- Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.Jakub Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:149261.details
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Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
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On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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The Functional Mapping Hypothesis.Michael Pauen - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):107-118.details
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(1 other version)Notes and Discussions: On Physicalism, Physical Properties, and Panpsychism.Michael Schütte Christian Nimtz - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):413-422.details
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Quotational higher-order thought theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.details
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Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
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The idols of inner-sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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(1 other version)Notes and Discussions.Christian Nimtz & Michael Schütte - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):413-422.details
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The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.details
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Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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How to be a type-C physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.details
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Introspective humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.details
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Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum.Sophie Gibb - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.details
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On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.details
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On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind.Jonathan E. Dorsey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225.details
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Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
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The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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Type-q materialism.Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - In Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.details
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Monty hall, doomsday and confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23–31.details
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The phenomenologically manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.details
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(1 other version)The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.Murat Aydede & Donald D. Price - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.details
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How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.details
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The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical.J. L. Dowell, & Janice Dowell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.details
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Consciousness-dependence, and the conscious/unconscious contrast. [REVIEW]Neil Manson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):115-129.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.details
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Explanation and two conceptions of the physical.Jakob Hohwy - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89.details
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Why I am not a dualist.Karen Bennett - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:208-231.details
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The Irreducibility of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-18.details
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The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):99-122.details
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