Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism

Synthese 160 (1):13-20 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Arguing for mathematical realism on the basis of Field’s explanationist version of the Quine–Putnam Indispensability argument, Alan Baker has recently claimed to have found an instance of a genuine mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon. While I agree that Baker presents a very interesting example in which mathematics plays an essential explanatory role, I show that this example, and the argument built upon it, begs the question against the mathematical nominalist
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BANITT
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-11-18
View other versions
Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
471 (#16,858)

6 months
16 (#47,849)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?