- (1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Freedom Within Reason.Susan Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Bad is freer than good: Positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will.Gilad Feldman, Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Roy F. Baumeister - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:26-40.details
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Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C):234-246.details
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The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism.Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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An error theory for compatibilist intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.details
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A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will.Eddy Nahmias & Morgan Thompson - 2014 - In Edouard Machery & Elizabeth O'Neill (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions.A. Feltz & E. T. Cokely - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1771--1776.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe de Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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Freedom evolves.Daniel Clement Dennett - 2003 - New York: Viking Press.details
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Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.details
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Causal judgment and moral judgment: Two experiments.Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser - 2008 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, 3 Vols. MIT Press.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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Are the folk agent-causationists?Jason Turner & Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.details
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(1 other version)The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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The rise of compatibilism: A case study in the quantitative history of philosophy.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):260-270.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Believing versus disbelieving in free will: Correlates and consequences.Roy Baumeister - 2012 - Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):736-745.details
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Compatibilism can be natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.details
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(1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.details
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(3 other versions)Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.details
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Contemporary ordinary language philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.details
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Essai philosophique sur les probabilités.Pierre-Simon Laplace & Maurice Solovine - 1814 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 30 (1):1-2.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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(1 other version)Attributions of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 257–278.details
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Preface by.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - In The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not.Robert N. McCauley - 2011 - Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Experimental Philosophy.Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.details
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.Peter van Inwagen - 1988details
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(1 other version)Compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Responsibility, Freedom, and Reason. [REVIEW]John Martin Fischer - 1992 - Ethics 102 (2):368-389.details
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