- Truth in ethics.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):209-226.details
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Mainstream semantics + deflationary truth.Alexis Burgess - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The folly of trying to define truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.details
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The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.details
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Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and minimalism.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):157-181.details
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Summary.[author unknown] - 2000 - Revue Théologique de Louvain 31 (2):319-320.details
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Summary.[author unknown] - 2000 - Revue Théologique de Louvain 31 (4):672-672.details
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Précis of Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):397-401.details
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Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.details
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There is no norm of truth: a minimalist reply to Wright.J. Dodd - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):291-299.details
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Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.details
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Insensitive Semantics.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):443-450.details
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What is minimalism about truth?J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):259-267.details
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Meaning and Deflationary Truth.Michael Williams - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):545.details
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Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.details
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Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
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Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.details
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Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):31-74.details
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Response to Commentators.Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):911-941.details
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Response to Jackson.Crispin Wright - 1994 - Philosophical Books 35 (3):169-175.details
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Precis of Truth and ObjectivityTruth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):863.details
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On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (1):45--98.details
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Unreflective Realism. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):905-909.details
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Conceptual truth.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):1–41.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Minimalism deflated: independence without substance.Bernhard Weiss - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):521-529.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.details
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Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth predicates.Christine Tappolet - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):209–210.details
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Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.details
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The Quest for Reality.Barry Stroud - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):395-398.details
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The emotive meaning of ethical terms.Charles Leslie Stevenson - 1937 - Mind 46 (181):14-31.details
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Understanding deflationism.Scott Soames - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):369–383.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Minimalism, truth-aptitude and belief.Michael Smith - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):21-26.details
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In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.details
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Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]Simon Blackburn & Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699 - 706.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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Philosophy of humor.Joshua Shaw - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):112-126.details
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Institutionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command.Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):74.details
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Laughter.Roger Scruton & Peter Jones - 1982 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1):197 - 228.details
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Laughter.Roger Scruton & Peter Jones - 1982 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1):197-228.details
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