- Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
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Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).details
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What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives.Christopher Kennedy - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Could've Thought Otherwise.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12).details
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VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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Rejecting ethical deflationism.Jacob Ross - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):742-768.details
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Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
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Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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Believing, holding true, and accepting.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.details
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Belief versus acceptance.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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``The Problem of Deduction".Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - In Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.details
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Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities.John C. Harsanyi - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (1):1-30.details
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Dispositional belief, assent, and acceptance.Pascal Engel - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226.details
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