Charles Sanders Peirce has been characterized as the greatest American philosophic genius. He is the creator of pragmatism and one of the founders of modern logic. James, Royce, Schroder, and Dewey have acknowledged their great indebtedness to him. A laboratory scientist, he made notable contributions to geodesy, astronomy, psychology, induction, probability, and scientific method. He introduced into modern philosophy the doctrine of scholastic realism, developed the concepts of chance, continuity, and objective law, and showed the philosophical significance of the theory (...) of signs and mathematical logic. The present series is the first published edition of his systematic works. (shrink)

Chapter 1 FROM ORDER TO DISORDER 5 mins. John enters and goes into his office. He says something very quickly about having made a bad mistake. He had sent the review of a paper. . . . The rest of the sentence is inaudible. 5 mins.

Inviting a reappraisal of the status of scientific knowledge, Andrew Pickering suggests that scientists are not mere passive observers and reporters of nature.

Role of the entrepreneur in a distinct role of profit.

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism. Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to (...) evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society. (shrink)

v. 1. The collective use and evolution of concepts.

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.

The theory of the economics of research played a central role in the analysis of scientific method of Charles Sanders Peirce. The present paper describes Peirce's project as he saw it and then puts its machinery to work in an analysis of current issues in the philosophy of science. The aim is to show that, even apart from their historical interest, Peirce's ideas on this subject have a substantial systematic interest.

(1) What may be gained by applying concepts generalised from economics to methodological problems? The perspective of cost-benefit analysis ('CBA' for short) may help the researcher to see what sorts of questions he should take into account when dealing with particular methodological problems. This claim is supported by applying generalised CBA-thinking to two standard problems of methodology. (2) In the practice of research the handling of basic statements does not normally constitute any problem, and no conscious decision is involved. In (...) the methodological reconstruction the key questions are: 'How can a particular basic statement be criticised?' and 'What are the costs of defending a statement that is "problematic"?' The problem of the empirical 'base' is an investment problem: whether or not to invest time and effort into processing a particular basic statement into a falsifying hypothesis for the theory we wish to test. The valuation of the costs of rejecting or, as the case may be, of defending a basic statement, are objective. (3) With respect to theories, in basic science, the issue is not one of acceptance or rejection of a single theory, but rather of theory preference. Both the rational response to a falsification and rational theory preference are governed by CBA-considerations. The option for one of two competing theories is based upon a CBA where the valuation of benefits and costs is objective. Theory change is an objective process, at least in those fields, where theorising is closely controlled by empirical testing: the better theory drives out the less good theory. The costs of defending a theory that is less good than its competitor are mainly epistemic resources forgone. The use of CBA in methodology not only is compatible with Popper's position, but it may pay to view Popper's methodology as an application of CBA to epistemic situations. (shrink)

Professor Price has enlarged his widely known and influential study of science and the humanities to include much new material, extraordinarily broad in its range: from ancient automata, talismans and symbols, to the differences of modern science and technology. Science since Babylon is now more fascinating and useful than ever to anyone concerned with the humanistic understanding of science. Originating in a series of five public lectures delivered under the auspices of the history department at Yale University in 1959, this (...) book is an investigation of the circumstances and consequences of certain vital decisions relating to scientific crises which have the world to its present state of scientific and technological development. Not just another book on "History of Science," it is a plea, an exemplification for a whole new range of studies to take its place in the territory between the humanities and the sciences. The chapter on "Diseases of Science" has received much public attention as an analysis of the present structure and probable future of the organization of science. The author documents his study with accounts of his own researches in his specific fields of interest, relating them to the "crises" which he believes to be of paramount importance. (shrink)

The "Notes of Dr. Smith's Rhetorick Lectures," discovered in 1958 by a University of Aberdeen professor, consists of lecture notes taken by two of Smith's students at the University of Glasgow in 1762-1763. There are thirty lectures in the collection, all on rhetoric and the different kinds or characteristics of style. The book is divided into "an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech" and "an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to (...) persuasion or entertainment." The species of communication discussed include descriptive and narrative (or historical) composition, poetry, demonstrative oratory, panegyric, didactic or scientific language, deliberative oratory, and judicial or forensic oratory. The subjects addressed in his teachings include the style and genius of some of the best of the ancient writers and poets, especially the historians and the English classics. (shrink)

Analysis of effects of economic growth on technological changes and inventions - covers patents, innovations in various industries, the role of intellectual stimulus, productivity advance and the extent of the market, etc. Comprehensive statistical tables, and list of inventions pp. 217 to 328.

