- (1 other version)What Is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), Truth, Objects, Infinity: New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It.Sharon Street - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.details
|
|
Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.details
|
|
Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.details
|
|
(2 other versions)A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-30.details
|
|
Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have it Both Ways.Sharon Street - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-32.details
|
|
Bad bootstrapping: the problem with third-factor replies to the Darwinian Dilemma for moral realism.Michelle M. Dyke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2115-2128.details
|
|
Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.David Faraci - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
|
|
Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation.Harjit Bhogal - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):677-694.details
|
|
How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments.David Copp - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):231-245.details
|
|
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
|
|
When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?Justin Morton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):265-280.details
|
|
No Coincidence?Matthew S. Bedke - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:102-125.details
|
|
What Makes Evolution a Defeater?Matt Lutz - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1105-1126.details
|
|
Causes and Coincidences.David Owens - 1990 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):49-64.details
|
|
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.Micah Lott - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):71-96.details
|
|
Coincidence and Common Cause.Tamar Lando - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):132-151.details
|
|
Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism.Øystein Linnebo - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574.details
|
|
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.details
|
|
Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.details
|
|
(1 other version)Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics. pp. 215-252.details
|
|
Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.details
|
|
Statistical Mechanical Imperialism.Brad Weslake - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-257.details
|
|
Extra-Physical Structure in a Physical World? or, Is the Study of Life Provincial?John T. Roberts - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):221-243.details
|
|
(1 other version)What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro (eds.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor). Springer.details
|
|
From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past Hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences.Mathias Frisch - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1001-1011.details
|
|
Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?Kevin Brosnan - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.details
|
|
What Are Mathematical Coincidences ?M. Lange - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):307-340.details
|
|
On the evolutionary debunking of morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.details
|
|
Levels of explanation reconceived.Angela Potochnik - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):59-72.details
|
|
Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.details
|
|
The metaphysics within physics.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
|
|
(2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
|
|
A critical look at inflationary cosmology.John Earman & Jesus Mosterin - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):1-49.details
|
|
Darwinian skepticism about moral realism.David Copp - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):186-206.details
|
|
The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
|
|
Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.details
|
|
Well‐Ordered Science.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - In Science, truth, and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|