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Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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What is a phenomenal concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.details
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Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.details
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Qualia and analytical conditionals.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.details
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Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt072.details
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Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Identity and necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and individuation. New York,: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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Perceptual Processing Affects Conceptual Processing.Saskia Van Dantzig, Diane Pecher, René Zeelenberg & Lawrence W. Barsalou - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (3):579-590.details
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Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition.Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors & Harold Bekkering - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.details
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Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
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The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Mental imagery and synaesthesia: Is synaesthesia from internally-generated stimuli possible?Mary Jane Spiller & Ashok S. Jansari - 2008 - Cognition 109 (1):143-151.details
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Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.details
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Embodied Cognition: Lessons from Linguistic Determinism.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):121-140.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Andrew Woodfield - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):210-214.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
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Précis of Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):143-143.details
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Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.details
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Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.details
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Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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Concept empiricism: A methodological critique.Edouard Machery - 2006 - Cognition 104 (1):19-46.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
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Symbol Interdependency in Symbolic and Embodied Cognition.Max M. Louwerse - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):273-302.details
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