The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists can more formally 'stake their reputation', is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent in (...) examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study. (shrink)

The writing of history typically involves opinions that cannot be established by historical evidence. This 'involvement' takes two main forms: first, the intimation of evaluative opinions is often the point of historical narratives; and second, as Weber maintained, opinion plays a constitutive role-the identification of historical objects, of explanatory problems, and perhaps even the selection of solutions to these problems is governed by opinions or commitments that cannot be proven historically. The comments of both Bulmer and Camic, for example, presume (...) the validity of opinions about what was and was not important in the history of American sociology. I reject these opinions. In the book, the rejection was intimated. Perhaps the most useful thing I can do in this reply is to identify and sharpen some of the differences in unprovable opinions between myself and the critics though I must say that they were charitable and mild critics indeed-and make explicit some of the things that I wished to intimate in the historical discussion but could not prove. There are two reasons for doing this: Most of the questions raised by each of the commentators can be more easily addressed if these hidden themes and differences of opinion are made more explicit. A more important reason is this: some of these conflicts might be turned into answerable historical problems. (shrink)

Does the viability of the discovery program depend on showing either (1) that methods of generating new problem solutions, per se, have special probative weight (the per se thesis); or, (2) that the original conception of an idea is logically continuous with its justification (anti-divorce thesis)? Many writers have identified these as the key issues of the discovery debate. McLaughlin, Pera, and others recently have defended the discovery program by attacking the divorce thesis, while Laudan has attacked the discovery program (...) by rejecting the per se thesis. This disagreement over the central issue has led to communication breakdown. I contend that both friends and foes of discovery mistake the central issues. Recognizing a form of divorce helps rather than hurts the discovery program. However, the per se thesis is not essential to the program (nor is the related debate over novel prediction); hence, the status of the per se thesis is a side issue. With these clarifications in hand, we can proceed to the next stage of the discovery debate--the development (or revival) of a generative conception of justification which goes beyond consequentialism to forge a strong linkage of generation (or rather, generatability) with justification. (shrink)

Robert John Ackermann deals decisively with the problem of relativism that has plagued post-empiricist philosophy of science. Recognizing that theory and data are mediated by data domains (bordered data sets produced by scientific instruments), he argues that the use of instruments breaks the dependency of observation on theory and thus creates a reasoned basis for scientific objectivity. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist (...) of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

"Legend is overdue for replacement, and an adequate replacement must attend to the process of science as carefully as Hull has done. I share his vision of a serious account of the social and intellectual dynamics of science that will avoid both the rosy blur of Legend and the facile charms of relativism.... Because of [Hull's] deep concern with the ways in which research is actually done, Science as a Process begins an important project in the study of science. It (...) is one of a distinguished series of books, which Hull himself edits."—Philip Kitcher, Nature "In Science as a Process, [David Hull] argues that the tension between cooperation and competition is exactly what makes science so successful.... Hull takes an unusual approach to his subject. He applies the rules of evolution in nature to the evolution of science, arguing that the same kinds of forces responsible for shaping the rise and demise of species also act on the development of scientific ideas."—Natalie Angier, New York Times Book Review "By far the most professional and thorough case in favour of an evolutionary philosophy of science ever to have been made. It contains excellent short histories of evolutionary biology and of systematics (the science of classifying living things); an important and original account of modern systematic controversy; a counter-attack against the philosophical critics of evolutionary philosophy; social-psychological evidence, collected by Hull himself, to show that science does have the character demanded by his philosophy; and a philosophical analysis of evolution which is general enough to apply to both biological and historical change."—Mark Ridley, Times Literary Supplement "Hull is primarily interested in how social interactions within the scientific community can help or hinder the process by which new theories and techniques get accepted.... The claim that science is a process for selecting out the best new ideas is not a new one, but Hull tells us exactly how scientists go about it, and he is prepared to accept that at least to some extent, the social activities of the scientists promoting a new idea can affect its chances of being accepted."—Peter J. Bowler, Archives of Natural History "I have been doing philosophy of science now for twenty-five years, and whilst I would never have claimed that I knew everything, I felt that I had a really good handle on the nature of science, Again and again, Hull was able to show me just how incomplete my understanding was.... Moreover, [Science as a Process] is one of the most compulsively readable books that I have ever encountered."—Michael Ruse, Biology and Philosophy. (shrink)

There is not, of course, a one-to-one relation between policy conclusions and the conclusions of positive economics; if there were, there would be no ...

This work opens with a development of the notion of Unfathomed Knowledge, which Bartley makes clear by using it to explain such recent scientific advances as the development of drugs for the treatment of AIDS, and by showing its implications for such far-flung fields as the Marxist theory of alienation, the sociology of knowledge, patent law, and morality.

Enth.: Dugoald Stewart's account of Adam Smith / ed. by I.S. Ross.

Simonton examines the idea of the genius through his own theory called chance-configuration theory.

Probably the most celebrated controversy in all of the history of science was that between Newton and Leibniz over the invention of the calculus. The argument ranged far beyond a mere priority dispute and took on the character of a war between two different philosophies of nature. Newton was the first to devise the methods of the calculus, but Leibniz (who independently discovered virtually identical methods) was the first to publish, in 1684. Mutual toleration passed into suspicion and, at last, (...) denunciation of each by the other as a fraud and a plagiarist. The affair became a scandal, as British mathematicians asserted Newton's claims before the public while their Continental colleagues hotly defended Leibniz's priority. Professor Hall analyzes the situation out of which the dispute arose, the circumstances that caused it to become embittered, the dispositions of the chief actors, and the shifts in their opinions of each other. (shrink)