmatism, other features besides evidence, such as practical reasons, can make it the case that one should believe something. According to a new kind of pragmatism, some epistemic notions may depend on one’s practical interests, even if what one should believe is independent of one’s practical (...)
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  • How to Be a Normative Expressivist.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
    Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does (...)
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  • Description and Expression: Physicalism Restricted.Virgil Aldrich - 1977 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):149 – 164.
    'Material thing' is a two-level concept. In 'first-order extension' - the field of perceptual experience - it is a 'body' that may 'body forth' (show, express) a 'content', like the bodies of persons or pictures. In 'second-order extension' -the physical field or space - it is a 'physical object' whose micro-constitution is the target of the reference of theoretical terms or formulae. As such, it has no content - nothing to 'express'. In the description of a material thing in first-order (...)
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