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(1 other version)VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:141-162.details
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The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.details
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(1 other version)Truth, value and epistemic expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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(1 other version)Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.details
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(1 other version)Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.details
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Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch. [REVIEW]Michael Lynch - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):191-193.details
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Truth as the Good in the Way of Belief.Michael P. Lynch - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):377-388.details
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ReWrighting Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):63–84.details
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Minimalism and the value of truth.By Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.details
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Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.details
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Is truth a normative concept?Paul Horwich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1127-1138.details
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(1 other version)Defining ‘Intrinsic’.David Lewis & Rae Langton - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 17-30.details
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(1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.details
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Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 175-198.details
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(1 other version)Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):31-74.details
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Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
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Forms of correspondence: the intricate route from thought to reality.Gila Sher - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.details
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Functional pluralism.Gila Sher - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):311-330.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence.Will Gamester - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1243-1265.details
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Companion to Intrinsic Properties.Robert M. Francescotti (ed.) - 2014 - Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.details
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The value of minimalist truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.details
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Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.details
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Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.details
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Deflating truth about taste.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):389-402.details
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Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.details
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Pragmatism and the Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-261.details
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Pluralist theories of truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.details
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On Alethic Disjunctivism.Douglas Edwards - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.details
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(1 other version)VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-162.details
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(1 other version)Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.details
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(1 other version)Truth.Michael Dummett - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):148-148.details
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True belief is not instrumentally valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.details
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(1 other version)Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Platitudes and metaphysics.Daniel Nolan - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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(1 other version)Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne.details
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(1 other version)Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.details
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Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):109-111.details
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