- Intentionalism and pain.D. T. Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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The Mind's Awareness of Itself.Fred Dretske - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-124.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
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(1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1993 - In Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.details
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What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.details
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Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain.Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.details
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Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.details
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Knowing what I see.Alex Byrne - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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(1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
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Emotional introspection.William E. Seager - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.details
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What is it like to like?William S. Robinson - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.details
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A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.details
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The location of pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.details
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Is feeling pain the perception of something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.details
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Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study.Murat Aydede (ed.) - 2005 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Stanford, CA: MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.details
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Is introspection inferential?Murat Aydede - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.details
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Qualia ain't in the head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Is the experience of pain transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.details
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D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2008 - MIT Press.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.details
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Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Sensory Qualities.Austen Clark - 1992 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.details
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Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.details
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(1 other version)Sensory Qualities. [REVIEW]C. L. Hardin - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):244-246.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):640-642.details
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