- Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.details
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What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
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Is Rationality Normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.details
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The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
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Shmagency revisited.David Enoch - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors about Error Theory.Charles Cote-Bouchard & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.C. Cowie & Alexander Greenberg - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 173-196.details
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Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Moore's problem with iterated belief.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43.details
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Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.details
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The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.details
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