Kant on the Relation of Intuition to Cognition

In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan (2016)
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Abstract

Recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. In this paper we show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian cognition and we suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of cognition.

Author Profiles

Andrew Stephenson
University of Southampton
Anil Gomes
Oxford University

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