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The Theory of Practice: An Ethical Enquiry.Shadworth Hollway Hodgson - 2013 - Hardpress Publishing.details
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What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.details
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Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):21-40.details
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Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind–body problem and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.details
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The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 271-284.details
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Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.details
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Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth.Robert Kane - 2001 - In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.details
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Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):231-248.details
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Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.details
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Précis of the illusion of conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.details
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Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.details
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Beyond Button Presses.Robyn Repko Waller - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):441-462.details
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Oblique causation and reasons for action.Frederick Stoutland - 1980 - Synthese 43 (3):351 - 367.details
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Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation.Ernest Sosa - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):271-81.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Free-will, praise and blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.details
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Conscious Control over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.details
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Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):119-137.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific Challenges to Free Will.Eddy Nahmias - 2010 - In C. Sandis & T. O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-356.details
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Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?Carlos J. Moya - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.details
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The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Making decisions.Hugh J. McCann - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):246-263.details
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The conceivability of mechanism.Norman Malcolm - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (January):45-72.details
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Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.details
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The Importance of Awareness.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.details
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Expressing who we are: Moral responsibility and awareness of our reasons for action.Neil Levy - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):243-261.details
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When is an alternative possibility robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.details
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.details
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Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.details
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The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities.Robert Kane - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):57-80.details
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The argument for anomalous monism.Ted Honderich - 1982 - Analysis 42 (January):59-64.details
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A noncausal theory of agency.Stewart Goetz - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):303-316.details
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Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.details
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Free will, chance, and mystery.Laura Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.details
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