- Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Are there counterexamples to the consistency principle?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
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Symbolic belief in social cognition.Evan Westra - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):388-408.details
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Na-na, na-na, Boo-Boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo.Mark Walker - 2022 - Manuscrito 45 (2):1-49.details
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Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669.details
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Replies to Fitelson and Konek.Julia Staffel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3155-3167.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems.Daniel Rothschild - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1979-1995.details
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Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency.Raimund Pils - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-21.details
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A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification.Raimund Pils - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):450-467.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
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Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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'Belief' and Belief.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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The how and why of approximating Bayesian ideals.Nicholas Makins - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):528-543.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Eleven angry men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.details
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A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre.Clayton Littlejohn - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2683-2696.details
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Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks.Benjamin A. Levinstein & Daniel A. Herrmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.details
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Just Probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Counterfactuals and Probability. [REVIEW]Justin Khoo - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):489-495.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Knowledge by constraint.Ben Holguín - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28.details
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Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
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Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):450-456.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.details
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Losing Confidence in Luminosity.Simon Goldstein & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Noûs (4):1-30.details
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