- Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
|
|
Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
|
|
On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):326-330.details
|
|
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
|
|
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
|
|
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
|
|
The case against reality: why evolution hid the truth from our eyes.Donald David Hoffman - 2019 - New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Independent Publishers since 1923.details
|
|
Being Rational and being Right.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
|
|
Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.Stephen P. Stich - 1990 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rationality, Normativity, and-1 Commitment.Jacob Ross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:138.details
|
|
Ignorance and Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time.John Broome - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Moral Theory: An Introduction.Mark Timmons - 2001 - Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.details
|
|
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.details
|
|
Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
|
|
Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts.John Hawthorne & Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 9--30.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
|
|
Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Moral obligation. Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
In defense of objectivism about moral obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.details
|
|
Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
|
|
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
|
|
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
|
|
Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
|
|
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
4. Probability and Prodigality.Daniel Greco - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:82.details
|
|
Utilitarianism and Co-operation.Donald H. Regan - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (4):689-689.details
|
|
Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
|
|
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
|
|
Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment.Jacob Ross - unknowndetails
|
|
Williamson's casual approach to probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|