- The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1984 - In David Copp & David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, reason, and truth: new essays on the foundations of ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 49-78.details
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Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.details
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Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.details
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Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do).Jeroen Hopster - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (5-6):41.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):491-509.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The “Just Too Different” Objection to Normative Naturalism.Hille Paakkunainen - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12473.details
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No Coincidence?Matthew S. Bedke - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:102-125.details
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Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics.Gideon Rosen - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 151-169.details
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Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.details
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(1 other version)Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.details
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Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity.Matthew Braddock - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):91-113.details
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Ethics and Evolutionary Theory.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):502-515.details
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From Isolation to Skepticism.Scott Hill - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668.details
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Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.details
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Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.details
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Evolution and Moral Realism.Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):981-1006.details
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The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.Joshua Greene - 2013 - New York: Penguin Press.details
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Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.details
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Varieties of Necessity.Kit Fine - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 253-281.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Explanations Defended.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 241--262.details
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Knowing What Matters.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2017 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Does Anything Really Matter? Responses to Parfit. pp. 149-167.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Evolution and Normative Scepticism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488.details
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Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.details
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The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.details
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Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy.Michael Ruse - 1986 - New York, NY: Prometheus Books.details
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What are moral intuitions and why should we care about them? A neurobiological perspective.John Allman & Jim Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):164-185.details
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Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.details
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Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.details
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The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.details
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