- Epistemic Projects, Indispensability, and the Structure of Modal Thought.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):611-638.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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Anti-exceptionalism and the justification of basic logical principles.Matthew Carlson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-19.details
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Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.details
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Doubt, circularity and the Moorean response to the sceptic.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):1–14.details
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Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.details
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Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.details
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In Defense of the Implicit Commitment Thesis.Ethan Brauer - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Four basic logical issues.Ross Brady & Penelope Rush - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):488-508.details
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Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo.Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.details
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Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination.Cameron Boult - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.details
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Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: an Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant.Mark J. Boone - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):377-398.details
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Why Reid was no dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4511-4525.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Circularity, Scepticism and Epistemic Relativism.Steven Bland - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (2):150-162.details
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The anecdotal nature of religious disagreements.Daniele Bertini - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80 (3):215-229.details
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Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2019 - Noûs (4):956-984.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.details
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In defense of Newtonian induction: Hume’s problem of induction and the universalization of primary qualities.Ori Belkind - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):14.details
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In defense of Newtonian induction: Hume’s problem of induction and the universalization of primary qualities.Ori Belkind - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-26.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism.Dan Baras - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):368-389.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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No-‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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About the warrants of computer-based empirical knowledge.Anouk Barberousse & Marion Vorms - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3595-3620.details
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In defense of flip-flopping.Andrew M. Bailey & Amy Seymour - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13907-13924.details
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What Logical Evidence Could not be.Matteo Baggio - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2559–2587.details
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Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism.Matteo Baggio - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-27.details
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The Sceptic, The Outsider, and Other Minds.Anita Avramides - 2022 - Topoi 42 (1):175-186.details
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Mere faith and entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.details
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How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
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An old problem for the new rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.details
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Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421.details
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Pragmatic Scruples and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):365-380.details
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A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.details
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Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):333-354.details
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Rethinking Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):587-607.details
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El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.details
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Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.details
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Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.details
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Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem.Jon Altschul - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.details
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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What is reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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Planning on a Prior Intention.Facundo Alonso - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265.details
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Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.details
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