- Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Subjective consciousness and self-representation.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):215-236.details
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The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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A Phenomenal Case for Sport.Jens E. Birch - 2009 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):30-48.details
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For-Me-Ness, For-Us-Ness, and the We-Relationship.Felipe León - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):547-558.details
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How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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Physicalism and sparse ontology.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.details
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Grounding-mechanical explanation.Kelly Trogdon - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1289-1309.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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My Body: Is It Me?Thomas W. Smythe - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):179.details
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Phenomenal Overflow, Bodily Affect, and some Varieties of Access.Sean M. Smith - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):787-808.details
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Mario Bunge’s Materialist Theory of Mind and Contemporary Cognitive Science.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (10):1475-1484.details
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Mario Bunge: Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (8):1213-1221.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.details
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On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Phenomenal Externalism's Explanatory Power.Peter W. Ross - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):613-630.details
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Critical notices.Tom Rockmore - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):93 – 107.details
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Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.details
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Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.details
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Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.details
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Randomness, Contingency, and Faith: Is there a Science of Subjectivity?Steven L. Peck - 2003 - Zygon 38 (1):5-23.details
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The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.details
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The Functional Mapping Hypothesis.Michael Pauen - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):107-118.details
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Subjectivity and Mineness.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):325-341.details
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Notes and Discussions.Christian Nimtz & Michael Schütte - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):413-422.details
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Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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