"One of the most impressive pieces of scholarship I have ever encountered."-W. E. Kennick, Amherst College There is nothing in the literature on the Philosophical Investigations comparable to this learned and exhaustive commentary. Offering both information and interpretation, it is a remarkable book that fills a recognized need for a close study of one of the world's major works of philosophy. After a general introduction, Father Hallett divides the text of the Investigations into forty-one units, and then provides an introduction (...) to each section, along with detailed comments on individual paragraphs, statements, and expressions. His use of paragraph numbers in the general introduction and in the sectional introductions permits ready reference downward, for detailed development or illustration of a general observation, or upward, from a particular passage to its wider context. To clarify the philosophical point of Wittgenstein's remarks, Father Hallett makes frequent references to other parts of the Investigations; to Wittgenstein's other writings, both published and unpublished; and to the works which Wittgenstein knew and often had in mind, such as those of Frege, Russell, Moore, James, Augustine, Plato, Schlick, and Kohler. Father Hallett also cites and quotes secondary sources, and he includes an appendix relating Wittgenstein to more than 150 authors, particularly those of his own generation or earlier whom he read, or knew personally, and who are mentioned in this commentary. Written in straightforward and lucid prose, this outstanding book reveals continuities in Wittgenstein's thought over long periods of time. It is an indispensable guide for those preparing courses on the Investigations and a useful tool for students taking those courses. (shrink)

Long awaited by the scholarly community, Wittgenstein's so-called Big Typescript (von Wright Catalog # TS 213) is presented here in an en face English–German scholar’s edition. Presents scholar’s edition of important material from 1933, Wittgenstein’s first efforts to set out his new thoughts after the publication of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Includes indications to help the reader identify Wittgenstein’s numerous corrections, additions, deletions, alternative words and phrasings, suggestions for moves within the text, and marginal comments.

The now-classic Metaphors We Live By changed our understanding of metaphor and its role in language and the mind. Metaphor, the authors explain, is a fundamental mechanism of mind, one that allows us to use what we know about our physical and social experience to provide understanding of countless other subjects. Because such metaphors structure our most basic understandings of our experience, they are "metaphors we live by"--metaphors that can shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing them. In (...) this updated edition of Lakoff and Johnson's influential book, the authors supply an afterword surveying how their theory of metaphor has developed within the cognitive sciences to become central to the contemporary understanding of how we think and how we express our thoughts in language. (shrink)

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical-therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seriousness’ (in particular his insistence that philosophy demands that one ‘Go the bloody (...) hard way’). Drawing on a number of correlations between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, in this paper I defend a strong ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein, and show how this can be maintained without ‘trivialising’ philosophy. (shrink)

This text offers major re-evaluation of Wittgenstein's thinking. It is a collection of essays that presents a significantly different portrait of Wittgenstein. The essays clarify Wittgenstein's modes of philosophical criticism and shed light on the relation between his thought and different philosophical traditions and areas of human concern. With essays by Stanley Cavell, James Conant, Cora Diamond, Peter Winch and Hilary Putnam, we see the emergence of a new way of understanding Wittgenstein's thought. This is a controversial collection, with essays (...) by highly regarded Wittgenstein scholars that may change the way we look at Wittgenstein's body of work. (shrink)

The paper clarifies therapeutic ideas about philosophical method which Wittgenstein puts forward in his "Big Typescript". It does so by analysing how Wittgenstein treats the question 'What is meaning?', in that part of the same work from which the opening sections of his "Philosophical Investigations" derive. On this basis, the paper explains why Wittgenstein set himself a therapeutic goal, why this is reasonable, and how he sought to attain that goal without 'pronouncing new truths about the subject of the investigation', (...) viz. meaning. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was one of the most powerful influences on contemporary philosophy, yet he shunned publicity and was essentially a private man. This remarkable, vivid, personal memoir is written by one of his friends, the eminent philosopher Norman Malcolm. Reissued in paperback, this edition includes the complete text of fifty-seven letters which Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm over a period of eleven years. Also included is a concise biographical sketch by another of Wittgenstein's philosopher friends, Georg Henrik von Wright. 'A reader does (...) not need to care about philosophy to be excited by Mr Malcolm's book; it is about Wittgenstein as a man, and its interest is human interest'. (shrink)

The metaphysician wants to go beneath surface phenomena and to get at the essence of things, But instead arrives at a "picture" suggested by everyday language. Eliminating pictures requires bringing out the facts of everyday use and is not positivism or psychoanalysis. Still pictures arrange facts and lead to theories though not giving underlying realities. Rather essence is in usage: "essence is expressed by grammar". Thus philosophical therapy leads to closer accord with the world.

