- Are philosophers expert intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.details
|
|
The reliability challenge to moral intuitions.Dario Cecchini - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (2):1-13.details
|
|
Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation, details
|
|
Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition.Dario Cecchini - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):4-28.details
|
|
Thought Experiments and Experimental Ethics.Thomas Pölzler & Norbert Paulo - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Evolutionary Ethics.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics.details
|
|
Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology.Miguel Egler - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (1):48-66.details
|
|
Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Women and Deviance in Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2013 - In Katrina Hutchison & Fiona Jenkins (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 61--80.details
|
|
Understanding the Role and Nature of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry.Nicolas Nicola - 2017 - Dissertation, Queen's Universitydetails
|
|
Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911.details
|
|
Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.details
|
|
Reproducibility of empirical findings: experiments in philosophy and beyond.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - unknowndetails
|
|
How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
|
|
Experimental Philosophy and the Underrepresentation of Women.Carrie Figdor & Matt L. Drabek - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 590-602.details
|
|
On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):95-116.details
|
|
(1 other version)Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.details
|
|
On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.details
|
|
Expressive Responding, Experimental Philosophy, and Philosophical Expertise.Shane Nicholas Glackin - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):909-931.details
|
|
Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.details
|
|
(1 other version)Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. [REVIEW]David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.details
|
|
Tracking instability in our philosophical judgments: Is it intuitive?Jennifer Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.details
|
|
Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.David Colaço, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich & Edouard Machery - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):199-212.details
|
|
Intuition as a Capacity for a Priori Knowledge.Henry W. Pickford - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (28):147-169.details
|
|
Moral judgments, gender, and antisocial preferences: an experimental study.Juergen Bracht & Adam Zylbersztejn - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (3-4):389-406.details
|
|
Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.details
|
|
Intuitivní zahradník: Epistemický status morálních intuic.Jan Horský - 2014 - Pro-Fil 2014 (S1):15-35.details
|
|
A Soft Defense of a Utilitarian Principle of Criminalization.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (1):123-141.details
|
|
Against the Linguistic Analogy.Noel B. Martin - unknowndetails
|
|
A Feminist Defense of Moderate Moral Intuitionism.Bill J. C. Cameron - unknowndetails
|
|