Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.

Beginning with a discussion of the Informal Logic Movement and the renewed interest in critical thinking in education, this book critically assesses the work of Robert Ennis, Richard Paul and John McPeck.

I have been supposing that for the theory of reasoning, explicit belief is an all-or-nothing matter, I have assumed that, as far as principles of reasoning are concerned, one either believes something explicitly or one does not; in other words an appropriate "representation" is either in one's "memory" or not. The principles of reasoning are principles for modifying such all-or-nothing representations. This is not to deny that in some ways belief is a matter of degree. For one thing implicit belief (...) is certainly a matter of degree, since it is a matter of how easily and automatically one can infer something from what one believes explicitly. Furthermore, explicit belief is a matter of degree in the sense that one believes some things more strongly than others. Sometimes one is only somewhat inclined to believe something, sometimes one is not sure what to believe, sometimes one is inclined to disbelieve something, sometimes one is quite confident something is not so, and so forth. (shrink)

This title, first published in 1973, brings together a variety of papers by Israel Scheffler, one of America’s leading educational philosophers. The essays each stress the importance of critical thought and independent judgement to the organization of educational activities. In the first section, Scheffler adopts a metaphilosophical approach, emphasizing the role of philosophy in educational thought. A number of key concepts are dealt with next, including the study of education and its relation to theoretical disciplines, philosophical interpretations of teaching, and (...) the education of teachers. The final section is critical, and deals with the writings of several key thinkers in the field. A broad and authoritative study, this reissue will provide any Philosophy student with an essential background to the criticism and theories surrounding the philosophy of education. (shrink)

The traditional views of science as the possessor of a special method, and as the epitome or apex of rationality, have come under severe challenges for a variety of historical, psychological, sociological, political, and philosophical reasons. As a result, many philosophers are either denying science its claim to rationality, or else casting about for a new account of its rationality. In this paper a defense of the traditional view is offered. It is argued that contemporary philosophical discussion regarding the rationality (...) of science is plagued by a failure to distinguish among three different questions, all taken to be "the" question of the rationality of science. Once these questions are delineated, it becomes possible to answer one of them in such a way that the traditional link between science's rationality and its method is reestablished--although the scientific method is itself given a non-traditional rendering. In short, it is argued that there is a feature of science which is appropriately characterized as its method; that this method does in fact secure science's rationality; and that science is therefore correctly construed as preeminently rational. It is suggested in addition that the philosophy of science is itself best seen as a primarily epistemological activity, and consequently that a correction from the excessively historicist conception of recent philosophy of science is in order. (shrink)

This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those (...) that we ourselves use. I then propose some conditions that are considerably weaker, and argue that they fulfill the descriptive and explanatory requirements of intentional ascription. (shrink)

Philosophers of many different traditions—Platonist, positivist, and critical realist—have taken a hand at criticizing and evaluating the history of science, but this work represents the first attempt by an idealist philosopher to examine this emergent field of study and suggest historicism as an appropriate philosophy to guide its future efforts. After dedicating his work jointly to Croce, Feyerabend, Popper, and Scriven, whom he admits constitute a heterogeneous group from which to draw inspiration, Finocchiaro devotes most of his nineteen chapters to (...) poking holes into the explanations offered by noted historians of science for various discoveries and happenings within science over the past three centuries. (shrink)