"Its publication should be a major event for cognitive linguistics and should pose a major challenge for cognitive science. In addition, it should have repercussions in a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology and psychology to epistemology and the philosophy of science.... Lakoff asks: What do categories of language and thought reveal about the human mind? Offering both general theory and minute details, Lakoff shows that categories reveal a great deal."—David E. Leary, American Scientist.

The paper develops a novel account of the nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which motivates an unfamiliar form of philosophical criticism that was pioneered by the later Wittgenstein. To develop the account, the paper analyses two thematically linked sets of problems, namely problems about linguistic understanding: a set of problems Wittgenstein discusses in a core part of his Philosophical Investigations, and the ‘problem of linguistic creativity’ that is central to current philosophy of language. The paper argues that these (...) problems are generated by tacit and unwarranted presuppositions at odds with warranted beliefs the philosophers raising the problems reflectively hold at the same time. For a rigorous conceptualisation of this phenomenon, the paper develops the notion of a ‘philosophical picture’ first proposed by Wittgenstein, and specifies the particular class of philosophical problems that may be raised due to adherence to such pictures. The results motivate a new form of philosophical criticism: the systematic exposure of relevant philosophical pictures, and efforts to overcome their tacit influence on philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Argues that Wittgenstein's early ethical notion of agreement with the world pivoted to become his later therapeutic notion of agreement with living forms, which satisfies the conditions necessary for a full therapeutic philosophy.

<Hylas> It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, ...

The later Wittgenstein is notoriously hard to understand. His novel philosophical approach is the key to understanding his perplexing work. This volume assembles leading Wittgenstein scholars to come to grips with its least well understood aspect: the unfamiliar aims and method that shape Wittgenstein's approach. Wittgenstein at Work investigates Wittgenstein's aims, rationale and method in two steps. The first seven chapters analyse how he proceeds in core parts of the Philosophical Investigations: the discussion of the Augustinian picture of language, ostensive (...) definition, philosophical method, understanding, rule-following, and private language. The final five chapters examine his most striking methodological remarks: his repudiation of theory and non-trivial theses, and some core notions of his methodology: his notions of clarification, synoptic representation, nonsense, and philosophical pictures. The volume considerably advances discussion of the therapeutic aspects of his approach that are currently a focus of debate. This volume is an indispensable methodological companion to the Philosophical Investigations, useful to both specialists and students alike. Fischer, Erich Ammereller, Severin Schroder, Anthony Kenny, Oswald Hanfling, Cora Diamond, Hans-Johann Glock, Stuart Shanker. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Scmantic Theory and Tacit Knowlcdgc’, Gareth Evans uscs a familiar kind of cxamplc in ordcr to render vivid his account of tacit knowledge. We arc to consider a finite language, with just one hundrcd scntcnccs. Each scntcncc is made up of a subjcct (a name) and a prcdicatc. The names are ‘a’, ‘b’, . . ., T. The prcdicatcs arc ‘F’, ‘G’, . . ., ‘O’. Thc scntcnccs have meanings which dcpcnd in a systematic way upon their (...) construction. Thus, all scntcnccs containing ‘a’ mean something about john; all scntcnccs containing ‘b’ mean something about Harry; all scntcnccs containing ‘F’ mean something about being bald; all scntcnccs containing ‘G’ mean something about being happy; and so 011. For this vcry simple language L, wc arc to consider various semantic theories. We could consider thcorics whosc dclivcranccs about wholc scntcnccs are of.. (shrink)

The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight (...) outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Voluntary Action Reasons and Causes References.

_Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy_ provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...) the mind and perception, and on thinkers including Locke, Berkeley and Ayer, the book demonstrates how such autonomous habits of thought systematically generate unsound intuitions and philosophical delusions, whose clash with reality, or among each other, gives rise to ill-motivated but maddening problems. The book re-examines models of therapeutic philosophy, due to Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, and develops an approach that may let us overcome philosophical delusions and the problems they engender. In this way, the book explains where and why therapy in called for in philosophy, and develops techniques to carry it out. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.