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Social content and psychological content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson.details
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Ignorance of meaning.Gabriel Segal - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language. Oxford University Press.details
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Content: Wide vs. narrow.Kent Bach - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. Routledge.details
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All the Difference in the World.Tim Crane - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):1-25.details
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The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.details
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The nature of narrow content.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.details
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Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content.Alex Byrne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3017-3026.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Individuation and causation in psychology.Tyler Burge - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (4):303-22.details
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Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.details
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Direct and indirect belief.Curtis Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.details
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Belief states and narrow content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.details
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Content and self-knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.details
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Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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Horgan and Tienson on phenomenology and intentionality.Andrew Bailey & Bradley Richards - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2024 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Narrow content meets fat syntax.Stephen P. Stich - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.details
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What narrow content is not.Ned Block - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.details
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Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics.Barry M. Loewer (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.details
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Beyond belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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Narrow content and narrow interpretation.Stephen L. White - 1991 - In The Unity of the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Reply to Speaks.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3061-3065.details
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Reply to Byrne.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3049-3054.details
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Social norms and narrow content.Meredith Williams - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):425-462.details
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Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind.Robert Andrew Wilson - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Partial character and the language of thought.Stephen L. White - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (4):347-65.details
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In Defense of a Different Taxonomy: A Reply to Owens.Valerie Walker - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):425 - 431.details
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Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem.Kenneth Taylor - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):355-72.details
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Galacticism, thought-relativism, quasi-internalism.Jeff Speaks - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3037-3047.details
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Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.details
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Seeing What is not There.Gabriel Segal - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (2):189.details
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A Slim Book About Narrow Content.Gabriel Segal - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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How Narrow is Narrow Content?François Recanati - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-229.details
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Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne.details
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Charity, interpretation, and belief.Colin McGinn - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):521-535.details
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Narrow content.Michael McDermott - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):277-88.details
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Solipsistic semantics.Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):595-614.details
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Real narrow content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.details
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Representation and narrow belief.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.details
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Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.details
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Mental causation.Frank Jackson - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):377-413.details
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In Defence of Narrow Content. [REVIEW]Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):539-550.details
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Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.details
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Why broad content can’t influence behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.details
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.details
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Replies.Jerry Fodor - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):50–57.details
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A modal argument for narrow content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.details
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Must psychology be individualistic?Frances Egan - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.details
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