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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition (trans. Hacker and Schulte).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 2009 - Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by E. M. G., G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. Translator: Anscombe von Wright & R. Rhees.details
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Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.details
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The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
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Donald Davidson's theory of mind is non-normative.Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Philosophers' Imprint 3:1-14.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
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Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts.John Hawthorne & Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 9--30.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Précis of Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423-428.details
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I—Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.details
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Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence.Peter Railton - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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Blameworthiness without wrongdoing.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Act and Agent Evaluations.Michael Stocker - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):42 - 61.details
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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.details
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Normative Guidance.Peter Railton - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-34.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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How reasons for action differ from reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of reason: new essays in the philosophy of normativity. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Knowledge, context, and the agent's point of view.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91--114.details
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Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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