- Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.details
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Normativity For Naturalists.Brian Leiter - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):64-79.details
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Reactivity and Refuge.Michelle Mason - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 143-162.details
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Is it Better to Love Better Things?Aaron Smuts - 2014 - In Christian Maurer, Tony Milligan & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), Love and Its Objects: What Can We Care For? Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The People Problem.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. pp. 141.details
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Reactive Attitudes.Michelle Mason - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Love and Free Will.Aaron Smuts - manuscriptdetails
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Incompatibilism and personal relationships: another look at strawson's objective attitude.Seth Shabo - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):131-147.details
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In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love.Aaron Smuts - details
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Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame.Seth Shabo - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.details
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Responsibility Ascriptions in Technology Development and Engineering: Three Perspectives. [REVIEW]Neelke Doorn - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):69-90.details
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The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.details
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Holding others responsible.Coleen Macnamara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.details
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(1 other version)More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The objective attitude.Tamler Sommers - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.details
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Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment‘.Paul Russell & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2006 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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On having control over our actions.Doug Hardman - 2024 - Philosophical Investigations 47 (2):165-177.details
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Social media, interpersonal relations and the objective attitude.Michael-John Turp - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (3):269-279.details
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Responsibility and the limits of good and evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2705-2727.details
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Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame.Per-Erik Milam & Luke Brunning - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability.Szigeti Andras - 2012 - Philosophica 85 (2):91-121.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson's Intrapersonal Defense of Compatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):95-124.details
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Free Will in Context.Patrick Grim - 2007 - Behavioral Science and the Law 25:183-201.details
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(1 other version)More Work for Hard Incompatibilism1.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Blaming the Buddha: Buddhism and Moral Responsibility.Bobby Bingle - 2018 - Sophia 57 (2):295-311.details
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Virtue unrewarded: Morality without moral responsibility.Bruce N. Waller - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):427-447.details
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Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility.James Lenman - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):7-31.details
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Knowing About Responsibility.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):201-216.details
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Anger and Absurdity.Daniel Coren - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):717-732.details
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In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.details
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In Defense of Love Internalism.D. Justin Coates - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):233-255.details
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The Power to Make Others Worship.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):221 - 237.details
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Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them.Robert Schroer & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):357-387.details
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A Defense of Derk Pereboom’s Containment Policy.Jeremy Scharoun & Neil Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1291-1307.details
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Strawson's underappreciated argumentative structure.Nicholas Sars - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):1045-1060.details
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Resentment, Parenting, and Strawson’s Compatibilism.Daniel Coren - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):43-65.details
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Thinking: The Life of the Mind I. London: Martin Secker and Warburg Limited. Aune, Bruce (1967)“Hypotheticals and 'Can': Another Look,” Analysis, 27 (June), pp. 191–195. Repr. in Gary Watson (ed.)(1982), pp. 36–41. Austin, John L.(1956)“Ifs and Cans,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 42, pp. [REVIEW]Jan Bransen & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 1978 - Philosophy 28 (1):1-18.details
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Automatic Behavior and Moral Agency: Defending the Concept of Personhood from Empirically Based Skepticism.C. D. Meyers - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):193-209.details
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Further Reflections on The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert: A Reply to Nelkin and Pereboom.Michael McKenna - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):277-290.details
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Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense.J. P. Messina - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):189-208.details
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Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):208-229.details
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Harry Frankfurt: El agente moral y la noción de incondicionalidad.Miquel Beltrán - 1994 - Convivium: revista de filosofía 6:91.details
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THE CONTOURS OF FREE WILL SCEPTICISM.Simon Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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