- Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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Recapture Results and Classical Logic.Camillo Fiore & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2023 - Mind 132 (527):762–788.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Full Blooded Entitlement.Martin Smith - 2019 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism.Luca Moretti - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):576-586.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Are there Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality?Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):329-344.details
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Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2021 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidential Anti-Scepticism.details
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Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.details
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What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.details
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New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.details
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Hyperintensional Ω-Logic.David Elohim - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 65-82.details
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Hyperintensional Ω-Logic.David Elohim - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag.details
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Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism.John Pittard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5009-5038.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Hume and reliabilism.Qu Hsueh - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):27-51.details
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Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives : is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology.Michael Wilby - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1).details
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How to trust a scientist.Jeroen De Ridder - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 93:11-20.details
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Against Quasi-Fideism.Jeroen de Ridder - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):223-243.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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Accuracy and ur-prior conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.details
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Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):80-100.details
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.details
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What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.details
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Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.details
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Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!).Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):235-254.details
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The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.details
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Testimonial hinges.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):53-68.details
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Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3521-3532.details
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Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):217-234.details
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Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.details
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Introduction.Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):221-234.details
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How to perceive reasons.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):77-88.details
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Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):402-415.details
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Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.details
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Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self‐Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism.E. J. Coffman - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):78-98.details
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Could knowledge-talk be largely non-literal?Julianne Chung - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):383-411.details
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Four challenges to the a priori—a posteriori distinction.Albert Casullo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2701-2724.details
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