- A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism.Davide Fassio - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):343-364.details
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Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals.J. Adam Carter - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness?Michael Vollmer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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On the fittingness of agential evaluations.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):251–268.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
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Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):920-947.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177.details
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Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-16.details
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Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1951-1966.details
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Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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To believe is to believe true.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):131-136.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.details
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The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning.Andy Mueller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5395-5414.details
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How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.details
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Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms.Alexander Miller & Seyed Ali Kalantari - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):575-584.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Engel on doxastic correctness.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1451-1462.details
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The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.details
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Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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The Norms of Belief as the Norms of Commitment: A Case for Pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy (00):1-17.details
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The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):474-490.details
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Transparency and the truth norm of belief.Alireza Kazemi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints.Alireza Kazemi - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (3):437-457.details
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Normativity in the Philosophy of Science.Marie I. Kaiser - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):36-62.details
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Transparency and the ethics of belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.details
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No, one should not believe all truths.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh.Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:128-145.details
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Understanding of the norm of political discourse.Emma C. Gordon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-13.details
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On the alleged normative significance of a platitude.Benoit Https://Orcidorg Gaultier - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):42-52.details
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