- (1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.details
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Meaning and Mental Representation.Peter Carruthers - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):527-530.details
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Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert Cummins - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):637-642.details
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(1 other version)Reality and Representation.David Papineau - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):629-632.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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(3 other versions)Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes.Robert Schwartz & David Marr - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):411.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.Terry Horgan & George Graham - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 321-344.details
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Computational models: a modest role for content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.details
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Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.details
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(1 other version)Marr on computational-level theories.Oron Shagrir - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.details
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A theory of content II: The theory.Jerrold A. Fodor - 1990 - In Jerry A. Fodor (ed.), A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.details
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Language and nature.Noam Chomsky - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):1-61.details
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(1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.details
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Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.details
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Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person.John R. Searle - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (March):123-146.details
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Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert Cummins - 1989 - MIT Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.details
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Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.details
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A theory of content II.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A theory of content I. MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Stanford, CA: MIT Press.details
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In defence of narrow mindedness.Frances Egan - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.details
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Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
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Seeing What is not There.Gabriel Segal - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (2):189.details
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Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior.John Collins - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625-658.details
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(1 other version)Individualism and perceptual content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.details
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Computation and content.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.details
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Representation Reconsidered.William M. Ramsey - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Reply to Egan.Noam Chomsky - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 268--274.details
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Content, computation and externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.details
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(2 other versions)Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person.John R. Searle - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):123-146.details
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Reality and representation.David Papineau - 1987 - New York: Blackwell.details
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Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657.details
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Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.details
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Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr’s Theory of Vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.details
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Reply to Horwich.Noam Chomsky - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(2 other versions)Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person.John R. Searle - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):123-146.details
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(1 other version)Individualism and Perceptual Content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):461-484.details
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Reality and Representation.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1987 - Noûs 26 (3):379-389.details
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