- Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Twardowski i przygodna przyszłość. Prawdopodobieństwo kontra Cienka Czerwona Linia.Jakub Węgrecki - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (4):83-101.details
|
|
.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.details
|
|
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?Rima Basu - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 191-210.details
|
|
Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Jie Gao - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
|
|
The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
|
|
Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
|
|
Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
|
|
Are Algorithms Value-Free?Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2023 - Journal Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):1-35.details
|
|
On what we should believe (and when (and why) we should believe what we know we should not believe).Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
|
|
Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In The Future of Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A range of replies.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (16).details
|
|
The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Nonexistence and Aboutness: The Bandersnatches of Dubuque.Stephen Yablo - 2020 - Critica 52 (154).details
|
|
Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
|
|
Four grades of ignorance-involvement and how they nourish the cognitive economy.John Woods - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3339-3368.details
|
|
Acting on knowledge-how.Timothy Williamson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).details
|
|
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).details
|
|
New Semantics for Bayesian Inference: The Interpretive Problem and Its Solutions.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):696-718.details
|
|
Gender and first-person authority.Gus Turyn - 2023 - Synthese 201 (122):1-19.details
|
|
Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6739-6765.details
|
|
Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
|
|
Expectation Biases and Context Management with Negative Polar Questions.Alex Silk - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (1):51-92.details
|
|
How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.details
|
|
Knowledge and decision: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Moritz Schulz, Patricia Rich, Jakob Koscholke & Roman Heil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-13.details
|
|
What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
|
|
The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
|
|
Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
|
|
Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
|
|
Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
|
|
The logic of probabilistic knowledge.Patricia Rich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1703-1725.details
|
|
The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
|
|
Perceptual experience and degrees of belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.details
|
|
A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.details
|
|
Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience.Savannah Pearlman & Williams Elizabeth - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).details
|
|
Skills as Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese & Beddor Bob - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):609-624.details
|
|
Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
|
|
Quantification and Epistemic Modality.Dilip Ninan - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):433-485.details
|
|
Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.details
|
|