- Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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How to think about mental qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.details
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Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2004 - In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.details
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The superiority of Hop to HOT.William G. Lycan - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 93â114.details
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The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Blackwell. pp. 288–297.details
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The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.details
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Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.N. Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):443-448.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”.Kati Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.details
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Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character.Jennifer Matey - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer “It” to “Me”?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177.details
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How many kinds of consciousness?David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.details
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What are the contents of experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.details
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The case for phenomenal externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.details
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The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.details
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A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):3-4.details
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Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
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Experience as representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.details
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The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.details
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The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Review of 'The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts' by Rocco J. Gennaro. [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.details
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Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.Pete Mandik - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.details
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Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.David Chalmers - 2013 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness.David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.details
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The Brain and its States.Richard Brown - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 211-238.details
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Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.details
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What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.details
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Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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